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 I map a rhetorical history of controversy over birthright citizenship in order to study the 
conditions of legal judgement and argument perpetuating racially-marked alien citizenship after 
the ratification of the 14th amendment. I examine four interconnected moments of struggle over 
the meaning of the 14th amendment: (1) the Congressional debate over how to write the 
citizenship clause in 1866 to ensure the exclusion of indigenous peoples; (2) the judicial debate 
between political and territorial jurisdiction in Elk v. Wilkins (1884) and US v. Wong Kim Ark 
(1898); (3) the political and legal debates over whether indigenous peoples are US citizens by 
birthright in the early 20th century; (4) and the political and legal debates over whether Congress 
has the power to (non)consensually denationalize US citizens, such as in Hamdi v Rumsfeld 
(2004). The case studies demonstrate that the topos of jurisdiction fosters a flexible mode of 
exclusion within birthright citizenship. In turn, state actors have interpreted jurisdiction in ways 
that square political and racial interests with the inclusive liberal language of the law. However, 
because jurisdiction is both tropological and physical, its rhetorical and material afterlives have 
been taken up by the communities marginalized by citizenship law’s exclusions in order to move 
citizenship law towards para-doxa, or towards counter-hegemonic legal interpretations.  
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 Connecting the topos of jurisdiction to the core tenets of liberalism—impersonality and 
consent—the case studies show how the afterlives of “subject to jurisdiction” functioned as sites 
of managing both the racial identity of citizenship and the writing of the state’s legitimacy to 
define citizenship in the first place. To conclude, I argue that we have never been liberal; 
citizenship law is not the product of already-existing liberal commitments. Rather, it is a product 
of liberalism’s attempts to manage anxieties rooted in impersonality and consent, especially 
when embodied by racially marginalized peoples. Changing the scholarly perspective on liberal 
citizenship status clarifies how liberalism’s residual rhetorics have empirically been taken up, 
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CHAPTER 1:  ALIEN AND CITIZEN 
 
“We’re the only country in the world where a person comes in and has a baby, and the baby is 
essentially a citizen of the United States…with all of those benefits…It’s ridiculous. It’s 
ridiculous. And it has to end.”—President Donald Trump speaking to Axios in October, 2018.1  
 
“But there are many lawyers—many lawyers are saying that's not the way it is in terms of 
[birthright citizenship]. What happens is they are in Mexico, they are going to have a baby, they 
move over here and a couple of days they have the baby. No, but Bill, they are saying [Wong 
Kim Ark] is not going to hold up in court. Now it's going to have to be tested but they say it's not 
going to hold up in court…Bill, we have a country. You need borders and you need laws. We 
have no law.”—Candidate Donald Trump speaking to Bill O’Reilly in August, 2015.2 
 
“In other words, the fourteenth amendment does not exclude from citizenship by birth children 
born in the United States of parents permanently located therein, and who might themselves 
become citizens; nor, on the other hand, does it arbitrarily make citizens of children born in the 
United States of parents who, according to the will of their native government and of this 
government, are and must remain aliens.”—Justice Fuller dissenting in US v. Wong Kim Ark 
(1898).3 
“[The 14th amendment] will allow for the incorporation of a certain people who invade her 
borders; who owe to her no allegiance; who pretend to owe none; who recognize no authority in 
her government; who have a distinct, independent government of their own—an imperium in 
imperio; who pay no taxes; who never perform military service; who do nothing, in fact, which 
becomes a citizen, and perform none of the duties which devolve upon him, but, on the other 
hand, have no homes, pretend to own no land, live nowhere, settle as trespassers wherever they 
go…I mean the Gypsies…If the mere fact of being born in the country confers that right, then 
                                                 
1 Johnathan Swan and Stef W. Knight, “Exclusive: Trump Targeting Birthright Citizenship with an Executive 
Order.” Axios, October 30, 2018. https://www.axios.com/trump-birthright-citizenship-executive-order-0cf4285a-
16c6-48f2-a933-bd71fd72ea82.html  
 
2 “Trump v. Bill O’Reilly on Ending Birthright Citizenship: “We’re Losing Our County.” Real Clear Politics, 








they will have it; and I think it will be mischievous.4” –Senator Cowan, congressional debates 





 Beginning in April 2018, multiple news sources reported that a “migrant caravan” of 
about 1,100 people was making its way through Central America towards the United States. By 
October reporters described the caravan as “swell[ing] to about 5,000 overnight” as it entered 
Mexico, figuring it as a “hoard” teeming with “lice” and “chicken pox” and “human 
traffickers.”5 Just as when the specter of migrant caravans arose in the 19th century, conservative 
pundits began to question the declaration of birthright citizenship in the 14th amendment of the 
Constitution. In contrast to jus sanguinis, or citizenship through blood/lineage, birthright 
citizenship confers citizenship through jus soli, or birth on national soil. Though the United 
States retains both norms of citizenship, each kind answers the question of ‘who truly belongs’ 
by citing a different metaphoric source of authority—blood or soil—that is imagined to convert 
people into fellow citizens.6 As senator Cowan expresses above, opponents of birthright 
citizenship claim that the “mere fact of being born in the country” cannot distinguish between 
alien and citizen in a way that excludes “gypsies” and others who do not fit the dominant norms 
                                                 
4 Cong. Globe, 2829. May 30, 1886.   
 
5 Mark Stevenson, “Migrant Caravan Swells to 5,000, Resumes Advance Toward US,” Newsmax, October 21, 2018, 
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/migrant-caravan-approaches-us-border/2018/10/21/id/887270/. 
 
6 Birthright citizenship is more common in the Americas. See: Polly J. Price, “Jus Soli and Statelessness: A 
Comparative Perspective from the Americas,” in Citizenship in Question: Evidentiary Birthright and Statelessness, 
ed. Benjamin N. Lawrance and Jacqueline Stevens (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), 27–42; Most 
countries that inherited English common law also inherited jus soli citizenship. However, the United States is unique 
in that it still has birthright citizenship as its primary means of conferring membership. For instance, the United 
Kingdom repealed jus soli in 1982 and Ireland repealed it in 2004. See:  Maarten P. Vink and Gerard-Rene De 
Groot, “Birthright Citizenship: Trends and Regulations in Europe,” EUDO Citizenship Observatory (Edinburgh 





of citizenship (i.e., white, property-owning, settled, etc.). In other words, if citizenship is the 
formal mechanism by which the alien becomes assimilated and familiar, then Cowan and other 
opponents of birthright citizenship argue that birth-on-soil is too random and too arbitrary to 
keep citizenship from becoming “mischievous.”7 Instead, opponents of birthright citizenship, 
such as Justice Fuller cited above, argue that the “will” of the government must judge who is a 
citizen upon birth on national soil and who must remain an alien. Citing this line of argument, in 
October 2018 President Trump vowed to protect the southern border from the most recent 
caravan, threatening to withhold birthright citizenship from the children of migrants through 
executive order. Like Cowan’s claim that “gypsies” “invade her borders” to have citizen-
children, Trump’s threats were supplemented by stories of women, such as Maryury Elizabeth 
Serrano Hernandez, who had allegedly “scaled the border wall” to give birth in the United 
States.8  
 Though stories of invading caravans and their future citizen children are not new; they 
have gotten more frequent, figuring a new ‘alien citizen’ that substitutes for the cause of 
whatever seems especially threatening to citizenship. Fifty years after the ratification of the 14th 
amendment, the “Chinese” and the “Indian” would firmly supplant the “gypsy’s” reign as the 
existential threat to US citizenship (chapters three and four).9 A hundred years after the 
                                                 
7 This definition of citizenship stems from Chantal Mouffe's description of citizenship as a site for distinguishing 
between friend and enemy. See: The Challenge of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 1999); For an analysis of 
citizenship as a way of distinguishing between alien and familiar in the United States and other western countries 
see: Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2008). 
 
8 Barnini Chakraborty, “Honduran Woman, 19, in Migrant Caravan Scales Border Wall to Give Birth in US after 
2,000-Mile Trip,” Fox News, December 6, 2018, https://www.foxnews.com/us/honduran-woman-19-in-migrant-
caravan-scales-border-wall-to-give-birth-in-us-after-2000-mile-trip. 
 
9 “Gypsy” as fictional entity is not meant to say that gypsy, Romany, and traveler identities do not exist or are not 
real. Instead, the “gypsy” from the kind of political discourse cited above ceased to be the dominant threat to 
citizenship. See Belton, Questioning Gypsy Identity, for a historical and ethnographic analysis of the many gypsy 
identities in the US and Europe.  
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ratification of the amendment, these alien citizen identities were substituted by the “communist,” 
and then by the “anchor baby,” a pejorative term describing the US-born child of undocumented 
(mainly Mexican and Central American) migrants. In concert with the growth of the “anchor 
baby” narrative, since 1993, every congressional session has proposed the reinterpretation of jus 
soli citizenship in order to exclude the native-born children of undocumented and temporary 
migrants. 10 During the War on Terror, the “gypsy” became the “citizen terrorist,” a term coined 
by political scientist Peter Schuck to describe people like Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, US 
citizens by birthright who were classified as enemy combatants and detained incommunicado 
(Chapter 5).11 Thus, the alien citizen is similar to the “brown threat” described by Kumi Silva. It 
is not just a representation of otherness; it is a “form of othering that can be transferred from 
body to body based on specific (but always shifting) cultural and political criteria at any given 
time.”12 Even as it moves from one body to another, the figuration of alien citizenship remains a 
permanent fixture within birthright citizenship’s legal topoi, or its forms of argument and its 
reservoir of commonplace narratives. 
 The scrutiny directed towards birthright citizenship in the above arguments encapsulates 
a pervasive ambivalence towards US citizenship law. The following chapters investigate the 
rhetorical forms driving this repetitive scrutiny, ultimately arguing that it indexes a fundamental 
                                                 
 
10
 For 1993 to 2009 see: Rogers Smith, “Birthright Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and 2008.” 
Journal of Constitutional Law 11, (2009): 1329–1335. For a more current overview of the debate see  
Margaret D. Stock, “American Birthright Citizenship Rules and the Exclusion of ‘Outsiders’ from the Political 
Community,” in Citizenship in Question: Evidentiary Birthright and Statelessness, eds. Benjamin N. Lawrance and 
Jacqueline Stevens (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), 179–99. 
 
11 Peter H. Schuck, “Citizen Terrorist,” Hoover Institution, December 1, 2010, 
https://www.hoover.org/research/citizen-terrorist. 
 
12 Kumarini Silva, Brown Threat: Identification in the Security State (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2016), 13. 
14 
 
problem with defining and describing the source of sovereign power—the ‘blood,’ ‘soil,’ or 
‘will’ figured as defining the citizen—in liberal legal rhetoric. Chapter two demonstrates that the 
ratification of the 14th amendment exacerbates this struggle, wherein “all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” are declared to be US 
citizens.13 By basing citizenship in jurisdiction, the amendment liberalized what had been an 
unwritten, status-based, exclusionary citizenship law, rendering it impersonal and consensual.14 
Put another way, the 14th amendment formalized the kind of non-status-based citizenship that 
Alexander de Tocqueville famously praised as distinctly American.  
 As the following chapters explain, the formal redefinition of citizenship via jurisdiction 
had immense impact on how the relationship between citizen, state, and sovereign power could 
be legally articulated. This is because jurisdiction is rhetorical and physical—it is both the 
discursive basis for declaring and enforcing law and the physical space in which the law takes 
place. Jurisdiction actually does allow for the “incorporation of a people who invade her 
borders” without guaranteeing that they pledge “allegiance” to the nation. Migrant caravans can 
and do cross jurisdictions.15 Moreover, the United States’ ongoing colonization of indigenous 
lands makes it so that jurisdictions can and do turn the people inhabiting those lands into the 
                                                 
13 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (1868). Section one of the 14th amendment states: “All persons born or naturalized in 
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein 
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
 
14 The role of jurisdiction will be discussed in further detail in chapter two. The notion that the 14th amendment 
formalized an “ill-defined” citizenship and rendered it radically inclusive is from Garrett Epps, Democracy Reborn: 
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Fight for Equal Rights in Post-Civil War America (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 
2007); C.f. Carrie Hyde, Civic Longing: The Speculative Origins of U.S. Citizenship (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2018). 
 
15 For example, another “caravan” is moving through Mexico at the time of writing. See: Associated Press, “Mexico 




“caravans,” who are then figured as threats to citizenship. In the context of migrant mobility and 
settler colonization, citizenship-via-jurisdiction displaces the state’s ability to consistently figure 
an internal ‘outside’ to citizenship, or what Giorgio Agamben would call a homo sacer upon 
which to stake its claim to sovereignty.16 In other words, jurisdiction’s social (after)lives allow 
its rhetorical and concrete forms to be taken up in public culture and liberated from state actors’ 
grasps.17 For this reason, the 14th amendment is the discursive site of immense anxiety over the 
racialization of the nation. It has been attacked and reinterpreted by jurists and politicians 
ranging from Cowan to Trump, who argue that a citizenship defined by birth-in-jurisdiction risks 
being too inclusive. As a result, throughout US history, people who are citizens by birth but have 
been deemed “alien” in legal and public culture have been deported, denied passports, denied 
voting rights, detained indefinitely, and expatriated.18 They have also lived an existence of 
perpetual foreignness, of constantly having to prove that not only were they born here but that 
that is good enough to be seen as a citizen. 
 In what follows, I unpack how this project investigates the above-described paradox, 
whereby the liberalization of citizenship law coincides with a turn to illiberal racialization after 
Reconstruction. I argue that a psychoanalytic understanding of rhetoric clarifies the relationship 
between liberalism and racialization in citizenship law. Specifically, instead of seeing citizenship 
                                                 
16 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, (Palo Alto, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1998). 
 
17 Alexander G. Weheliye, Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the 
Human (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 53. The social (after)life of jurisdiction will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 2.  
 
18 For examples and specific case studies see: Mae M. Ngai, “Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen,” 
Fordham Law Review 75 (2007): 2521–30; Jacqueline Stevens, “U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and 
Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens,” Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law 18 (2011): 606–720; Jacqueline 
Stevens, “The Alien Who Is a Citizen,” in Citizenship in Question: Evidentiary Birthright and Statelessness, ed. 




law as the product of already-existing liberal commitments; psychoanalysis frames it as a 
product of liberalism’s management of the anxieties figured in its representation of impersonality 
and consent. As Eric Watts has argued regarding postracial fantasies, humanistic inquiry into 
tropes and generic forms allows for analysis of “the way these feelings burrow into the social 
body and populate warring, anxious publics.”19 Tracing the tropes marking debates about 
birthright citizenship, this project attends to how the fantasy structure of liberalism needs the 
alien citizen as well as the historical moments where the alien citizen is brought to crisis in 
jurisdiction’s racialized social (after)lives.  
 
Racialization, Psychoanalysis, and Liberal Paradox 
 Most scholars have explained alien citizenship by arguing that, like immigration and 
naturalization law, citizenship law is also a tool of racialization. While critical race scholars, 
such as Ian Haney López, Mae Ngai, and Linda Bosniak, see racialization as stemming from 
explicitly exclusionary policies (e.g., the Chinese Exclusion Acts) as well as from policies that 
criminalize certain behaviors associated with racialized migrants (e.g., SB 1070).20 Others, such 
as Hector Amaya, Karma Chávez, and Amy Brandzel, see citizenship law’s role in racialization 
as an extension of biopolitics, which is a form of power that disciplines and normalizes 
populations into biological-racial categories for the purpose of sustaining life.21 In both 
                                                 
19 Eric King Watts, “Postracial Fantasies, Blackness, and Zombies,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 
14, no. 4 (2017): 13. 
 
20 Ian Haney López, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York: NYU Press, 2006); Ngai, 
“Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen”; Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: The Making of Modern America 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien. 
 
21 Hector Amaya, Citizenship Excess: Latino/as, Media, and the Nation (New York: NYU Press, 2013); Karma R. 
Chavez, Queer Migration Politics: Activist Rhetoric and Coalitional Possibilities (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 2013); Amy L. Brandzel, Against Citizenship: The Violence of the Normative (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 2016). 
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explanations, alien citizens are products of the racializing structure of law (as is the case for 
critical race theory) or the racializing structure of biopower. For critical race theorists, alien 
citizens have been racialized as aliens based on their identification as belonging to the same legal 
class as their migrant parents. For biopolitics, alien citizenship results from citizenship’s 
normalizing logic, or from the way that assuming the status of citizen requires the subject to 
fulfill the “duties” of citizenship described by Cowan above (e.g., paying taxes, performing 
military service, owning a home).  
 Following Michel Foucault’s lineage of biopolitics, scholars claim that as liberalism takes 
hold in the western world, abnormals, monsters, and other abject beings proliferate.22 According 
to Uday Mehta, liberalism’s ideals of freedom, equality, and universality bring about an “anxiety 
of freedom” found even in its originary texts. Per Mehta, “liberalism originates in ambivalence—
in the need to order, if not limit, what it valorizes to be natural and emancipatory.”23 Afflicted by 
its mandate to construct and channel liberty in a nondestructive direction for all of society, 
“liberalism continually risks destroying what it says it wants to create.”24 In other words, with 
the growth and spread of liberal ideologies of freedom, our prisons and asylums expand 
                                                 
 
22 See for example: Uday Mehta, The Anxiety of Freedom: Imagination and Individuality in Locke’s Political 
Thought (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in 
Queer Times (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007); David Theo Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and 
the Politics of Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993); Lisa Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2015); Andrew Dilts, Punishment and Inclusion: Race, Membership, 
and the Limits of American Liberalism (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014); These works are drawing on 
the following presentations of biopolitics in Foucault's oeuvre: Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: 
Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003); Michel Foucault, 
Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France, 1974–1975 (New York: Picador, 2003); Michel Foucault, Discipline 
& Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1995). For an overview of the intensification and 
modification of liberalism in the Reconstruction era see: Nancy Cohen, The Reconstruction of American Liberalism, 
1865-1914 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
 
23 Mehta, The Anxiety of Freedom, 1.. 
 




alongside the names for subjects who do not quite fit what Cowan says “becomes a citizen.” 
David Theo Goldberg calls this process the “liberal paradox,” or liberalism’s simultaneous 
commitment to liberty, equality, and fraternity alongside the “multiplication of racial identities 
and the sets of exclusions they prompt and rationalize, enable, and sustain.”25  
 Putting Foucauldian biopolitics in conversation with psychoanalysis, scholars have 
explained this paradox by arguing that othered identities multiply because the “other” provides a 
psychic barrier against liberalism’s imagination of a sovereign demos, which puts subjects in 
conflict with one another.26 According to Yannis Stavrakakis, scapegoating of certain identities 
is a powerful way of articulating political order and for garnering identification with political 
causes. Demonization stands in for the slipperiness of all political identities and demands in 
language, making liberalism’s broken promises and over all antagonism tolerable.27 Moreover, 
exclusion sustains identification with the core tenets of liberalism, or any political fantasy, 
because they explain what Stavrakakis, following Slavoj Zizek, calls the “theft of national 
enjoyment,” or the feeling that someone else has caused the political agitation that is keeping me 
from getting what I want from politics.28  
                                                 
25 Goldberg, Racist Culture, 6; See also: David Theo Goldberg, The Racial State (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2001), 57–63. 
 
26 There are too many studies of alterity and otherness to name here. However, this project is influenced by how 
otherness is theorized in the following texts: Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-
Coloniality (New York: Routledge, 2000); Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 
2004); William Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Yannis Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political (New York: Routledge, 2002); 
Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology, (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1993). 
 
27 Yannis Stavrakakis, The Lacanian Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory, and Politics (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 197. 
 




 In other words, the “gypsy” and other alien citizens figure prominently in complaints 
about birthright citizenship because they are tropes that, in part, lead to the subject’s investment 
in fantasy. Importantly, in psychoanalytic theory, fantasy is not the same as fiction or farce. The 
world of politics and law are constructed on the symbolic level and supported by fantasmatic 
frames that give us imaginary coherence by “promising it an anchor in the real.”29 The “gypsy,” 
then, plays a role in making the fantasies that animate the subject’s experience of the world feel 
meaningful and true. Fantasies are akin to ideologies or discursive formations in that they solicit 
sense-making. However, fantasy provides a more precise account of the rhetorical work of 
ideology and discourse because it analytically highlights “the ways that language works to 
preserve a semblance of coherence when rifts emerge.”30 Fantasies—and the rhetorical forms 
that sustain them—compensate for the net of discourse characterizing the subject’s experience in 
language.  
 Fantasy’s compensatory function can be explained by considering how the subject’s 
experience in language is structured by the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real. The symbolic 
names the order of signifiers. This is the realm of radical alterity—the Other—which is “beyond 
all understanding,” and yet, we must “insert” all understanding into it through our use of 
language and speech. Thus, the symbolic exercises “an obviously disruptive influence over 
human and interhuman relationships” because signifiers are never quite adequate for speaking or 
for being spoken into language as a subject.31 The imposition of the symbolic structures the 
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imaginary, which describes the realm of intersubjective meaning and fantasy. The subject’s 
experience in the imaginary works towards what Chris Lundberg calls feigning unicity, or 
towards the imagination of “a unified social field” despite the disruptive effects of the 
symbolic.32 Feigning unicity is the rhetorical labor of “connecting signifiers and representations 
with their references and providing the illusion of communion between subjects and their 
others.”33 Importantly, feigning unicity occurs within and because of the inevitable condition of 
failed unicity, which results from the real. The real describes the world outside of the symbolic, 
which is nevertheless mediated by the symbolic and the imaginary orders. The remainder of the 
real structures the subject’s relationship to lack—or desire—which governs the formation of 
fantasy.34 While these registers structure our experience as speaking subjects, there is no 
predictable one-to-one relationship between word, subject, and world. Rather, the point of 
considering these three registers when reading texts is to illuminate their “economic” relationship 
to the world and to the unconscious. An economic relationship implies that the subject 
experiences reality (i.e., the imaginary) through its location in a site of circulation and exchange 
“in relation to the whole field of intertextual discursive effects.”35  
 Thus, political fantasies such as liberalism are sustained by their role in both feigning and 
failing unicity. Although fantasy formations orient the subject towards achieving meaning, they 
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are structured by signifiers, “of signifiers as such, handled by a subject for signifying aims, 
signifying so purely that the meaning very often remains problematic.”36 In other words, the 
narratives explaining our place in politics are rife with fantasies that are brought to crisis by their 
inevitable location in language. As Matheson explains, “The economy of tropes that allows the 
conditions for meaning to emerge (the Symbolic) and the meanings and values invested in these 
tropes, including the subject itself (the Imaginary), do not and cannot perfectly capture all of 
existence or experience.” 37 The subject is constantly confronted with their location within the net 
of discourse that locates them in relation to the real—the excess that refuses signification and 
meaning. In this way, while fantasies protect the subject from the threat of fragmentation, they 
also inevitably and continuously drive the subject towards fragmentation. For this reason, fantasy 
and anxiety are interconnected; anxiety signals the artifice of fantasy and fantasy protects the 
subject from anxiety.38 Thus, fantasy is how we work out our location within language while it is 
also how we experience the imposition of language, or its “disruptive effects.” 
 Nevertheless, the inevitable failure of fantasy is precisely what keeps the subject 
affectively invested in the tropes that sustain it because tropes provide the symbolic conditions 
for enjoying an object. Tropes—mainly metaphor and metonymy—work economically, or as 
sites of repeated and habitual exchange and circulation, to make meaning for the subject in 
language. Metaphor refers to the rhetorical processes whereby certain signifiers and 
representations ‘condense,’ taking on disproportionate weight in a signifying chain through 
repetition and social struggle. Metonymy orders and establishes connections between signifiers 
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in a field of difference, allowing for a proliferation of meaning.39 In explaining the movement 
between metaphor and metonymy, Sara Ahmed uses the term “sticky” to convey how particular 
signs become potent as an effect of “a history of articulation, which allows the sign to 
accumulate value.”40 Metaphors are “sticky signs,” that become affectively saturated with 
accreted value and significance, while metonyms “slide” between signs, continuing the pull of 
desire by facilitating repetitive investment in a chain of objects. 41 While Ahmed stresses the role 
of affect in the accumulation of value and significance, enjoyment provides a more precise 
account of desire and fantasy in signification.42 According to Lundberg, enjoyment takes an 
economic form: it is “a tropologically produced material cause of the signifying body’s affects 
and labor.”43 Tropes allow the subject to be sustained by whatever fantasies animate it. 
Importantly, however, deferral is what ultimately sustains fantasy. According to Lacan, the 
“subject does not simply satisfy a desire, he derives enjoyment from desiring, and this is an 
essential dimension of his enjoyment.”44 Thus, if the “gypsy” stands in for the “theft of 
enjoyment,” or the failure of liberalism to give the subject what it wants from politics, that 
failure is precisely what keeps the subject invested in the fantasy in the first place.45 Zizek makes 
this point in arguing that naming the ‘other’ as the cause of the theft of national enjoyment 
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conceals “the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly stolen from us: the lack 
is originary, enjoyment constitutes itself as stolen.”46 Lacan would add that the inevitable troping 
of the other constitutes enjoyment as stolen, continuing the flow of desire and investment in 
fantasy.  
 That signifying is inherently anxious, resulting from both feigning and failing unicity, 
highlights that tropes such as the “caravan” do not just serve an ideological function. Tropes 
endure throughout time because they facilitate ritualized and repeated enjoyment of fantasy 
objects that are perpetually felt as ‘stolen.’47 For this reason, the alien citizen seems to endlessly 
move from body to body, substituting for whatever political problem threatens to interfere with 
liberal freedom. For instance, the shape-shifting nature of the alien citizen was evident even 
during the drafting of the amendment in 1866 when Cowan’s peers contested the veracity of the 
“gypsy” threat only to substitute the “gypsy” with a metaphor for whatever excluded class of 
people were threatening to claim the status of US citizen and interfere with business as usual. 
Based in their individual local contexts, congressmen located in the frontier states referenced the 
same opposition to the amendment’s declaration of birthright citizenship by substituting “gypsy” 
for the pejorative terms “digger Indian” and the “wild Indian.”48 Importantly, American Indians 
were not just “others” in the frontier states. As chapter two will show, they were actively 
interfering in railroad construction by claiming land rights to evade removal. At the same time, 
senators in the western states complained about the possible inclusion of “Chinamen” into the 
14th amendment’s definition of citizenship. Commenting on this endless process of substitution, 
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California senator John Conness dismissed complaints about the amendment’s inclusivity by 
saying, “why all the talk about Gypsies and Chinese? […] It cannot be because they have been 
felt to be particularly oppressive in this or that locality. It must be that the Gypsy element is to be 
added to our political agitation, so that hereafter the negro alone cannot claim out entire 
attention.”49 Characterizing post-Reconstruction race relations as a process of substituting one 
racial antagonism for another, the senator points to the overall function of the “gypsy” and its 
companion tropes in the debates about birthright citizenship. Not only do they substitute for the 
cause of a political agitation or theft of enjoyment; they shape-shift, forming an endless chain of 
‘others’ that facilitate the conditions for enjoying the theft of enjoyment.  
 If the “gypsy” is a trope that substitutes for a ‘theft of national enjoyment,’ then what is 
being stolen? Specifically, as chapter two will show in more detail, the alien citizen encircles the 
homo homini lupus trope within liberalism. Following Jacques Derrida, the wolf figures 
prominently in western thought as an existential threat to law, politics, and sociality because, like 
the sovereign, s/he is outside of law and does not recognize borders or sovereign authority.50 In 
turn, the wolf has to be sequestered, evaded, or neutralized. Thus, homo homini lupus pervades 
western discourse because it expresses a fundamental political and social problem: the difficulty 
that masses of relatively unconnected people endure with getting along with one another, 
understanding one another, and governing together as citizens who supposedly share sovereign 
power.  
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 The threat of homo homini lupus is in part calmed in Western thought by narrating 
subjection to a unified sovereign power (as in Bodin’s On Sovereignty and Hobbes’ Leviathan). 
However, liberalism “compel[s] the conversion of particularity into universal form,”51 in its 
stipulation that humans are born free, rational, and equal, and are not naturally subject to 
sovereign power. As Carl Schmitt and others have argued, liberalism’s emphasis on 
impersonality, universality, and consent displaces this trope without actually dealing with 
sovereignty, the impetus for the problem in the first place.52 Per Schmitt, liberalism displaces the 
source of a sovereign authority to figure an inside and an outside (i.e., what Agamben calls a 
homo sacer). Instead, as chapter two will show in more detail, liberalism locates the source of 
authority to regulate the citizenry in the law and in the people. While displacing the source of 
authority, liberalism does not displace the wolf. Indeed, because the wolf recognizes no borders, 
no sovereign, and no reasoned political speech, liberalism stipulates that a governing authority in 
the form of laws, policies, and norms, is needed to ensure order and guarantee peace.53 In this 
way, the “gypsy” seems to appear in liberal public discourse every time a “caravan” threatens an 
“imperium in imperio” on national soil by claiming a citizenship status that politicians and jurists 
see as paradoxical to the dominant imagination of what kind of person a citizen should be. The 
“gypsy” provides the rationale for excluding citizens so that the rest of the citizenry can enjoy 
their liberalism.  
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 Such an understanding of rhetoric and fantasy reframes debates about inclusion and 
exclusion surrounding birthright citizenship. First, psychoanalytic rhetoric shows that alien 
citizenship plays a compensatory role in debates about birthright citizenship, shifting the analytic 
focus from the specific historical contexts producing the alien citizen to the imagined threats to 
coherency driving investment in alien citizenship (i.e., the theft of national enjoyment). Second, 
emphasizing the rhetorical conditions for signification in fantasy illuminates that the law writ 
large is caught in the net of discourse. Specifically, the following chapters will show that alien 
citizenship has not resulted as much from enforcing the law, or the juridical processes occurring 
after judgement. Instead, alien citizenship forms part of the judicial event itself, or what Sora 
Han calls the literary and rhetorical act of judgement.54 In this way, the controversies over the 
14th amendment’s citizenship clause have not been about who a citizen is, as much as it about 
what kind of power legitimizes this declaration in the first instance. For this reason, in contrast to 
other excluded identities, the alien citizen specifically speaks to liberalism’s displacement of 
sovereignty away from ‘the king’ and onto the people and their law.55 The alien citizen is a 
remnant of the state’s inability to continuously figure a homo sacer in a legal rhetoric 
characterized by liberalism.  
 Thus, the “gypsy” does not just threaten the biological-racial body of the nation; the 
“gypsy’s” racialized threat is also to the settler state’s legitimacy to declare law and to enforce 
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the “will of the native government.”56 This means that, contrary to Foucault’s location of 
sovereignty in pre-liberal politics, the “genesis of sovereignty” is an ongoing struggle.57 Roberto 
Esposito has shown that “just as the sovereign model incorporates the ancient pastoral 
power…so too biopolitics carries within it the sharp blade of a sovereign power that both crosses 
and surpasses it.”58 For Esposito, “sovereignty is not before or after biopolitics, but cuts across 
the entire horizon, furnishing the most powerful response to the modern problem of the self-
preservation of life.”59 This cutting between sovereignty and biopolitics is carried out through the 
terrain of judicial rhetoric.  
 The judicial register of the law is not a neutral vehicle for declaring rules and norms; it is 
the site for repeatedly investing in the state’s sovereign authority to declare and enforce law, or 
to articulate the blood, soil, and will that make the citizen. In this way, Tim Barouch has argued 
that when judges write opinions they are not just “declaring a winner, articulating an ideology, 
and sending an opinion into circulation.”60 They are performing the legitimizing functions of 
judicial argument that “construct judicial authority.”61 Within citizenship law, the sovereign 
authority to regulate citizenship—and thus, to distinguish between wolf and man—is stated and 
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reshaped at every instance. Thus, the repetition of the “gypsy” signals an anxiety concerning the 
legitimacy of state sovereignty and the penetrability of US citizenship status as a whole, its 
ability to be alienated from those who are regarded as real Americans. This feeling of alienation 
from the law generates a continuous quest to rewrite and reinterpret citizenship within the 
boundaries of the 14th amendment in order to square its open-ended universalizing liberal 
language with political and psychic investments in maintaining white supremacist sovereign 
power.  
 Moreover, citizenship has had to constantly be redrawn not merely to deal with 
liberalism’s existing paradoxes, but to defer and relinquish the always-potential threat of 
paradox, or counter-hegemonic interpretations (para-doxa) of who has the authority to declare 
citizenship within liberal democracy. Chapters two through five demonstrate that instead of 
opposing the fantasies upholding liberal citizenship, para-doxa has continuously tried to 
“realize,” or make appear in discourse, its core anchors—the ideologies of impersonality and 
consent that comprise the struggle between the universal, the particular, and the state in 
liberalism. In approaching the realization of these core tenets of liberalism, para-doxa does not 
fulfill the aims of liberalism because, according to Alenka Zupancic, the only existing object of 
desire that can be “fulfilled” is “the lack that sustains its metonymy.”62 As mentioned above, 
fulfilling the fantasies supporting liberal citizenship involves continuously figuring alien 
citizenship because it provides a stable source of exclusion from within the language of law. Its 
substitution for the cause of political agitation allows for continued investment in liberalism 
amidst the anxiety of freedom. However, when desires driving fantasy formations are “realized,” 
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anxiety ensues. Though, as mentioned above, anxiety is the backdrop of signification, it becomes 
especially pertinent when the subject’s fantasies are paradoxically brought to crisis by getting 
what was once desired. Lacan illustrates this through the figure of the breastfeeding infant. 
Though the colloquial phrase “separation anxiety” suggests that the infant is anxious that it will 
lose its mother’s breast, Lacan claims, “Don’t you know that it’s not longing for the maternal 
breast that provokes anxiety, but its imminence? What provokes anxiety is everything that 
announces to us, that lets us glimpse, that we’re going to be taken back onto the lap.”63 The 
continuation of the lack of the breast drives the fantasy formation; its disruption destroys the 
fantasy. Thus, anxiety signals not only fragmentation but fantasy’s imminence, which would 
bring the fantasy to an end.  
 Building on this understanding of fantasy and anxiety, the following chapters 
demonstrate that liberal citizenship’s paradoxical moments arise not when the “gypsy” subject is 
produced and excluded. Instead, liberal citizenship emerges as a problem in public and legal 
culture when the capacity to define who is a citizen and who is not gets contested from within 
legal rhetoric, exposing the emptiness of the law’s authority to declare itself as sovereign. In 
threatening to realize the tenets of liberal fantasy, para-doxa illuminates the inability of liberal 
citizenship to ground the political in a meaningful distinction between friend and enemy, fellow-
citizen and wolf.64 In this way, citizenship is felt as paradoxical within liberalism not because it 
necessarily produces excluded juridical subjects, but instead because it instantiates a struggle 
over articulating sovereign power that pervades Euro-American law since “time immemorial.”  
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Chapter Overview  
 Thinking of alien citizenship as a formal rhetorical process of sustaining liberal fantasy 
clarifies how and why particular alien citizens come to ‘stand in’ for the anxiety of freedom 
underlying liberal democracy. Thus, in contrast to studies that map the conjunctures underlying 
the naming of particular (non)citizen aliens, I interrogate the role of citizenship as a legal rhetoric 
in driving the anxious scrutiny over birthright citizenship. In doing so, I analyze the topoi, 
namely jurisdiction, underlying the writing and enforcing of citizenship law.  
 In exploring the controversy surrounding the 14th amendment, chapter two unpacks the 
centrality of the para-doxa, or counter-hegemonic interpretation, to controversies over defining 
jurisdiction. Surveying the intellectual history of liberalism as well as the history of citizenship 
in the United States, this chapter shows how, as a key facet of securing affective investment in 
liberal fantasies of freedom, equality, and consent, writing the “gypsy” into citizenship law 
functions as a way to regulate doxa and thus, the way that particular demands and identities are 
channeled into universals in liberal public culture. With this history in mind, it returns to the 
debates concerning the phrasing of the 14th amendment, demonstrating that para-doxa has been 
managed via the topos of jurisdiction after the 14th amendment. It argues that a novel 
interpretation of jurisdiction enabled politicians to carve out a discursive space for a subject who 
is born in US territory but not a legal subject—a homo sacer. Importantly, however, the last part 
of the chapter demonstrates how jurisdiction’s function as topos also make it an imperfect venue 
for the static persistence of the homo sacer. Specifically, Dandy’s Band’s successful use of the 
14th amendment’s citizenship clause to evade removal in Wisconsin demonstrated to congress 
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that the topos of jurisdiction could also function as a territorial and discursive limit to the state’s 
authority to declare who is and is not a citizen via birthright.  
 Chapter three extends the investigation into the role of jurisdiction in managing the 
state’s legitimacy to define citizenship in the first place. It does so by investigating how the first 
two Supreme Court constructions of the 14th amendment’s citizenship clause grappled with the 
paradoxes wrought by “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” Specifically, I analyze and compare 
Elk v. Wilkins (1884) and United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898). Through close readings of the 
cases, I argue that they instantiated two disparate forms of national address and boundary 
formation, which frame the trajectory of citizenship into the future. At the end of the 19th 
century, jurists tended to interpret “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” via two legal traditions: 
the civil tradition and the common law tradition. These traditions brought forth three distinct 
jurisdiction narratives. Jurists versed in common law interpreted “subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof” by referencing the tradition of jus soli, or right of soil, articulating the “soil” as the 
source of authority to recognize citizens. While jus soli figures jurisdiction as enabling what 
John Locke calls tacit consent, civilian jurists argued that when people are born in a country, 
they are not citizens unless the nation explicitly consents to grant them the political status of 
citizen. The source of recognition of one’s political status was narrated as blood—as in jus 
sanguinis—and as positive law, or lex.  
 Using these narratives, the cases’ decisions and their reasoning demonstrate two 
incongruent ways of figuring the citizen-state-alien relationship. While Elk argues that 
citizenship is based on the explicit and mutual consent of state and subject, Wong shows that 
becoming a citizen is extra-rhetorical; consent is not predicated on language, recognition, or 
agreement and is instead based on one’s “mere” presence on the soil. In this way, Wong figures 
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jurisdiction as a what Carl Schmitt calls a nomos of the Earth, a totalizing, extra-rhetorical 
assimilation into the body politic occasioned by material presence.65 While Elk’s reliance on 
explicit consent—and specifically the state’s explicit consent—constructs the community of 
citizens as based in rhetoric and mutual recognition, Wong allows for the articulation of a 
citizenship that emerges independent of state power. 
 The fourth chapter investigates how Elk and Wong’s distinct readings of the 14th 
amendment shaped American Indian citizenship policy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
As illustrated by Elk, the US government excluded indigenous peoples from citizenship for most 
of history. However, the industrialization of the United States and the closing of the frontier 
made their inclusion serve state interests.66 The turn to inclusion bolstered the goals of 
progressive American Indian organizations such as the Society for American Indians (SAI), who 
sought citizenship status as a vehicle for political power. However, it threatened so-called 
“traditional” nations, who saw citizenship as lethal to national sovereignty and self-determinacy. 
The Haudenosaunee were among the most vocal opponents of both US and Canadian citizenship 
and they frequently clashed with state actors and with progressive American Indians both within 
the confederation and in the SAI. These two disparate interests came into direct conflict during 
the Snyder Hearings surrounding the effectivity of the allotment program in solving the “Indian 
problem.” Ultimately, by making all indigenous peoples birthright citizens in name only, the 
final version of the ICA went against both progressive and conservative interests. For this reason, 
American Indian legal studies tends to describe the ICA as a legal tragedy. 
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 This chapter queries how the ICA reached its tragic form by investigating how both sides 
of the citizenship debate (pro-and-anti-citizenship activists) took up the language of competence 
to articulate their goals. Beginning with the emergence of competence as a threshold for political 
jurisdiction in congressional and BIA hearings, I then turn to how competence was utilized in 
SAI and in Haudenosaunee campaigns during the same time period. I argue that articulations of 
competence both sides of the debate elucidated the inability of fixing the source of sovereignty in 
the state, the law, or the citizen. Thus, the inability of Congress to find a norm for restraining the 
particular in the universal, allowed for counter-readings of territorial jurisdiction that placed 
American Indians simultaneously inside and outside the body politic, as sovereign citizenship 
subjects and as sovereign foreign subjects. Both readings revealed the emptiness of sovereignty.  
  Following the unsettled disputes regarding indigenous peoples’ sovereignty and their 
relationship to U.S. citizenship, the fifth chapter examines the role of the citizen’s consent to 
relinquish her citizenship status. While the 14th Amendment coupled with the Expatriation Act of 
1868 opened the door for locating sovereignty within the citizen by virtue of mere birth within 
the state’s jurisdiction, subsequent case law and legislation continued to articulate two 
incompatible notions of citizenship in the treatment of denaturalization, denationalization, and 
expatriation. Beginning with the Naturalization Act of 1906 and the creation of the Federal 
Bureau of Naturalization, U.S. state attorneys were given the authority to not only investigate 
fraudulent or illegitimate claims to citizenship, but they were also given the means to 
denaturalize and denationalize citizens.67 Alongside popular hysteria over immigrants and 
political radicals during the first and second World Wars, this newly created institutional 
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framework wrought a period of nonconsensual denaturalizations and denationalizations that 
continued the logic of consent upheld in Elk.  
 However, when the Warren Court of the 1960s began reading the Expatriation and 
Nationality Acts in the context of section I of the 14th Amendment—as protecting both kinds of 
citizens against nonconsensual expatriation—the citizen became legally inscribed as what Patrick 
Weil describes as ‘sovereign,’ or as a person whose rights and privileges are inborn via birth in 
the territory and naturalization.68 For example, in Afroyim v. Rusk (1967), the case that settled the 
question of nonconsensual expatriations, Justice Black wrote, “We hold that the 14th Amendment 
was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible 
destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race.”69 After Afroyim, the Court 
largely “sustain[ed] denationalization statutes,” leading to a “virtual prohibition on government 
power to terminate citizenship unilaterally,” or without the citizen’s explicit consent.70 It is at 
this moment in the 1960s, that the sovereign’s right to posit and depose is completely displaced 
onto the sovereign people. In this context, how did the War on Terror bring about another surge 
of expatriations?  
 In answering this question, chapter five traces the rise of the sovereign citizen amidst a 
surge of nonconsensual expatriations in the first half of the 20th century. Specifically, I extend 
Weil’s thesis by showing that the Warren Court’s interventions in the congressional power to 
expatriate citizens illuminates the contradictions of identity and consent found in Elk and Wong 
Kim Ark. By demanding that Congress locate and interpret the will of the citizen, the expatriation 
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cases substitute intent with assent. I argue, however, that by reading intent as located in the 
citizen’s vocal or written assent, these cases invert and yet advance Elk’s racialized logic of 
recognition. With the legal-rhetorical context of the sovereign citizen in mind, the final sections 
of the chapter return to Hamdi. Comparing the contentious oral arguments in the Supreme Court 
case with the clinical settlement agreement that Hamdi “eagerly” signed in order to attain his 
freedom,71 I argue that because speech is figured as the content of the citizen’s will, Hamdi’s 
entrance into the liberal citizen subject identity—through the granting of habeas corpus by the 
majority opinion—is also the moment where he becomes “outlawed” through his own speech. 
Such outlawing occurs because, despite our ideological associations of speech with presence and 
with will to power, speech is always mediated (in this case by legal institutions) and always puts 
people into a struggle over recognition. This struggle over recognition has made citizenship the 
site of violence and coercion even after the sole power to ‘posit and depose’ is located in the 
citizen subject.  
 The case studies described above show that the liberal ideal of the consensual citizenship 
subject has been ‘realized’ repeatedly by Hamdi, by American Indian activists throughout the 
19th and 20th centuries, and by the children of migrants such as Wong Kim Ark. Following 
Weheliye’s logic then, if the law has tried to keep Man separate from human, it keeps failing.72 It 
is the emptiness of Man, the fact that it has to be narrativized into law via jurisdiction in order to 
garner legitimacy, that terrorizes liberal fantasies that render the Western order of things 
coherent and whole. In this way, citizenship’s exceptions have perhaps not been about making 
outright exclusions, but about simultaneously inscribing liberal equality and then trying to 
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control its reach. In other words, the paradox of citizenship is less the result of an actually 
existing liberalism and more the result of a struggle to restrain a fully realized, ultimately 
regicidal liberalism. Thus, the conclusion extends the claim that we have never been liberal, or 
that citizenship law is not the product of already-existing liberal commitments. Rather, it is a 
product of liberalism’s attempts to manage anxieties rooted in impersonality and consent. 
Reframing the cause of citizenship’s problems from liberalism to anxious reactions to liberal 













CHAPTER 2: THE PARADOX OF JURISDICTION AFTER RECONSTRUCTION 
 
The historicized past poses a perpetual threat for the present. Brought back to life, the past 
unsettles and destabilizes the stories we tell about law to make us feel comfortable with the way 
things are—Robert Gordon.1 
 
The Problem of the 14th Amendment  
 
In a speech at the University of Hawaii on May 6, 1987, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood 
Marshall denied the invitation to commemorate the bicentennial of the US Constitution by 
praising the original drafters. He stated,  
 The government [the Constitution of 1787] devised was defective from the start, 
 requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain 
 the system of constitutional government, and its respect for the individual freedoms and 
 human rights, we hold today. 
 He went on to say that when contemporary US Americans talk about “the ‘Constitution,’ they 
invoke a concept that is vastly different from what the framers barely began to construct two 
centuries ago.” Relating the history of chattel slavery and genocide leading to Civil War, 
Marshall claims that “We the People,” was never intended to nor did it ever refer to the majority 
of bodies inhabiting the nation-state. In place of the Constitution, “arose a new, more promising 
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basis for justice and equality, the 14th Amendment, ensuring protection of life, liberty, and 
property of all persons.”2  
 Marshall’s words reflect the immense impact of the 14th amendment on US jurisprudence 
as well as on everyday life. The 14th amendment not only defined citizenship for the first time in 
the Constitution but it also formally attached rights and privileges to citizenship. Though 
authored by politicians steeped in republican ideology, it laid the formal groundwork for a liberal 
nation premised on impersonal, universal membership and consent.3 Of course, anyone who has 
read a US history textbook knows that, though the amendments abolished slavery and granted 
citizenship to African Americans and suffrage to African American men, they did not grant any 
kind of real widespread substantial equality. The 14th amendment was neutralized by a Supreme 
Court that read the due process clause in the most restrictive way possible, and the fifteenth 
amendment was all but nullified by voting restrictions and terrorism.4 As the next three chapters 
will show, the citizenship clause was repeatedly scrutinized in order to ensure strategic 
inclusions and exclusions. First, jurists and politicians found interpretive schemas for excluding 
American Indians and Chinese Americans. Then, they interpreted the amendment as including all 
American Indians, even those who did not consent to be US citizens. The eventual inclusion of 
everyone via birthright citizenship in the 20th century then coincided with repeated expatriation 
campaigns, seeking to expel “undesirables” who were already citizens. The Reconstruction 
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project of a unified nation based in equality failed, which as demonstrated in the last chapter, is 
precisely what sustains the enjoyment of liberalism in the first place.  
 However, for Marshall the significance of the 14th amendment was that it provided 
rhetorical tools for the creation of new constitutional principles that could “meet the challenges 
of a changing society” into the future.5 Indeed, in formally defining citizenship via subjection to 
jurisdiction, the amendment paradoxically provided the rhetorical basis for defining citizenship 
in a way that could include indeterminate kinds of people. This chapter explores the tension 
described by Marshall between the ‘promise’ of the 14th amendment and its various 
interpretations by situating the citizenship clause within the history of liberalism. In doing so, it 
contextualizes the following chapters’ analyses of how the citizenship clause was used to claim 
and contest birthright citizenship for ‘alien citizens.’ First, I survey the role of the alien citizen in 
the history of liberalism and the implications of this history on conceptualizations of citizenship. 
As a key facet of securing affective investment in liberal fantasies of freedom, equality, and 
consent, writing the “gypsy” into citizenship law regulates doxa, or the culturally mediated 
means of interpreting law. Thus, the figuration of the “gypsy” functions to moderate how 
particular demands and identities are channeled into universals in liberal public culture, in turn 
resisting para-doxa, or counter-hegemonic interpretations of law.  
 The second section demonstrates that after the ratification of the 14th amendment in 1868, 
para-doxa has been managed through the topos of jurisdiction, or the power to declare and 
enforce law within a specific territory. Conceiving of jurisdiction through the lens of topos 
highlights its role as both the tropological instantiation of the authority of law as well as a 
physical (common)place. As Schmitt argues in his musing on the concreteness of law in Nomos 
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of the Earth, “even such [abstract] commonplaces become concrete and extraordinarily vivid if 
one considers their spatial meaning…so, even today, we have the still indispensable topoi of the 
chancellery and the lectern, of the judge’s bench and the town meeting, of conferences and 
congresses, of cinema and radio.”6 Jurisdiction, as perhaps a topos par excellence, marks the 
domain within which one set of legal authorities are rendered legitimate by drawing its authority 
from the marking of physical boundaries in the form of the courtroom, the territorial border, and 
the sea.7 Focusing on the conflict during the drafting of the 14th amendment in 1866, I argue that 
jurisdiction’s function as topos, as both trope and concrete location, allowed politicians to 
articulate a flexible method of exclusion that could adapt to the changing territorial and national 
boundaries of the Reconstruction era. Focusing on a defense of the amendment by Senator 
Williams, which would go on to be cited in exclusionary interpretations of the citizenship clause 
(i.e., in Justice Fuller’s dissent in Wong Kim Ark), I show that its flexibility was predicated on 
the appearance of the homo sacer, the quintessential “gypsy” who is subject to law without being 
a subject of law.8   
 Importantly, however, the last part of the chapter demonstrates how jurisdiction’s 
function as topos also make it an imperfect venue for the static persistence of the homo sacer 
because it is both narrative and material, both a performative of sovereign power and a territorial 
and discursive limit to that same sovereign power. In this way, jurisdiction embodies its own 
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confrontation with the limits of discourse and thus, with the destabilization of fantasies. Thus, 
even though jurisdiction has served to mitigate the paradox of sovereign authority, its “social 
(after)life” has also exacerbated the problem of sovereign authority. Alexander Weheliye 
describes the social (after)life of juridical categories as the “lines of flight, freedom dreams, 
practices of liberation, and possibilities of other worlds” that are excavated and brought back to 
life as flesh. 9 Though Weheliye connects the excesses of the juridical to what Stefano Harney 
and Fred Moten have called the “undercommons,” as the last chapter showed, the excessive 
remainder of any articulation results from rhetoric’s ongoing failure to feign unicity, or to put 
reality together in a way that sustains coherency.10 What thinkers like Weheliye and Harney and 
Moten highlight, however, is the way that subjects whose humanity and citizenship have been 
refused occupy a paradoxical relationship to that refusal. Following in these critical footsteps, the 
following chapters attend to the social (after)lives of jurisdiction by holding in tension the 
figuration of rhetoric as form and persuasion with/in processes of (de)humanization and 
racialization.11  
 
Citizenship, Doxa, and Liberalism’s Para-doxa  
 The persistence of the “gypsy” in moderating the paradoxes of liberal citizenship 
illuminates the role of antagonism in legal and political thought. Indeed, citizenship has been the 
center of antagonism since its conceptual origins in the Greek polis where, according to JGA 
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Pocock, “the community of citizens is one in which speech takes the place of blood, and acts of 
decision take the place of acts of vengeance.”12 Though speech and decision do not immediately 
recall antagonism, Hannah Arendt reminds us that the community of citizens was fundamentally 
agonistic, or rooted in conflict, precisely because the polis was a sphere of speech and action.13 
That is, because speech is not communication it misfires, inviting discord and 
misunderstanding.14 Even though such misunderstanding can be the site of social and political 
engagement,15 it is also the site of immense anxiety about the waywardness of rhetoric and 
sociality. Thus, speech is ultimately the site of the destabilization of fantasy even as it is the site 
for inhabiting fantasy. From Plato’s pharmakon to Hobbes’ depiction of the Tower of Babel in 
Leviathan, speech has been depicted as the vehicle of the political and as its potential demise.  
 One of the main ways that the Ancient Greeks managed this tendency was through the 
exclusion of slaves and women from the polis, so that the origin of rhetoric (and democracy) 
correspond with a founding exclusion geared towards mediating the capacity to deliberate.16 By 
excluding these identity categories, the doxa guiding the kind of political judgement, or 
prudence, necessary for citizenship could be contained in order to guard against paradox, which 
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literally means “beyond belief,” or the counter-public opinion and the counter-intuitive. 
Importantly, doxa, which is usually translated as public opinion, is not the same thing as 
falsehoods or more recently, “fake news.” Doxa refers to what some scholars call “social 
reality,” or the way things appear based in one’s situated position. Arendt, for example, argues 
that for Socrates, “doxa was the formulation in speech of what dokei moi, that is, ‘of what 
appears to me.’”17 Despite the situated nature of doxa, its commonness and taken-for-grantedness 
is why it has also been associated with hegemony; what appears to us as natural and normal is 
inevitably intertwined with lessons from the world around us.18  
 The power of doxa in public culture is why it was the target of attacks by Plato, who 
sought to rid the main peddlers of doxa, the sophists, from the political. The exclusion of the 
sophists from the ideal polis is usually interpreted as the attempted exclusion of paradox and 
contradiction from language itself.19 However, Debra Hawhee implicitly connects this exclusion 
of the paradoxical to the exclusion of the perpetuators and topics of paradox. In her study of 
animality and rhetoric, she shows that in ancient rhetorical education, paradox also encompassed 
sophistic strategies of description in encomiums that flattened and inverted hierarchies between 
non-humans and kinds of humans, bringing animals and political outcasts such as Helen of Troy 
into lofty praise-worthy positions.20 Even though Hawhee shows that exercises in paradox were 
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done to evoke wonder and to show off rhetorical prowess, the anxiety surrounding not only 
sophistic rhetoric but irresolvable paradoxes in general undergirding Western political 
philosophy shows that both must be subordinated to reason in order to ensure a well-ordered 
polis. As many scholars have shown, identarian exclusions (of slaves and women) served as a 
way to regulate speech in order to facilitate productive conflict of the polis, ensuring that 
agonism did not bleed into antagonism.21   
 Though citizenship in the polis might seem far removed from the drafting of the 14th 
amendment in 1866 and even farther removed from Trump’s threat to withhold birthright 
citizenship in 2018, citizenship’s intellectual and rhetorical roots convey that it has always been 
premised on exclusion and normalization. In other words, political exclusion was not something 
introduced by biopolitics or by liberalism. As legal historian Ediberto Román has argued, 
beginning in the polis, the “citizenship construct” contains aspects that “accept and arguably 
foster differences in the treatment of individuals living in society.”22 For this reason, the 
imperative to exclude and normalize disappears from the medieval common law version of 
subjectship, upon which the notion of jus soli is based, because this kind of political membership 
did not include any of the rights to participate in governance that ancient Greek, republican, or 
liberal citizenship bear.23 Nevertheless, when republicans and liberals revive citizenship as the 
vehicle for political agency in the modern era, they revive the imperative—wrought by 
rhetoric—to move uneasily between agon and antagonism. 
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 Thus, as proponents of “citizenship” and not subjectship, early United States’ citizenship 
was based in identarian exclusions similar to the Greek polis.24 This all changed, however, with 
the abolition of slavery and the 14th amendment. The first sentence of the 14th amendment 
denotatively states who a citizen is in a way that legal historian Garrett Epps calls “inclusive, 
universal, and comprehensive.”25 The absence of any identarian markers radically transformed 
politics in the United States by allowing for the creation of a racially indeterminate body politic 
perpetuated by reproduction within national territory. By stating that “all persons, born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the states in which they reside,” the Amendment universalized political 
membership within the nation-state’s territory, removing the racial, property, and class 
requirements in citizenship case law and policy from the Articles of the Confederation 
onwards.26 Citizenship in the United States was now impersonal, or not based in any ascriptive 
or status-based norms.  
 However, as the persistence of the “gypsy” trope and the above-mentioned violence 
perpetuated against Black citizens after Reconstruction conveys, identarian exclusions persisted 
in novel interpretations of “subject to jurisdiction” that secured state actors’ ability to bar certain 
classes of people from full citizenship. While this will be described in more detail below, 
thinking back to the role of the alien citizen in sustaining the fantasies upholding liberal 
citizenship, one can read the failure of Reconstruction reforms as the process by which legal 
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rhetoric was used to stabilize liberalism’s commitments to impersonal consent, commitments that 
displace the location of sovereign authority away from the state. That is, the continuous naming 
of “alien citizens” and the legal interpretations that sustained their presence within citizenship 
law sustain investment in impersonal consensualism precisely by stealing it away from the 
people and the law.  
 Thus, this attempt to regulate the impersonality of modern citizenship is a core feature of 
liberal public culture. As such, when translated into modern liberal culture, the citizen continues 
to bridge free-flowing inclusive agonism with identarian exclusion even as liberalism formally 
rejects a politics based upon this kind of exclusion. Instead of making the explicit identarian 
exclusions that regulated the polis, however, liberalism aims to preserve freedom by regulating 
the will. In explaining this aporia central to modern liberalism, Etienne Balibar claims that 
modern liberalism follows the Spinozan ideal wherein “power ultimately rests with a ‘free 
multitude’ who act ‘as if they were led by a single soul.’” The as if is “clearly fundamental” 
since within liberalism, citizenship is the primary means of transforming the free multitude “as 
if” it formed a single soul.27 Whether through submission to a sovereign (as in Hobbes), shared 
language and roots (as in Herder), or education and reason (as in Locke), or the veil of reason (as 
in Rawls), citizenship is tasked with converting the amorphous ‘person’ into a politico-legal 
subject whose will comprises part of the body politic.  
 For example, as chapter four will illustrate, the classification of American Indians as 
(birthright) citizens was premised on their demonstration of competence, or jurisdiction over 
their legal affairs. However, the US government soon found out that “too many” American 
Indians could become classified as competent according to the rules laid down in the allotment 
                                                 




program. Thus, state actors continuously sought formal rules that would defer the designation of 
competence. In this way, the “as if” to which Balibar refers must be moderated and normalized 
through linguistic practices that exceed any single actor’s will. The “as if,” then, is premised on 
figuring exclusions that ensure that the will of the body politic does not verge into the 
paradoxical and the counter-hegemonic. Indeed, the US government came up with more and 
more rules of competence in order to secure the capacity to name incompetent American Indians 
who could be excluded from citizenship. Balibar calls this neutralization the exclusion of the 
“anarchic” kernel of citizenship, the “periodic or permanent, open or latent, manifestation of a 
conflictuality that cannot be reduced to the rules of representation or communication, that 
remains excessive in relation to any consensus, or that pushes agonism beyond the limits of a 
coherent pluralism.”28 In other words, citizenship law has been geared towards restraining the 
anarchic kernel of citizenship, or what Weheliye would call its social (after)life, but it keeps 
failing to completely restrain it.   
 Similar to the tension between doxa and paradox in the Greek polis, liberalism similarly 
struggles with restraining the counter-hegemonic by regulating not only reason but interpretation 
as well. For example, Victoria Kahn illustrates the anxiety stoked by John Milton’s paradoxical 
interpretation of the proto-liberal social contract doctrine. Writing during the same period as 
Thomas Hobbes’ social contract narrative Leviathan, Milton’s Tenure of Kings and Magistrates 
validates the right of the people to usurp the king and the law because the consensual subject 
always possesses the sovereign power to exercise their “natural birthright.”29 In contrast to 
                                                 
28 Balibar, 96. 
 
29 Victoria Kahn, Wayward Contracts: The Crisis of Political Obligation in England, 1640-1674 (Princeton, NJ: 




Hobbes and Grotius’ careful attention to fixing the correct meaning of words and things, Milton 
denied the necessity of a metalanguage prior to the social contract, deploying the sacred and 
secular metaphors of covenant, tenure, and contract to illuminate that not only is the social 
contract metaphorical, but so is the monarchy and the absolute sovereignty that it claims.30 
Importantly, Milton used the form of the common law legal tradition of equity to move from a 
social contract leading to “a tragic narrative of voluntary servitude” (as in Hobbes) to one that 
dictated the “violent plot of regicide.”31 Though both social contract narratives were radical 
during their time, Tenure’s embrace of figurative language and indeterminacy works against the 
standardization of interpretive protocols in doxa. It even goes so far as to advocate for killing off 
the power-center of the symbolic order through regicide, or cutting off the king’s head. As the 
following chapters will demonstrate, this regicidal tendency within the rhetorical forms 
comprising liberalism veer into para-doxa, threatening the received order of things.  
 The response generated by Tenure’s embrace of regicide exemplifies the hardened tie, 
beginning with the Ancient Greeks and continuing into liberalism, between regulating 
interpretation and mediating the conditions for democracy. As Claude Lefort has argued, modern 
(liberal) democracy emerges with the cutting of the king’s head and the demise of the trope of 
the king’s two bodies, which instantiates an empty space and a negativity that allows for intense 
conflict through the metonymic proliferation of meanings. For Lefort, democracy is marked “by 
the negative, the emptiness in the locus of power,” which simultaneously makes Miltonian 
rearticulation possible by institutionalizing conflict and division.32  
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 Because of the anxiety provoked by the emptiness in the formal grounds of democracy 
(i.e., the speech of the demos), early modern social contract writers consistently joined what 
Kahn calls a linguistic contract with the social and political contract. For example, as mentioned 
above, Hobbes’ Leviathan makes the regulation of not only words, but also of passions a central 
stipulation of the social contract. For Hobbes, the regulation of sentiment and meaning is 
necessary for stabilizing the social contract because, as evidenced by Tenure, the same metaphor 
can be used to usurp the king or to bind oneself to him.33 Hobbes claims that once language and 
the passions are regulated and made calculable, “then we will he have succeeded in creating the 
abstract liberal subject, whose interior life has been relegated to the private sphere, and who has 
been made—at least in theory—calculable and dependable.”34 The attempt to regulate and taper 
the unwieldiness of the consenting subject while still affirming its role in constructing human 
freedom suggests that Miltonian consent, free form consent directed towards the death of an 
expansively interpreted illegitimate state, is best kept as a capacity that is constantly deferred to 
the past.  
 Though Kahn is writing about the early modern era, the development of modern Euro-
American jurisprudence carries on this anxiety concerning paradox into the present day, 
especially in formalist and originalist theories of reading law that try to fix legal interpretation 
either to logical deduction of rules or to the past.35 As Robert Cover states, there is a constant 
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tension within Euro-American legal doctrine between the “jurisgenerative principle by which 
legal meaning proliferates in all communities,” and the “jurispathic principle” of interpretive 
hegemony that emanates from the state and the courts.36 To achieve meaning law relies on doxa, 
or in being rooted in common narratives and frames of reference. However, to maintain 
hegemony, the jurispathic must (violently) guard against the jurisgenerative so as not to devolve 
into paradox.37 While Tenure figures legal doxa as firmly housed within the jurisgenerative 
principle of free-floating interpretation sans the jurispathic presence of the state, Leviathan aims 
to firmly supplant the jurisgenerative with the jurispathic. Modern liberalism wavers between 
these two poles.  
 Thus, even though Hobbes’ social contract narrative is ultimately the more influential 
version, Miltonian paradox resurfaces in liberal imaginaries, causing anxiety about the instability 
arising from wayward contracts and wayward laws. For example, this dialectic can be seen in the 
development of modern contracts, where increasingly complex and bureaucratic protocols for 
constricting free interpretation, driven by the interests of the powerful, grew alongside the 
prevalence of contracting.38 While the legal capability to enter into whatever contract the 
individual desires only increased throughout the 19th and 20th century—barring a few exceptions 
such as sale of body parts—the establishment of the terms and the “legal empowerment rules,” 
                                                 
36 Cover, Narrative, Violence, and the Law, 139. 
 
37 Fred Moten has expanded on this dialectic by showing that the interplay between the jurisgenerative, “the 
undercommon swarm’s constant making and breaking law,” and the imposition of the violence of legal 
interpretation grounds the process by which racialized life is “out_lawed.” The next section will illustrate the tension 
between the jurispathic and the jurisgenerative principles of law by analyzing the focus on jurisdiction in drafting of 
the 14th amendment’s citizenship clause. See The Universal Machine (Consent Not to Be A Single Being). (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 115-117.  
 
38 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich 




the rules that create the framework for valid agreements, have traditionally only been accessible 
to the owners of property and businesses so as to ensure the jurispathic maintenance of 
interpretative protocol.39 Chapter five’s examination of expatriation and consent will 
demonstrate that the interpretation of contract, though free and open, always occurs in the 
“shadow of coercion.”40 
 Stemming from its conceptual origins in the Greek polis to its idealization as the vehicle 
of impersonal and consensual politics in liberalism, citizenship has been the site of conflict over 
who has what kind of power in political society. The regulation and training of doxa has been 
central to this conflict because citizenship’s inscription into law introduces the ability to 
reinterpret and refigure the identity and power of the citizen. While the Greeks and the early 
Americans made explicit identarian exclusions to ensure a degree of homogeneity to keep 
antagonism and indeterminacy at bay, liberalism anchors its fantasies in the ideals of 
impersonalism and universalism. Thus, in order to maintain the same kinds of exclusions that 
ward off the “anarchic” kernel of citizenship, liberal public culture has been geared towards 
securing a linguistic contract, or a metalanguage of citizenship that will continuously figure an 
“outside,” or a “gypsy” subject, in order to guard against the paradoxes of citizenship. As a key 
facet of securing affective investment in liberal fantasies of freedom, equality, and consent, 
writing the “gypsy” into citizenship law normalizes doxa and thus, the conversion of demands 
and identities in liberal public culture. As will be demonstrated below, the topos of jurisdiction is 
the territorial and rhetorical ground upon which this writing has occurred.  
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Jurisdiction as Site of Liberal Citizenship’s Paradoxes  
 As the following chapters demonstrate, the conflicts over interpreting citizenship law 
leading to the figuration of the “gypsy” have swirled around jurisdiction, or the capacity to 
declare and enforce law within a specific territory. As mentioned above, by stipulating that all 
people born of naturalized and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are citizens, the 
amendment removed grounds for identarian exclusions. This lack of identarian exclusion was 
precisely what Andrew Johnson opposed in his speech vetoing the nearly identical citizenship 
clause in the Civil Rights Act (CRA):  
 By the first section of the bill…comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians 
 subject to taxation, the people called Gypsies, as well as the entire race designated as 
 blacks, people of color, negroes, mulattoes, and persons of African blood. Every 
 individual of these races, born in the United States, is by the bill made a citizen…The 
 right of Federal citizenship thus to be conferred on the several excepted races before 
 mentioned is now for the first time proposed to be given by law.41   
Echoing the opposition to birthright citizenship covered in the last chapter, Johnson opposes not 
just the inclusion of formerly outlawed subjects but their inclusion written into law, which would 
literally formalize citizenship, and thus, open it up to the jurisgenerative principle.    
 The bill’s designation of birthright citizenship via jurisdiction was especially 
controversial because jurisdiction allows for an impersonal and consensual form of liberal 
governance. In his history of territorial jurisdiction, critical race scholar Richard T. Ford claims 
that the famous historical shift from “status” to “contract” characterizing Western democracies 
                                                 




was “accompanied by an equally significant shift from status to locus.” 42 This shift was 
predicated on the development of modern territorial jurisdiction, which allows for governance 
based on the abstract presentation of space, rendering political relationships impersonal and 
objective. In premodern Europe, political communities were either conceived of as tribal, or as 
based on kinship and mutual affinity, or they were conceived of as realms personified by the 
king’s person and his territorial possessions.43 However, modern territorial jurisdiction derives 
membership based on one’s location within an abstracted area defined by distance within a given 
space.44 For example, the territorial jurisdiction of the United States is defined by relatively fixed 
impersonal spatial parameters and not by where certain people live or by the tale of Lewis and 
Clark or Mason and Dixon. In concert with the development of modern cartography, the growing 
ideology of rational, humanist government, and the expansion of the English common law, 
jurisdictional identities based on political territory largely displaced identities based on kinship 
or status throughout the western world.45  
 Because of its impersonal spatial mode of governance, defining citizenship through 
jurisdiction could allow for the unfettered inclusion of Chinese people, mestizos, and indigenous 
peoples. Conceptually, jurisdiction is endlessly inclusive because it is a built environment, whose 
fixed, impersonal spatial parameters ideally allow for the kind of tacit consent theorized by John 
Locke. In this way, jurisdiction purports to actualize the kind of impersonal, non-status-based 
mode of governance based on consent idealized in liberalism because one can physically move in 
and out of (more-or-less) clearly differentiated territories. However, as the anxieties expressed by 
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politicians ranging from Andrew Johnson to Donald Trump indicate, the impersonal freedom 
allowed by jurisdiction constantly requires revision in order to counteract paradox, or in order to 
uphold state interests in political belonging based on ethno-racial identity. This is because in the 
modern era of global migration (which includes the 19th century), the “gypsy” can and does 
move across jurisdictions. The migrant utilizes the impersonal abstract configuration of space 
that can allow exit and entrance at will, even if this movement is extremely restricted by formal 
and informal borders. In this way, the migrant indexes the fantasy of tacit consent. 
 Thus, it is no surprise that the anxiety expressed by Johnson resurfaced when the 
citizenship clause came before Congress during the drafting of the 14th amendment in 1866. The 
original drafts of the amendment did not include the citizenship clause. However, after the 
amendment was almost complete Senator Wade advocated for defining citizenship in order to 
ensure that Black people would not be denied citizenship by the contingency of the term 
“citizen.”46 According to Kurt Lash, Wade’s suggestion made Jacob Howard, the amendment’s 
author, realize that without a firm definition of citizenship, the substantive rights declared in the 
14th amendment were not guaranteed.47 Therefore, on May 30, 1866, Howard introduced the new 
clause to the Senate and sought approval for the new language “All persons born in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the states in 
which they reside.”48  
 While the concerns about “gypsies” and Chinese people cited in the last chapter were 
calmed by senator McDougall from California, who assured congress that the Chinese 
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population was not large and that congress would pass laws restricting migration from China, the 
new amendment elicited opposition because it did not include the qualifier, “excluding Indians 
not taxed.”49 “Indians not taxed” comes from the census requirement in Article I, Section 2 of the 
US Constitution, which excluded this class of Indigenous person from the official census. This is 
the same clause that also notoriously grants 3/5 representation to enslaved peoples. The “not 
taxed” classification serves as a reminder that indigenous peoples were largely treated as foreign 
nations by the first settler colonists and then as “quasi-sovereigns” by the US Supreme Court. 
“Indians not taxed” stipulated that Indigenous peoples who lived in “tribal relations” and “not 
subject to the laws thereof” were treated as separate political entities while those who had 
“renounced tribal rule” were, in theory, treated as part of the political representation of the 
state.50  
 Senators immediately lambasted Howard, claiming that the clause was an “unconscious 
attempt…to naturalize all the Indians within the limits of the United States.”51 For example, 
Senator Doolittle argued:  
 It seems to me very clear that there is a large mass of the Indian population who are 
 clearly subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who ought not to be included as 
 citizens of the United States. All the Indians upon reservations within the several States 
 are most clearly subject to our jurisdiction, both civil and military…Mr. President, the 
 word ‘citizen,’ if applied to them would bring in all  of the Digger Indians of 
 California…Take Colorado; there are more Indian citizens of Colorado than there are 
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 white citizens this moment if you admit it as a state. And yet by a constitutional 
 amendment you propose to declare the Utes, the Tabahuaches, and all those wild Indians 
 to be citizens of the United States, the great Republic of the world, whose citizenship 
 should be a title as proud as that of king, and whose danger is that you may 
 degrade that citizenship.52  
 I quote Doolittle at length to demonstrate the problematic nature of “jurisdiction” for a 
Congress that sought to overturn the ascriptive and white supremacist faults of the original 
Constitution, yet also feared what radical inclusivity would entail. The unclear jurisdictional 
boundaries characterizing US territory exacerbated this fear. For example, Doolittle’s claim that 
even Indians in reservations are “clearly subject to jurisdiction” shows that the binary that he 
wants to sustain between “wild Indian” and a citizen that is “as proud as that of a king” is 
untenable given the material conditions of US territory. Specifically, “jurisdiction” does not 
allow him to square the settled territory he inhabits with its capacity to inscribe an innumerable 
amount of unknowable people into the word “citizen.” As such, Doolittle’s opposition reflects 
his location in Wisconsin. During the drafting of the amendment Wisconsin was embroiled in 
violent removal campaigns of the Ho-Chunk people in order to facilitate railroad development as 
well as to mitigate frequently volatile confrontations between white settlers and the Ho-Chunk.53 
The political turmoil caused by removals led to bands of Ho-Chunk that were classified as 
“stray,” or as not firmly entrenched in tribal relations.54 Members of stray bands lived in 
                                                 
52 Cong. Globe. May 30, 1866: 2893.  
 
53 Grant Arndt, Ho-Chunk Powwows and the Politics of Tradition (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 
2016), 36–37. 
 
54 Stephen Kantrowitz, “Not Quite Constitutionalized: The Meanings of ‘Civilization’ and the Limits of Native 
American Citizenship,” in The World the Civil War Made, eds. Gregory Downs and Kate Masur (Chapel Hill, NC: 




proximity to settlers, trading with them, buying property, and generally living as ‘subject to 
jurisdiction’ of the United States. Thus, “strayness” brought about ambiguity as to whether tribal 
members were still not within US jurisdiction.  
 In response, Senator Trumbull, the author of the CRA, reiterated that “subject to 
jurisdiction” and “excluding Indians not taxed” are redundant phrases. Citing the traditional 
treatment of American Indians as sovereigns, he asks, “Can you sue a Navajoe [sic] Indian in 
court? Are they in any sense subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States? By no 
means. We make treaties with them.”55 By stating that American Indians are not subject to 
jurisdiction because they are not suable in court references the standard legal definition of 
jurisdiction as the ability to enforce law within a territory. Nevertheless, this clarification of 
jurisdiction led to more disagreements about the capacity for the amendment to exclude 
American Indians amidst a rapidly changing national territory. For example, Senator Johnson 
from Maryland remarked that the omission of “Indians not taxed” was unwise because the state 
had an increasing incentive to “impose law” on Indigenous peoples. Alluding to American 
Indians’ rapidly eroding sovereignty amid the “Peace Campaign,” Johnson argued that because 
Indigenous peoples are born within the territorial limits of the United States that they will also be 
born subject to the jurisdiction because the US government increasing interferes with the 
complete sovereignty of many nations. Doolittle made a similar argument in citing attorney 
general Cushing’s claim that “the very best policy of dealing with the Indian tribes is to subject 
them at once to our legislative power and jurisdiction.”56  
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 These concerns over the problems of equating subjection to law with citizenship led to a 
discussion about which phrasing was the most plainly exclusive. Like the early modern social 
contract writers, politicians began to contemplate how to fix the meaning of the clause in order to 
allow for the clearest method of excluding indigenous peoples living in tribes. For example, 
Johnson argued for the inclusion of “excluding Indians not taxed” because “it is advisable…to 
put every provision in plain language as not to be capable of two interpretations, if we can.” This 
led Howard to claim that his opponents had “misapprehended the effect of the language which he 
suggests” because “excluding Indians not taxed” would allow for states to naturalize American 
Indians through taxation. Therefore, he states that “the language as it stands is sufficiently certain 
and exact.” As such, he assured the senators that even he was “not yet quite as liberal” as to pass 
a “sweeping act of naturalization by which all Indian savages, wild or tame, belonging to tribal 
relation, are to become my fellow-citizens and go to the polls and vote with me and hold lands 
and deal in every other way that a citizen of the United States has a right to do.”57 Thus, 
according to Howard, “excluding Indians not taxed” created the potential for more inclusion by 
basing citizenship on taxation instead of on being “subject to jurisdiction.”  
 Senator Williams supported Howard’s view that “subject to jurisdiction” was not only 
sufficiently exclusive but that it also allowed for a barrier between “fellow-citizens” and liminal 
subjects who were in national territory but not of it. He does this by introducing the notion that 
jurisdiction has two senses, one entailing subjection to law and the other entailing being a subject 
of law. He argued that  
 In one sense all persons born within the geographical limits of the United States are 
 subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, but they are not subject to the jurisdiction 





 of the United States in every sense. Take the children of an embassador [sic]. In one 
 sense, that child…is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, because if that child 
 commits the crime of murder…to a certain extent he is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
 United States, but not in every respect; and so with these Indians.  
Comparing ambassadors’ tradition of sovereign immunity with the sovereign legal status of 
Indigenous peoples, Williams reconciles the capacity to differentiate the homo sacer from 
“fellow-citizenship” and the power of the polls, or the expression of wills, that accompany it. 
Importantly, an ambassador would never be classified as a homo sacer because the international 
legal fiction of extra-territorial sovereignty envelops them in the jurisdiction of their homeland. 
During this time period, indigenous peoples had a completely different relationship to nation-
state sovereignty than ambassadors because the Marshall Trilogy had classified them as “quasi-
sovereigns,” lying somewhere between alien, domestic, and foreign.58 However, by making the 
comparison between Indigenous sovereignty and extra-territorial sovereignty, Williams winks at 
the senators concerned with the need to “impose the law” on non-citizen American Indians while 
simultaneously excluding them from citizenship.  
 Williams goes on to explain how the amendment still preserves the figure of the homo 
sacer by elucidating the rhetorical dimension of jurisdiction, stating that “All persons living 
within a judicial district may be said to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court until they are 
brought, by proper process, within the reach of the power of the court. I understand the words 
                                                 
58 Johnson v. McIntosh (1821) declared that American Indians did not possess an enforceable title to their land and 
thus, enjoyed the right of occupancy, but not ownership. Importantly, by defining American Indians as property-less, 
this case provided the legal infrastructure necessary for the US to implement the allotment program in the first place. 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) and Worcester v. Georgia (1832) held that tribes were separate nations with 
their own laws but were not sovereign foreign nations. Instead, American Indian nations were “domestic dependent 




here…to mean fully and completely subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”59 The 
distinction between dwelling within territorial jurisdiction and being brought within the reach of 
the power of the court that can decipher and enact one’s “complete” subjection highlights the 
fact that jurisdiction does not merely describe an already existing legal relationship between 
subjects, institutions, and territories. Jurisdiction acts, bringing these legal relationships into 
being through its instantiation as a “decision which makes the law effective.”60 In this way, 
jurisdiction constitutes the basis for the law’s performative capacity, or what Marianne Constable 
refers to as its socially-sanctioned capacity to do things—to bind, to marry, to sentence, etc.61 
This is why jurisdiction requires rhetoric to not only construct a convincing narrative that speaks 
the law into being, but also to perform the law as sovereign, or as possessing ultimate authority 
within a territory or institution. Thus, Williams’ speech depicts jurisdiction as unilaterally 
subjecting people to law (i.e., upon committing murder) while also being dependent on the 
‘second sense’ of recognition (i.e., the courts, judicial process, etc.). This duality highlights what 
Zornitsa Keremidchieva calls the assemblage of jurisdiction rhetoric, its ability to “assembl[e] 
bodies, interests, institutions, and identities through which the institutional discursive 
infrastructure of state power is constituted and mobilized.”62  
 Jurisdiction is thus, integral to sustaining the presence of the of alien citizen because it 
maintains the authority of the jurispathic principle of law while effacing the trace of violence and 
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coercion. Cover contends that jurisdiction is the performance of neutrality and authority that the 
judge needs to mask the violent force of the law.63 The speaking of the law, the declaration of 
jurisdiction, makes present the legal limit and makes the unwritten informal “normative 
condition of possibility visible and readable.”64 The intertwinement of sovereign power and 
rhetoric in jurisdiction also elucidates how it resolves the potentially perilous regicidal consent of 
liberal citizenship. Even though the modern legal science of jurisdiction theorizes it as a 
voluntary relation between subject and state, the lived experiences of subjects within specific 
jurisdictions often feel much more like preordained status relationships. For instance, Ford 
claims, “territorial identities are in an important sense remnants of the era before the modern 
hegemony of contractual social relations…like the social positions of the family, they are largely 
involuntary relationships of status.”65 People are born into jurisdictions just like they are born 
into families and into ascriptive communities. Just as contracts are most often written and 
implemented by those who already possess excess power, jurisdictions are drawn and enforced 
by the state.  
 After Williams’ speech, the amendment passed with Howard’s version of the citizenship 
clause with a 30 to 10 vote. The 39th Congress’ discussion of jurisdiction as the basis of 
citizenship illuminates that at that time, the best way to close the gap between the ideological 
space of the nation and the territories and bodies inhabiting the spaces between its various 
jurisdictions was to bring out the rhetorical nature of law. Nevertheless, Williams’ solution to the 
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jurisdictional problem of inclusivity did not last, even though his words would be cited 
repeatedly to ward off the crisis of inclusivity lurking in the 14th amendment’s new citizenship.66   
 Even after the language of the 14th amendment was finally agreed upon on May 30, 1866, 
Congress, jurists, and state officials continued to struggle over how inclusive the amendment 
actually was, especially what “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” entailed. As the process of 
“incorporating America” continued, the government frequently had to confront the status of the 
indigenous lands and bodies under its jurisdiction. Did continuous incorporation mean that 
indigenous peoples would be given all the rights and privileges of citizens? Since the early 
American settlers had treated indigenous peoples as separate nation-states, could the United 
States even incorporate these lands legally? Moreover, as migration from Latin America and 
Asia increased to meet the demand for labor brought about by nation-building, lawmakers began 
to look for ways to keep the US-born children of these migrants from becoming citizens and 
thus, gaining any kind of political power.67 Motivated by the contradictory pulls of profit and 
white nationalism, politicians sought ways to legally incorporate laboring bodies and indigenous 
peoples’ lands while circumscribing these bodies’ movement from flesh to Man.68 The 14th 
amendment’s social (after)life, or what Thurgood Marshall sees as its rhetorical tools, made this 
difficult.   
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  The treatment of American Indians after the drafting of the amendment illustrates the 
role of the “gypsy”—as subject and as “social (after)life” in making law. Prompted by ongoing 
debate within congress as to whether the 14th amendment made indigenous peoples citizens, the 
House Committee on the Judiciary declared that American Indians who were members of 
recognized tribes were not “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” the United States and thus, were 
not citizens.69 However, the last paragraph of the report notoriously left the legal status of non-
tribal, so-called “stray,” American Indians ambiguous, stating that “when the members of a tribe 
are scattered, they are merged in the mass of our people, and become equally subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States.”70 Though this language might have been put in to nullify any 
treaty obligations with tribes enduring the violence of removal, it also opened up space for 
contesting removal by claiming citizenship.71  
 Dandy’s Band’s demand for citizenship under the 14th amendment in the 1870s is one 
example of the way that jurisdiction also allowed for counter-hegemonic paradoxical 
interpretations of jurisdiction and thus, the sovereign authority to declare who a citizen is via 
exclusion. Dandy’s Band was a segment of “stray” Ho-Chunk (also known as the “Wandering 
Winnebago”) who had refused to relocate from Wisconsin to Nebraska during the removal 
campaigns of the 1830s. As the industrialization of the West intensified in the 1860s and 1870s, 
the remaining Ho-Chunk in Wisconsin were targets of removal campaigns in order to ensure the 
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peace of the railroad and settlers.72 However, decades of removal had caused major shifts in Ho-
Chunk daily life and many had been incorporated into the developing economy of Wisconsin, 
trading maple sugar, berries, ponies, and furs with local settlers.73 For example, one of the head 
chiefs, Winneshiek, contested removal by appealing to their incorporation in Wisconsin’s market 
economy in a speech to the Wisconsin congress by saying “I want to stay in Wisconsin and pick 
huckleberries. Got land here. Want to stay here and trade and Keep store…Some of your people 
like me well.”74 Some local papers also showed support for Dandy’s Band, by citing the amount 
of land owned by Ho-Chunks and their ability to maintain a “comfortable livelihood” by 
trading.75  
 After trying several different ways of usurping Wisconsin’s desire to remove the 
remaining Ho-Chunk from the state, Henry Lee, one of the lawyers representing Dandy’s Band 
petitioned the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs. He stated that per the 14th amendment and the 
1870 report on the status of American Indians, members of Dandy’s Band were US citizens by 
birthright and thus, the state could not remove them. He wrote that they had “severed ties” with 
the main tribe, “purchased real estate,” and “adopted the habits and customs of civilized life.” 
They were born on US soil and were now “subject to jurisdiction” and wanted to secure “the 
constitutional and inalienable rights of men.”76 Though this move was not immediately 
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successful in staving off removal or in gaining recognition as citizens, it sparked debate and 
censorship among congress and state officials. For example, when Wisconsin sought 
appropriations to remove Dandy’s Band, other members of Congress contested, claiming that  
 They have lost their tribal organization, and are to all intents and purposes, in 
 contemplation of law, so many inhabitants, and I suppose citizens, of the State of 
 Wisconsin, because under your new amendment to the Constitution all persons born of 
 naturalized in the US, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
 States and of the State wherein they reside…I do not propose that the Secretary of War or 
 the Secretary of the Interior shall take fifteen hundred or two or three thousand of the 
 citizens of Wisconsin and forcibly transport them and send them west of the 
 Mississippi.77 
These concerns required Wisconsin to “consensually” remove Dandy’s Band and the remaining 
Ho-Chunk.78 As such, BIA agents had to figure out whether individual members lived in houses, 
raised crops, and showed other signs of “civilization.”79 By the end of 1874, Wisconsin moved to 
extend citizenship to Dandy’s Band as well as the benefits of the Homestead Act, enabling 
members to stay in Wisconsin on their lands. The Band’s success, however, elicited anxiety 
about American Indians who fit under US jurisdiction due to their birth in a rapidly incorporating 
territory, and politicians quickly looked for a way to once again clearly delineate citizen from 
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alien.80 As the next chapter will show, a decade later, Elk v. Wilkins (1884) declared that non-
tribal (i.e., “stray”) American Indians are not subject to US jurisdiction.  
 Dandy’s Band’s use of jurisdictional citizenship conveys that the topos of jurisdiction 
proved to be a double-edge sword for jurists and politicians concerned with keeping “gypsies” 
and other aliens away from citizenship. This is because jurisdiction is rhetorical; it is comprised 
by signifiers that have an effect in the world and yet its referents are not quite manageable. Lacan 
illustrates the problem inherent in any mode of address when he states that “the system of 
language, at whatever point you take hold of it, never results in an index finger directly 
indicating a point of reality; it’s the whole of reality that is covered by the entire network of 
language.”81 Thus, jurisdiction highlights that the totality of law—not just individual statutes, but 
the entire power to make and enforce law—is still stuck in the system of language that keeps 
legal actors from holding onto the referents of legal rhetoric. In addition to its rhetoricity, 
jurisdiction is also a concrete location. Thus, it also exceeds any attempt to rhetorically 
manipulate it in the way that Williams and those who cite him envision. Because Dandy and 
other outsiders inhabit and cross into territories that end up being incorporated under US 
jurisdiction, they can turn citizenship via jurisdiction towards interpretations that legitimize their 
belonging to the soil. Thus, as topos, jurisdiction’s social (after)life is the site upon which 
citizenship law has tried to manage the wayward mobility of legal rhetoric and legal bodies. As 
topos, jurisdiction is always a bit unmanageable.  
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The Social (After)Life of Jurisdiction 
 Liberalism describes an ideal politics where an impersonal community of citizens 
legitimize governance through consent. However, in practice the rules and norms governing how 
to judge these tenets are scrutinized in order to guard against paradox by ensuring the continued 
refusal of alien citizenship. As this chapter has demonstrated, jurisdiction has been a key site of 
defining and displacing the “gypsy” because, as the tropological basis of law, its “two senses” 
support a flexible mode of inclusive exclusion. Jurisdiction formally facilitates such flexibility 
because is not just a substantive set of rules or boundaries for defining power and authority over 
an area. It is also the formal venue by which the state’s legal apparatus validates and performs its 
own claim to sovereignty; it is the power that allows for the definition of rules in the first place.82 
Moreover, by erecting boundaries around a particular set of legal powers and authorities, 
jurisdiction creates different kinds of subjects under the law that can then be managed according 
to modern liberal forms of governance.83 In this way, jurisdiction brings into being the legal 
subjects over which it exercises authority, constructing subjects as urban or rural, citizen or alien, 
foreigner or native.84 For this reason, jurisdictional subjectivities are integral to maintaining 
supposedly color blind racial hierarchies in liberal public culture.85  
 Jurisdiction sustains this circular logic because it is, in part, rhetorical; as the voice of the 
law, jurisdiction at once narrativizes and naturalizes the law.86 Because jurisdiction is rhetorical, 
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its enactment relies on its figuration in a symbolic economy of discourse, necessitating writing, 
interpretation, and all of the anxieties that accompany the dissemination of discourse. For this 
reason, Leti Volpp has argued that the question of whether someone is “inside particular 
territorial borders” or “outside at the gates” is not easily answered by pointing to the bright white 
line in the sand or to a corpus of laws and policies.87 This is because the interpretation of 
jurisdiction in immigration and citizenship law has continuously reworked not only who the 
citizen is, but also what the state is—where its territorial and political boundaries are as well as 
what kind of power it bears in relation to the citizen. Analyzing the social (after)life of the 14th 
amendment demonstrates that jurisdiction’s allowance of impersonal voluntarism brings about a 
crisis in liberalism that continues to haunt the judicial register of 14th amendment citizenship law 
into the present era.    
                                                 












CHAPTER THREE:  DECIDING JURISDICTION IN ELK V WILKINS (1884) AND US V 
WONG KIM ARK (1898) 
 
  
Who is a citizen of the United States is an open question—Senator Johnson, May 30, 1866.1 
 
All persons living within a judicial district may be said to be subject to the jurisdiction of  the 
court until they are brought, by proper process, within the reach of the power of the court. I 
understand the words here…to mean fully and completely subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States. —Senator Williams in 1866.2 
 
 
 Zornitsa Keremidchieva notes that the jurisdictional stasis in Congressional debates 
constitutes a “stubborn problem” that draws lines of inclusion and exclusion that are contingent 
and movable.3 Senator Williams’ evocation of the two senses of jurisdiction—the rhetorical and 
the territorial—demonstrates how this stubborn problem was put to work in order to carve out a 
system of flexible exclusion in US citizenship jurisprudence. However, in the late 19th century, 
doxa regarding jurisdiction was not uniform and there was still considerable debate among jurists 
over how the Court should interpret the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” Moreover, as 
the century progressed, more and more people who had been traditionally excluded from 
citizenship based on racial identity advocated for their inclusion into the new citizenship status.4 
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In response to these new claims for citizenship, the state did not act uniformly. For American 
Indians, citizenship was granted and denied, withheld and imposed according to treaty 
agreements and, after 1871, bureaucratic whims.5 While the US government did not formally 
deny citizenship to the US-born children of Chinese nationals, they were detained, deported, or 
denied entry was dependent on their interaction with immigration and customs officials.6  
 Complicating matters, the debate over interpreting “subject to jurisdiction” was 
embroiled in a long-standing conflict over whether the emerging American legal canon was 
based in the international-civil tradition of law or in the English common law tradition.7 These 
traditions put forth opposing jurisdiction narratives, which, as shown in the last chapter, describe 
and enact the source and breadth of sovereignty. Common law doxa conceived of “subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof” as referencing the tradition of jus soli, or right of soil, which stipulates that 
people become subject to jurisdiction by being born on national soil. In contrast, civilian doxa 
posited that people are not citizens unless the nation-state explicitly grants them the political 
status of citizen. While the civilian tradition traditionally based subjection to jurisdiction on 
blood, or jus sanguinis (right of blood), after Reconstruction and the formal universalization of 
citizenship in the 14th amendment, civilians in the United States began defining political 
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jurisdiction as premised on recognition, which was frequently figured as lex, or the positive law 
that Justice Fuller references in his opposition to birthright citizenship cited in the first chapter.8  
 Both jurisdiction narratives resonated with the legal cultures that used them through their 
organization around three central metaphors undergirding Anglo-European law: blood, soil, and 
lex, or positive law. As mentioned in the introduction, that these signifiers function as tropes is 
important because tropes work economically to organize references for the subject in language. 
Metaphors become “sticky” through their accumulation of value as “effect of a history of 
articulation,” where subjects invest signs with repeated habitual cathexis. While signifiers 
become metaphors when they matter immensely for the subjects that use them, metonyms “slide” 
between and among objects, making connections by ordering signifiers in a field of difference.9 
As such, blood, law, and soil metaphorically organize meanings and feelings towards birthright 
citizenship by substituting for the ultimate source of authority to bring people together as a 
nation. For this reason, blood and soil especially remain key tropes for articulating national 
belonging even outside of the legal sphere.10 Even though, as will be demonstrated in the 
following chapters, law keeps being articulated as the “source” of authority to declare who is a 
birthright citizen, blood and soil remain the dominant ways that people talk about citizenship and 
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national belonging. Importantly, however, blood, soil, and law figure contradictory relationships 
between citizen, state, and alien, opening “subject to jurisdiction” to multiple possibilities and 
thus, to much anxiety.  
 This chapter investigates how these competing tropes were put to work in the jurisdiction 
narratives undergirding early constructions of the 14th Amendment’s citizenship clause. 
Specifically, I analyze and compare two pivotal Supreme Court decisions—Elk v. Wilkins (1884) 
and United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), both of which tested the boundaries of citizenship 
status as the United States sought to incorporate more territory and labor while excluding the 
racialized peoples that inhabited and worked the land. Prior to these cases, the Slaughterhouse 
Cases (1873) and United States v. Cruikshank (1876) had already completely changed the 14th 
amendment’s relationship to civil rights by holding that the amendment only protects the United 
States (i.e., not individual state) citizen’s rights, privileges, and immunities.11 Nevertheless, Elk 
and Wong were the first two major Supreme Court decisions testing the racial inclusivity of the 
citizenship clause. Wong is still a landmark decision whose interpretation of the 14th amendment 
is the (contested) basis for our current US citizenship law.  
 In Elk, the Court decided whether non-tribal American Indians were US citizens by 
birthright. Though eventually superseded by the ratification of the Indian Citizenship Act (ICA) 
in 1924, Elk was a significant case in clarifying law and policy towards American Indians in an 
era marked by genocide and dispossession. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the plaintiff John Elk 
was not a US citizen by birthright because the federal government had never formally consented 
to his membership. In addition to setting the precedent for American Indian citizenship, the 
rhetoric that the majority decision used in legitimizing the Elk decision continued in citizenship 
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jurisprudence throughout the 20th and 21st centuries in rationalizing the exclusion of 
undocumented migrants’ children from citizenship. Specifically, drawing on a civilian 
‘jurisprudential’ notion of jurisdiction, Elk held that being subject to jurisdiction entails state 
recognition expressed through lex, or positive law. Though penned by the same Justice Horace 
Gray, United States. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) came to roughly the opposite position regarding 
territorial jurisdiction, ruling that a person’s birth on US soil—irrespective of parental 
nationality, ethnicity, or explicit consent—was sufficient grounds for U.S. citizenship. Thus, by 
repurposing for the modern territorial nation-state a version of common law subjectship that 
upheld the subject’s perpetual allegiance to the sovereign, Wong opens the door for a kind of 
citizenship that is based in nomos, or the pre-political law of the land. 
 In the end, I argue that both narratives continue to organize legal interpretations of 
citizenship law because they tap into two distinct national fantasies that compensate for 
liberalism’s promise (or threat) of consensual impersonalism: jurisdiction as lex and jurisdiction 
as nomos. In line with Williams’ extra sense of jurisdiction, Elk’s presentation of jurisdiction as 
lex puts the power of judging who is and is not a citizen in state actors, guaranteeing the 
appearance of the homo sacer after the 14th amendment. In contrast, jurisdiction as nomos 
sustains the fantasy of national harmony by eradicating the need to discursively mediate the 
nation. This is a potent locus of enjoyment, and thus, investment, because it fosters the fantasy of 
extra-rhetorical belonging. The following two chapters investigate the ramifications of both 
senses of jurisdiction, ultimately showing that both are deployed to guard against the potential of 




The Jurisprudence of Elk v. Wilkins (1884): The Soil Is Not Enough   
 In the 19th century, the ambiguity of American Indians’ citizenship often teetered 
between their pre-colonial relationship to the land and the competing idea that their race made 
them unfit for citizenship.12 While westward looking settlers advocated for continuing the Indian 
Wars and removal with the hopes of eventually ridding the continent of indigenous peoples, 
reformers advocated for “civilization” and “assimilation.” Although both American Indians and 
Chinese migrants were seen as anathema to a wholly incorporated America by mainstream 
public culture, a growing group of former abolitionists and Eastern reformers turned to Indian 
citizenship as the next frontier in unifying the nation according to Reconstruction values.13 These 
reformers created what were known as “friends of Indians” organizations, which provided legal 
aid to American Indians and lobbied for policies that furthered assimilation. Even though war 
and genocide were still very much widespread, reformers began garnering more popular support 
after the Civil War, as many people began to see American Indians as victims of white greed for 
land instead of as perpetuators of violence.14 Even so, another segment of the white population 
advocated for segregating indigenous peoples on reservations in order to “protect” them from 
white settlers, as well as to make their land available to settlement.  
 All these discourses pivoted on resolving the ambiguity of American Indians’ legal status 
as legal cases and policies attempted to adjudicate what the state could and could not do to 
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resolve the problems wrought by colonial expansion. Originally treated as citizens of their own 
sovereign nations by the first settler colonialists, the Marshall Trilogy declared Indigenous 
peoples to be wards of the state who did not possess an enforceable title to their land, writing 
them into US law as human beings whom the law cannot represent.  Similar to how Dred Scott v. 
Sandford (1857) established that even when not enslaved, Black people were still not considered 
citizens because they were not figured as “people” in the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy 
established that members of indigenous nations were somewhere between foreigner, alien, and 
citizen.15 Indigenous peoples were not entirely foreigners because, like Dandy’s Band, many 
were born and lived within US jurisdiction. But they were also not citizens because they 
possessed their own nations and forms of governance. Even though particular nations were 
granted citizenship through treaty, they were excluded as a class from citizenship. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, this changed with the inclusive wording of the 14th 
amendment, however, and many politicians began to worry that American Indians (and 
“gypsies,” and Chinese people) would become imbued with the rights of citizenship. 
 One of the most important clarifications of indigenous legal status, and a direct precursor 
to Elk, was Standing Bear v. Crook (1879), which held that American Indians are persons under 
the law and, thus, were entitled to habeas corpus as well as the ability to expatriate themselves 
from their nations.16 The lawyers that argued on behalf of Standing Bear—A.J. Poppleton and 
John L. Webster—were prominent progressive lawyers in Nebraska who were active in 
assimilationist organizations such as the newly formed Indian Rights Association (IRA). In 
                                                 
15 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); The Marshall Trilogy consists of Johnson v. McIntosh 21 U.S. 543 
(1821); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 30 U.S. 1 (1831); and Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. 551 (1832) 
 




Standing Bear as well as in Elk, they worked alongside American Indian activist Susette La 
Flesche, who had published books and articles promoting assimilation for American Indians. La 
Flesche served as a witness in Standing Bear and likely connected John Elk to Poppleton and 
Webster.17  
 After the lawyers’ victory in Standing Bear, reformers turned to American Indian 
citizenship, which they saw as the ultimate path to assimilation. During Reconstruction, 
citizenship took on new meanings, signifying not only membership in a national totality but also 
the republican ideals of civilization, progress, and civic engagement. As Bethany Berger shows 
in her comparative history of Elk and Wong, Poppleton and Webster’s closing arguments in 
Standing Bear mobilized these dominant Reconstruction ideals as well as the House Committee 
on the Judiciary’s report on the 14th amendment. They argued that when an Indian severed tribal 
relations, he automatically became a citizen by becoming “absorbed” in the body politic.18 For 
this reason, Berger contends that Poppleton and Webster likely had the Elk case prepared before 
they actually found John Elk; “with the arguments prepared and the research done, all that [they] 
needed was a client.”19 Thus, it is probable that Poppleton and Webster instructed Elk to vote in 
the election in order to create a test case, forcing a definitive decision on whether American 
Indians who were not members of recognized tribes were citizens of the United States. As such, 
very little is known about John Elk or his actual role in the case. There are no archival records of 
Elk other than the Nebraska census and Elk. Nevertheless, Berger indicates that he likely sought 
help from Poppleton and Webster as well as other “friends of Indians” in order to escape 
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removal.20 As shown in the previous chapter, the government had relocated Elk’s Ho-
Chunk/Winnebago nation five times since his birth in order to settle and expand territory in 
Wisconsin and Nebraska. In the context of genocide and forced removal, Elk likely sought 
citizenship not because he desired to assimilate into white civic life. Like Dandy’s Band, he 
sought material stability and safety for himself and his family.  
Thus, what is known is that on April 6, 1880, Elk walked into a voting booth in Omaha to 
vote in a local election. When local registrar John Wilkins refused to allow him to vote, Elk’s 
lawyers filed suit. The case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court after the Nebraska 
court turned it down without a hearing. In the writ of error, Poppleton and Webster argued that 
Elk was in fact a citizen of the United States according to the 14th Amendment because, in 
addition to being born on US soil, “more than one year prior to the grievances hereinafter 
complained of, he had severed his tribal relations to the Indian tribes, and had fully and 
completely surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the United States, and still so continues 
subject to jurisdiction of the United States.”21 By showing that Elk had renounced his tribal 
affiliation and had lived and worked among whites, the lawyers attempted to make the same 
arguments that led Dandy’s Band to eventually be classified as citizens via the 14th amendment.  
According to the lawyers’ rhetoric, because American Indians bear a privileged 
relationship to the soil—by technically being born on what had become US territory—they 
become subjected to US jurisdiction whence they leave their tribes and begin to work and live 
among whites. Non-tribal American Indians as a class then, do not require naturalization or any 
explicit recognition of their change in status. The dissenting opinion authored by Justice Harlan, 
                                                 
20 Berger, 1191. 
 




makes a similar argument: Elk “joins himself to the body politic” through his daily life “working 
and living on US soil.” Moreover, by paying taxes, Elk had “become so far incorporated with the 
mass of the people of Nebraska.”22 Thus, utilizing the metaphors associated with jus soli, Elk’s 
advocates argued that people are made citizens via national soil; American Indians, whence they 
relinquish tribal affiliation, are hailed as citizens through territorial interpellation.  
 Despite using the same methods of proving citizenship that Dandy’s Band and countless 
other so-called “stray” individuals had used, it was considered paradoxical that American Indians 
as a race could be considered part of the body politic. Justice Gray’s majority decision held that 
Elk was not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States and thus, not a citizen according to 
the 14th amendment. In writing the decision, Gray contends that the main question guiding the 
case is “whether an Indian, born a member of one of the Indian tribes within the United States, 
is, merely by reason of his birth within the United States, and of his afterwards voluntarily 
separating himself from his tribe and taking up his residence among white citizens, a citizen of 
the United States, within the meaning of the first section of the fourteenth amendment of the 
constitution.”23 In posing the question in this way, Gray highlights the three rhetorical themes 
that he will employ to uphold Nebraska’s decision: Elk’s racialization, the mereness of territorial 
jurisdiction, and the role of the state’s express consent in the 14th amendment.  
 From the very beginning, the decision classifies Elk as an “Indian” and as an “Indian not 
taxed” to show that Elk was not born subject to US jurisdiction. Beginning with the Constitution, 
Gray writes that “originally established, ‘Indians not taxed’ were excluded from the persons 
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apportioned among the several states,” and thus, were not included in “the people.”24 He then 
explains that the classification of “Indians not taxed” referred to a status of American Indian 
whereby “members of those tribes owed immediate allegiance to their several tribes, and were 
not part of the people of the United States. They were in a dependent condition, a state of 
pupilage, resembling that of a ward to his guardian.”25 American Indians who fit this status were 
not subjects under the law and “general acts of congress did not apply to Indians, unless so 
expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them.”26 To support this contention, Gray 
cites the Constitution as well as the Marshall Trilogy, which held that Indigenous nations were 
separate political communities that vacillated between foreign nation and independent state. 
Thus, despite being born within the boundaries of the United States, American Indians were not 
inside the national body politic because they directed their primary allegiance towards their 
tribes, which were not separate nation-states but were separate political communities. However, 
while the above demonstrates that American Indians who still live in tribal territories and profess 
primary allegiance to their nations were not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, it 
does not prove that people like Elk were necessarily exempt. After all, Elk had severed ties with 
the Winnebago nation and had lived and worked among white people during the last year, 
making him one of the “stray” Indians that the House Committee on the Judiciary defined as 
“subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.27 
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 In addressing this issue, Gray’s decision contends that American Indians as a race do not 
possess the ability to change their status at will even if they are severed from their nations 
because they do not possess the capability of absorbing themselves into the body politic. The 
decision states, “the alien and dependent condition of the members of the Indian tribes could not 
be put off at their own will without the action or assent of the United States.”28 In other words, 
Elk cannot shed his status as a member of the Winnebago nation because as an American Indian, 
he does not possess the sovereign subjectivity (i.e., the competence) required to do so. While this 
statement seems to answer the question regarding Elk’s capability to declare himself a citizen of 
the United States., Gray’s decision has to confront the same inconsistency that Congress 
addressed during the drafting of the 14th amendment and during debates over Dandy’s Band: if 
the liberal doctrine of expatriation, which was formally declared statutorily in the Expatriation 
Act of 1868 and then extended to American Indians in Standing Bear, allows people to “put off 
at their own will” their citizenship acquired at birth, then why is this person’s consent to join a 
state that he was born in not sufficient?   
 Some late 19th century lawyers resolved this conundrum by appealing to the civil law 
tradition that states possess the sovereign authority to determine who becomes subject to their 
jurisdiction. For example, law professor Alexander Morse argued in a series of articles and 
amicus briefs that according to civilian law, individual states within the United States possess the 
sovereign authority to define and regulate who enters, exits, and becomes subject to its 
jurisdiction—to speak the law as it wishes and to whom it wishes. He claims,  
 International law recognizes the power (or faculty) in a state to naturalize the subjects or 
 citizens of another but naturalization does not take place by virtue of said international 
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 law, but as a consequence of local legislation. So that the new citizen or subject is the 
 pure and exclusive creation of the civil and political laws of the country of adoption and 
 he will enjoy solely the rights, privileges, and immunities which they confer.29  
Morse references a theory of citizenship and jurisdiction that is entirely predicated on the state’s 
explicit recognition of its subjects through the medium of laws and statutes—the nation’s voice. 
Thus, instead of locating authority in the soil as common law would have it, the source of 
authority takes the form of law and statutes.  
 Jurists reconciled this view with liberalism by connecting it to the right of expatriation. 
For example, Morse connects this kind of authority to express consent when he argues that the 
rights of expatriation and emigration are easily reconciled with the seemingly contradictory right 
of states to denationalize citizens and bar certain kinds of subjects from membership. He argues,  
 The contradiction is only apparent […] The right of expatriation, then, like that of 
 naturalization, is subordinated under the point of view of international law to the general 
 principle that each independent state is sovereign in its own territory, and that its laws are 
 binding upon all persons who are within its jurisdiction, but that they have no force 
 beyond her territory.30 
Even though the citizen can say “no” by expatriating herself, only the state can ultimately say 
“yes.” While jus soli gestures towards common law and German nationalist theories of nation 
and belonging, Morse’s theorization of civil law illuminates the circularity of jurisdiction under 
liberalism: jurisdiction subjects people to the rule of law that have been rendered legal subjects 
by the very same rule of law. Of course, exit is always a possibility.  
                                                 





 However, if Gray’s decision were to rest on incongruence between Elk’s racial identity 
and the “people,” it would converge with social contract metaphor deployed in Dred Scott: 
American Indians are not citizens because they do not belong to the class of “people” imagined 
by the drafters of the Constitution, the original social compact. This argumentation would work 
for the antebellum order of things. However, after the 14th Amendment citizenship cannot be 
explicitly based on racial classification. Though Congress possessed the right to make racial 
restrictions regarding naturalization—as evidenced by the Chinese Exclusion Acts discussed 
below—no such migratory restrictions were made regarding American Indians.  
 Gray does not end with classifying Elk as an “Indian not taxed” however. In fact, the 
dissent claims that Gray’s holding does not even rest on this distinction, but instead it rests on the 
temporal limits of birth-on-US-soil.31 As such, after explaining the “Indian not taxed” 
designation, Gray asks whether Elk’s birth within the territorial boundaries of the United States 
allows him to later subject himself to its jurisdiction. In other words, because Elk was born on 
US soil but in a separate nation, the question becomes not whether an Indian not taxed can 
become absorbed into the body politic. Instead, Gray asks whether birth-on-soil allows the 
individual subject to “absorb” himself into the body politic later in life.  
 Gray answers these questions by severing territorial jurisdiction from political and 
national jurisdiction and then by privileging the latter over the former. Looking at the “two 
sources of citizenship that the Amendment declares: birth and naturalization,” the decision states, 
“the evident meaning of these last words is, not merely subject in some respect or degree to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing 
                                                 




them direct and immediate allegiance”32 As mentioned in the previous chapter, however, the 
distinction that Gray is trying to draw was not self-evident. Thus, Gray spends the latter half of 
the eleven-page decision clarifying the distinction he is trying to draw between being “merely 
subject” to the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and being “completely subject” to it. In 
doing so, Gray’s decision juxtaposes territorial and political jurisdiction, creating a hierarchy of 
jurisdictions that will have an unforeseen rhetorical force in the coming century.  
 The decision subordinates territorial jurisdiction to political jurisdiction by highlighting 
the exceptions to territorial jurisdiction: enemies and ambassadors. After glossing the historical 
treatment of these two groups, Gray demonstrates the insufficiency of territorial jurisdiction by 
drawing equivalences between American Indians and foreign ambassadors. Citing Williams’ 
speech from the congressional debates in 1866, the decision claims that even though Indigenous 
peoples are born on US soil “in a geographical sense,” they are born in allegiance to “an alien 
though dependent power,” which makes them akin to “subjects of a foreign government.”33 
Alluding to the fiction of extraterritorial sovereignty, which holds that foreigners are subjects of 
their homeland and not the visited country, Gray holds that American Indians might be born on 
national soil but they are not of national soil because of their pertinence to another sovereign.  
 Conceding that Elk had renounced his membership to the Winnebago nation, Gray then 
adds, “but an emigrant from any foreign state cannot become a citizen of the United States 
without a formal renunciation of his old allegiance, and an acceptance by the United States of 
that renunciation through such form of naturalization as may be required by law.”34 Citing the 
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Marshall Trilogy, Gray then cements the alien-indigenous person equivalence by declaring that 
even though the federal government ceased making new treaties with Indigenous nations in order 
to solidify their classification as “in a dependent condition, a state of pupilage, resembling that of 
a ward to his guardian” they are still separate nations.35 Thus, citing a so-called “stray tribe,” 
whose remaining members were granted citizenship and voting rights, Gray cites that “they have 
totally extinguished their national fire, and submitted themselves to the laws of the states.”36 In 
other words, because the Winnebago’s “national fire” still burns—even after a series of forced 
removals and relocations—Elk is not capable of dispersing among the masses enough to warrant 
inclusion into the body politic; the soil is not enough to overtake his birth allegiance to the 
Winnebago nation. In this way, because the Winnebago nation exists, Elk is akin to an 
ambassador who carries with him Winnebago sovereignty and allegiance wherever he moves 
throughout US territory, unable to shed it through his own choice. 
 After turning territorial jurisdiction into a lesser form of legal address, Gray reads the 14th 
Amendment’s citizenship clause as stipulating national/political jurisdiction, constructing the 
citizen as a particular time/space configuration. It is at this point where Gray’s decision most 
directly resembles Morse’s liberalized civilian conception of citizenship in equating political 
jurisdiction not with recognition of a political status transmitted through bloodline but with the 
state’s explicit consent to its members. As such, Gray illuminates what state consent looks like 
by citing former treaties and statutes that have granted citizenship status to specific Indigenous 
nations. For example, he claims that “the treaty of 1867 with the Kansas Indians strikingly 
illustrates the principle that no one can become a citizen of a nation without its consent, and 
                                                 






directly contradicts the supposition that a member of an Indian tribe can at will be alternately a 
citizen of the US and a member of the tribe.”37 He then cites similar treaties with the Wyandots 
and with the Five Civilized Tribes. The decision’s final lines continue this line of reasoning, 
stating that  
 An Indian cannot make himself a citizen of the United States without the consent and co-
 operation of the government. The fact that he has abandoned his nomadic life or tribal 
 relations, and adopted the habits and manners of civilized people, may be a good reason 
 why he should be made a citizen of the United States, but does not of itself make him 
 one. To be a citizen of the United States is a political privilege which no one, not born to, 
 can assume without its consent.38  
 Here, Gray’s explanation of consent turns the liberal logic of popular consent on its head; the 
state’s express consent subjects the person to jurisdiction, not the other way around. Such a 
rhetorical maneuver constructs the body politic as impenetrable from the bottom up. Like a 
vampire, the US nation must invite its citizens in.  
 These rhetorical moves contribute to a decision that, as Justices Harlan and Woods 
indicate in their dissent, “construes the fourteenth amendment as if it read: ‘All persons born 
subject to the jurisdiction of, or naturalized in, the United States, are citizens of the United States 
and of the state in which they reside” instead of “All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,…”39 They argue that Gray reads the amendment as 
though “born in the United States” and “subjection to jurisdiction” must be coincidental instead 
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of consecutive clauses joined by “and.”  In reading the amendment thusly Gray circumscribes the 
time at which the “accident of birth” renders someone subject to jurisdiction and expands the 
time within which the state maintains the sovereign right to expressly consent to its citizens 
through naturalization. In doing so, Gray’s decision defines jurisdiction as not only political and 
national, and thus, irreducible to birth within a territory. For Gray, jurisdiction is also as 
premised on the state’s temporally continuous recognition of and consent to the subject.  
 What kind of rhetorical labor is Gray’s articulation of jurisdiction performing? How does 
it deal with the possible paradoxical inclusion of Elk in 14th amendment citizenship law? In other 
words, if liberalism stipulates that membership in the body politic emerges from the sovereignty 
of the subject—and not the state—then what happens when undesirable subjects demand to be 
included under language that can feasibly include everyone? As Sora Han asks, how must 
exclusions be articulated so as to uphold the fantasy of colorblindness and freedom that 
undergird the liberal imaginary?40 What are the consequences of writing the law thusly and what 
kinds of national spaces, boundaries, and subjectivities does it open and close?  
 Gray’s depiction of jurisdiction in Elk answers these questions by locating the source of 
sovereignty in lex, or in positive law. While such a location is often characterized as a neutral 
and logical way of deducing legality, it ultimately relies on rhetoric in the form of judgement, 
speaking, and dissemination.41 State actors must write laws, jurists are tasked with judging their 
legality, and bureaucrats from the Bureau of Indian Affairs are tasked with judging each 
indigenous person’s fitness for citizenship. Though seemingly neutral, the narrativization of 
jurisdiction as emerging via lex places an immense amount of power in state actors to regulate 
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the interpretation of citizenship. As lex, jurisdiction is figured as an interpellation through policy 
and substantive law, which guarantees the capacity to judge the homo sacer into existence, and 
thus, to regulate the antagonisms of liberalism.  
 Expanding on the historical definition of lex as merely the sovereign’s command or 
merely positive law, Arendt highlights the rhetorical nature of lex by reviving its definition as 
“enduring tie” and a relation of mutual recognition.42  Drawing on Montesquieu’s theorization of 
lex as rapport, or as a long-standing way of having a relationship, Arendt ties lex to publicity, 
speech, and action. Importantly, lex brings out the contractual nature of law, coming together 
“not by diktat or by an act of force but rather through covenants and mutual agreement.”43 
Stemming from the Roman basis of lex regia, which was ultimately premised on the people’s 
recognition of the king’s authority to declare law, lex highlights the consensual nature of 
legality—the fact that “states depend upon their subjects, as well as other states, to recognize 
their sovereignty—a dependence that ironically undercuts the very condition of independence 
that it is supposed to sustain.”44 In this way, Arendt aims to capture to jurisprudential nature of 
lex, its reliance on collective judgement (prudentia), which can be used to uphold state authority 
as well as to upend it. However, as evidenced by jurisdiction’s articulation in Elk, the state bears 
the ultimate jurispathic authority to judge when consent has happened and most of all whose 
consent matters in the last instance.  
 Like Williams, Elk highlights the rhetorical and ultimately juris-prudential basis of 
jurisdiction. That is, instead defining jurisdiction through one’s location within national territory, 
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Elk illuminates that jurisdiction must narrate the metaphoric source of power, which it figures as 
law and policy. In doing so, jurisdiction can continue to guarantee the appearance of a homo 
sacer, someone who is located within the reach of the law, and especially the court, but who is 
not recognized as a legal subject. While, this kind of rhetoric gestures towards the upcoming era 
of colorblind racism in US law, as the next chapter will demonstrate, it also forms one pillar of 
citizenship jurisprudence that disarticulates territorial dwelling from national belonging. As will 
be demonstrated, its social (after)life will provide topoi for subverting early 20th century use of 
citizenship as a tool of colonization.  
 
The Jurisdiction of United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898): On Nomos and the National Real 
 In many ways, Elk and Wong are incomparable. While Elk was born a member of the 
Winnebago nation in Nebraska, Wong Kim Ark was born in San Francisco to parents who had 
migrated from China. While Elk’s decision was based on whether “Indians” could make 
themselves citizens because of their relationship to US territory, Wong’s decision was based on 
whether parents transmit their political allegiances to their children. Nevertheless, both cases test 
the ethno-racial and political bounds of the 14th amendment through an interrogation of how 
racialized subjects—who were previously “illegible” in US law—become subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States. Moreover, even though Justice Gray wrote both decisions, they 
pose contradictory answers to this question, demonstrating that the vague, universal language of 
liberalism comes with the inability to capture both who the citizen is as well as what sort of 
power marks the citizen in the first place. Thus, of interest is what kinds of affective, symbolic, 
and institutional investments animate the slide between the two kinds of subjection to 
jurisdiction that the decisions memorialize in Constitutional law.  
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 Like Elk, Wong emerges in a cultural context of rampant anti-Chinese public sentiment 
and a judicial and political context of contradictory laws and policies towards regulating Chinese 
citizenship and migration. Berger claims, for example, that Elk and Wong both arose in a period 
in which citizenship and fitness for it became key axes of racial oppression.45 Though Chinese 
labor was incentivized, Chinese people, and more specifically Chinese women, were banned 
from migrating and from naturalizing in a series of Chinese Exclusion Acts that were upheld by 
the same Court that heard Wong.46 As such, much like the citizenship of unaffiliated American 
Indians, the citizenship of the US-born children of Chinese migrants was contested. A United 
States’ Circuit Court case from California, Look Tin Sing (1884), had established that the US-
born children of Chinese migrants were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and thus, 
were citizens under the 14th Amendment.47 However, as Lucy Salyer shows in her history of 
Chinese migrants’ interaction with Federal courts during the Chinese Exclusion era, port officials 
in California continued detaining citizen and non-citizen Chinese people when they attempted to 
reenter the country after returning from China.48 Thus, similar to American Indian encounters 
with various bureaucrats and court officials, Chinese and Chinese American people were treated 
as “illegible subjects” whose legal standing was treated ambiguously. In response to these 
detainments, however, a robust community of Chinese community organizations emerged, which 
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continuously supplied detainees with attorneys who would file habeas corpus petitions. Wong 
Kim Ark, who was detained for five months off the coast of California upon attempting to 
reenter the country after visiting his parents in China, was one of these legal aid recipients.  
 The petition filed by Wong’s lawyers, Thomas Riordan, Maxwell Evarts, and J. Hubley 
Ashton, describes Wong as a cook who was born in 1873 in San Francisco to Chinese migrants. 
The petition establishes that Wong “has had but one residence” even though he traveled to China 
in 1890 for a few months and then again in 1894.49 Upon attempting to reenter the country in 
1895, Wong’s application for reentry was denied on the grounds that he was not a citizen of the 
United States. After his attorneys filed a habeas corpus petition on his behalf, he was released 
only to be detained once again when the United States appealed the lower court’s decision. 
Wong’s lawyers cited Look Tin Sing, arguing that California had already upheld that “subject to 
the jurisdiction” referred to one’s birth within the state’s territorial jurisdiction. Once the case 
reached the Supreme Court, Wong had spent five months imprisoned on steamships off the coast 
of California.50  
 Justice Gray, joined by Justices Brewer, Brown, Shiras, White, and Peckham, wrote the 
majority decision, holding that section one of the Fourteenth Amendment declares jus soli 
citizenship for the United States. The significance and major effects of this decision will be 
discussed below and in the conclusion. However, as with Elk, the way in which Gray makes his 
decision—citing the common law to articulate a fundamental connection between allegiance, 
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territory, and jurisdiction—are also important in delineating what a citizen is because it outlines 
an entirely different way in which subjects are enrolled in the state.51 
 In many ways, the dispute between Gray’s majority decision and Fuller’s dissent is more 
about the place of the common law in an emerging “American jurisprudence” and less about the 
racialization of Wong Kim Ark and the rampant anti-Chinese sentiment of the era—though this 
is especially a factor in the dissent’s argumentation, which relies almost exclusively on 
xenophobic and racist tropes. However, as mentioned in the previous section, there was an 
ongoing and rather heated dispute between legal scholars as to which body of law was more 
appropriate for interpreting the 14th amendment’s citizenship clause. Historically, US citizenship 
was defined via the common law tradition of jus soli, albeit birth on soil only granted citizenship 
to white people. As opposed to Elk’s portrayal of political jurisdiction, jus soli locates 
sovereignty in national soil, which then possesses the power to make citizens.  
 The jus soli narrative of jurisdiction was also weighed against the political notion of 
jurisdiction (i.e., the extra sense). Importantly, the motive of weighing the two senses of 
jurisdiction was—like the debate in 1866—to decide which sense of jurisdiction allows for more 
national homogeneity and more power to regulate what kind of person is a citizen. For instance, 
in a rebuttal to Morse’s notion of political jurisdiction cited above, Henry Ide claimed that the 
connection between jurisdiction and territory was necessary in order to maintain sovereign 
authority over foreigners. He wrote “Conceding that the ‘jurisdiction’ referred to in the 
amendment means political national jurisdiction and not merely the jurisdiction of our laws, no 
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progress is made towards the conclusion that one born in our country is subject to the national or 
political ‘jurisdiction’ of another country, or is ‘subject to any foreign power.’”52 He goes on to 
indicate that  
 It is no answer to say that the child is born with the stamp of his father’s nationality upon 
 him. He is likewise born with the stamp, in case of domicile in the new country, of his 
 father’s actual domicile and intention never to renew or recognize his former allegiance 
 and to adhere to the new one. Which stamp is the more indelible and controlling? 
 Ultimately the latter controls in all cases.53  
In this way, these authors indicate that birth on the soil is what ultimately “stamps” the subject in 
its relationship to the law. Ide and Stoney, then, describe territorial jurisdiction as hailing 
subjects similar to how Carl Schmitt sees sovereign land-appropriation as erecting a nomos of the 
Earth, or a “terrestrial fundament, in which all law is rooted, in which space and law, order and 
orientation meet.”54 Soil “stamps” the subject with the imprint of the nation and allegiance to the 
state without the transmission of blood or consent.  
 In the Wong decision, Justice Gray adapts this interpretation of jurisdiction, cementing 
jus soli as the answer to questions regarding who is “subject to the jurisdiction, thereof.” Gray’s 
decision stakes its claim in this debate from the beginning when it claims that “the language of 
the constitution, as has been well said, could not be understood without reference to the common 
law.”55 Furthermore, he contends that prior to the 14th amendment’s declaration of citizenship, 
                                                 
52 Henry C. Ide, “Citizenship by Birth - Another View,” American Law Review 30 (1896): 248. 
 
53 Ide, 251. 
 
54 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum, trans. G. L. Ulmen 
(New York: Telos Press, 2006), 47. 
 




the common law was used to decide citizenship disputes. Thus, he claims that the citizenship 
clause “must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which 
were familiarly known to the framers of the constitution.”56 Here, Gray references the well-
known impact that the English common law had upon the framers of the Constitution. In writing 
Wong, Gray enacts the kind of common law jurisprudence extolled by early modern English 
jurists Edward Coke and John Selden. That is, eschewing other methods of construing the law 
such as natural law or legal positivism, he packs the decision full of precedent, painstakingly 
combing through centuries of English and US case law to demonstrate that the jus soli doctrine 
has dominated citizenship jurisprudence in Court. As such, Gray does not address the actual 
language of the fourteenth amendment until thirty-three pages into the fifty-page decision.  
 The majority decision’s use of common law argumentation is important not only because 
it legitimizes birth in national soil as ‘enough’ to be considered subject to jurisdiction. It also 
indexes a body of law that narrates the source of ultimate authority to recognize citizens as 
inherently rooted in territory and soil. For example, law journal articles supporting jus soli, 
analogized sovereignty to soil within territory. For instance, one law article from 1886 claims 
that no matter who a child’s parents are, when they are born on US soil, they are automatically 
subject to US jurisdiction because “the word jurisdiction means authority, power, potential 
authority, actual power […] The authority of a nation is co-extensive with its territory. The 
authority of a nation is limited to its territory. The authority of a nation is exclusive and supreme 
over persons and property within its own territory.”57 Here, the author repeatedly forges 
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equivalences between national authority and territory, supporting the contention that legal 
authority in general and the subjection to legal authority in particular is grounded in soil. 
 While civil law has a jurisprudential conception of law, conceiving of law as comprised 
of rules and norms that jurists apply to law in order to make logical deductions, common law 
conceives of the law as primarily jurisdictional, or as bound up with the material territories over 
which it exercises authority as well as the writs and records generated from the institutions that 
enforce it.58 Because of its tie to territory, common law, especially Edward Coke’s common law, 
was integral to the development of modern territorial jurisdiction.59 For example, the English 
decision Calvin’s Case (1608), which provides the legal groundwork for the US tradition of 
birthright citizenship, holds that people are the king’s subjects only in the king’s jurisdiction, 
effectively limiting his power to his territory. As Schmitt states, common law references the 
ancient notion that the original law is the soil. Tracing legal thought since the pre-Socratics, 
Schmitt states the earth is the mother of law (justissima tellus) in mythical language because 
“soil that is cleared and worked by human hands manifests firm lines,” creating an inherent 
order, “delineated by fences, enclosures.”60 Compared to the sea, the soil provides apparent 
unity, a way of erecting dominion and legitimizing authority.  
 Put another way, Gray’s copious citation of English common law is significant because it 
allows him to connect presence within a territory to not only allegiance but also to a kind of 
nomos evoked by the term jurisdiction within the context of common law. In this way, one could 
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say that instead of lex, the common law notion of jus soli brings forth nomos, or the extra-
rhetorical spatial dimension of law. For Schmitt, nomos should not be thought of as a norm or as 
positive law.61 In fact, the beauty of nomos for Schmitt is that it is not based in juris-prudence, 
norms, or positive law; “it is and remains the real kernel of an entirely concrete, historical, and 
political event.”62 Instead, nomos refers to its ancient semantic origins of “taking,” “distribution,” 
and “pasture,” which Schmitt sees as the constitutive historical event found at the beginning of 
every empire and nation-state.63 For Schmitt, nomos eradicates the concern for recognition with 
which ‘the other sense of jurisdiction’ concerns itself because the taking, manipulating, and 
appropriation of soil establish a spatial order of things that enroll diverse peoples as unified 
national subjects. This initial “taking” brings about a normative order of things through the 
political act of positing an inside and an outside, or a border between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ As such, 
Schmitt claims that “in its original sense […] nomos is precisely the full immediacy of a legal 
power not mediated by laws; it is a constitutive historical event—an act of legitimacy, whereby 
the legality of a mere law is first made meaningful.”64 Thus, the common law figuration of 
jurisdiction as nomos provokes an identification with law, land, and sovereignty that undergirds 
Wong.   
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 When Gray finally addresses the language of the amendment, he quickly explains that the 
key issue guiding the decision is jurisdiction, not race or familial lineage. He claims “the opening 
words, ‘All persons born,’ are general, not to say universal, restricted only by pace and 
jurisdiction, and not by color or race, as was clearly recognized in all the opinions delivered in 
the Slaughter House Cases, above cited.”65 Perhaps noting the potential contradiction to his Elk 
decision, he cites Elk, reiterating that sovereignty, not race was the issue. He claims,   
 It was decided that an Indian born a member of one of the Indian tribes within the United 
 States, which still existed and was recognized as an Indian tribe by the United States, 
 who had voluntarily separated himself from his tribe, and taken up his residence among 
 the white citizens of a state, but who did not appear to have been naturalized or taxed or 
 in any way recognized or treated as a citizen, either by the United States or by the state, 
 was not a citizen of the United States, as a person born in the United States, ‘and subject 
 to the jurisdiction thereof,’ within the meaning of the clause in question.66 
In other words, Elk was not denied citizenship because of his race, but because he was born in 
allegiance to another soil—the Winnebago nation—requiring him to go through the process of 
naturalization or be recognized by the state’s consenting speech act via law and policy.  
 The decision’s representation of Elk seems to reiterate its hierarchy of political over 
territorial jurisdiction. However, soon thereafter, Gray uses a pivotal Marshall opinion that 
articulates an historical and pragmatic connection between presence within territory, allegiance, 
and subjection to jurisdiction. Citing The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden (1812), the decision 
claims that “the jurisdiction of every nation within its own territory is exclusive and absolute, 
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and is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by the nation itself.”67 After noting the exceptions 
to this practice—children of enemies and children of foreign diplomats, he goes on to cite 
Marshall’s statement that there are sound reasons for not exempting aliens from exemption  
 from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found […] When private 
 individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as business or caprice may 
 direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other, or when merchant 
 vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous 
 to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to 
 degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, 
 and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country.68  
In other words, contrary to his Elk opinion, the mingling of the foreigner within the body politic 
subjects the foreigner to the jurisdiction of the state with or without the state’s explicit consent. 
Like tacit consent, when foreigners live and work within the jurisdiction, they not only become 
subject to it, but they also foster allegiance. “Merely” acting within US territory subjects 
everyone to a nomos, which allows for efficient governance since no one exists outside the law.  
 However, Marshall’s argument regarding the soundness of territorial jurisdiction does not 
answer the question at stake in Wong because the plaintiff was born in the United States. Thus, 
after proving that foreigners are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and pledge 
allegiance upon entering the territory, Gray declares that the 14th amendment “in clear words and 
in manifest intent, includes the children born within the territory of the United States of all other 
                                                 






persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States.”69 He supports this 
argument in two ways. First, relying once again on the Marshall citation, Gray claims that 
“Every citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and 
the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States.”70 Thus, once 
again mere presence within the territory subjects even foreigners to the jurisdiction of the United 
States. Next, however, Gray cites Coke’s monumental Calvin’s Case (1608) report, which 
upheld jus soli as the citizenship doctrine in England and its colonies. Through the voice of 
Coke, he claims that the parent’s allegiance “is direct and immediate, and, although but local and 
temporary, continuing only so long as he remains within our territory, is […] ‘strong enough to 
make a natural subject, for, if he hath issue here, that issue is a natural-born subject.’”71 Even if 
the parents are not citizens, they are still in allegiance to the US state by “merely” moving and 
existing within US territory; their presence implies their subjection to the nomos. Thus, children 
born on US soil are doubly subjected to its jurisdiction: they too are embroiled in the nomos 
because they are present and their birth on the soil engenders their citizenship status.  
 The construction of territory and jus soli in Wong gestures towards an investment in an 
imagination of national space that precedes and exceeds rhetoric and especially explicit consent. 
Contrary to Elk, no agreement between state and subject, person and body politic is necessary to 
not only subject people to US jurisdiction but also to make citizens of those who are born on the 
soil. Thus, even though Schmitt is a controversial scholar and his theorization of nomos is not 
orthodox, he is an important thinker when it comes to nationalism and law. This is because 
                                                 








instead of theorizing legal norms (how judges should read law), he describes the psychic basis of 
legal norms, or the affective investment in particular ways of interpreting law. That is, as Bruno 
Bosteels notes in regards to Schmitt’s desire for the metaphysical origins of law, “we might say 
that the logic of nomos present a terrorizing superego injunction as if it were the earth’s own call 
to us…its primordial injunction is a peremptory ‘you must’ that pretends to be derived without 
mediation from the ‘is’ of Mother Earth.”72 In other words, nomos is the “native government’s 
will” that does not need to be put into speech and represented. It just is because it resides in a 
collective experience of inhabiting the same soil. Schmitt longs for a law that does not need to be 
spoken in the same way that a mother might long for a child that does not need to be told (again 
and again) to eat all of her broccoli. Schmitt’s theorization of nomos and common law—his 
longing for nomos—is symptomatic of a wider, more pervasive anti-liberalism that characterizes 
liberal public culture.73  
 For Schmitt, nomos is the etymological root of his theory of sovereignty. The primordial, 
land-based law grounds sovereignty in a concrete fixed territory instead of abstracting it to the 
written codes or to the people as liberalism does. Soil anchors sovereignty by positing a shared 
history and a bounded spatial order. Thus, by constituting the material basis for an inside and an 
outside, nomos founds the political order by making a fundamental friend-enemy distinction, 
which then compels people to recognize the sovereign.74 For Schmitt, the war of all against all—
the horizontal struggle for power that liberalism brings forth through its impersonal inclusion of 
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everyone—is an ongoing process that must be resolved by a discursive distinction between inside 
and outside. The establishment of inside and outside, us and them is the only way to bind citizens 
to the state. However, this representational order must be grounded in the primordial Earth to 
facilitate the kind of aesthetic politics necessary for people to feel for the nation-state. Thus, 
nomos’ terrestrial basis puts forth a representational order of things that compels citizens to die 
for the state because it is literally grounded in walls, borders, tilled soil, the food we eat from the 
ground, and the literal lines in the Earth that divide “mine from thine.” Thus, the friend-enemy 
distinction put forth by the physical border and the representational order that it brings about are 
necessary for the citizen to bear any sort of political force. Jus soli forms a huge part of this 
theorization of jurisdiction because birth-on-soil interpellates the subject into a citizen by 
enveloping her into an aesthetic-political order of things that is imposed upon her merely by 
being present within the territory.  
 In this way, Schmitt’s theorization of the relationship between rhetoric, nomos, and law 
illuminates the psychic context of Wong, or the coordinates of fantasy that render its 
representation of jus soli meaningful and right. Specifically, Wong’s investment in nomos 
gestures towards the fantasy of a ‘national real,’ or an unmediated force of a pre-existing state 
power that normalizes and enrolls subjects regardless of identity, consent, or recognition. Indeed, 
in her history of Wong Kim Ark Meyler posits that the decision is surprisingly inclusive because 
the threat of China and Chinese nationals in American space made assimilation via citizenship an 
attractive pursuit.75 Jurisdiction as nomos, predicated on bodily presence on the soil, promises a 
kind of seamless expansion of not only state power but also of assimilable national subjects who 
become “fellow-citizens” via material presence.  
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 Thus, while in Elk, the state’s explicit consent to its members mitigates the anxiety 
provoked by the inclusion of the shape-shifting “gypsy” and other undesirable citizens under the 
language of liberal citizenship in the 14th amendment. In Wong, the political and representational 
force of the soil automatically makes undesirables into citizens by enrolling them in the nomos. 
Like Elk, this construction of citizenship, state, and territory will allow for the violent imposition 
of state power. As the next chapter will show, this will be accomplished through forceful 
inclusion instead of exclusion. However, the violence of forceful inclusion will also open a 
window for paradoxical contestations of US imperialism when American Indians and migrants 
begin to seize the productive potential of tacit consent-as-mobility.  
 
Subject to the Jurisdiction Thereof: Lex(is) or Nomos?  
 So far, this chapter has sought to understand the controversies over interpreting the 
fourteenth amendment’s citizenship clause in two pivotal 19th century Supreme Court cases. In 
answering this question, the chapter mapped the historical and cultural context of each case as 
well as how jurisdiction and citizenship were defined in legal review articles, in order to better 
interpret and analyze Elk and Wong. I showed that the incongruities in the two cases set up 
contradictory precedents that put forth two divergent ways of narrating the locus of sovereignty 
in jurisdiction: the nation as expressed in positive law (lex) and the soil (nomos).  
 Importantly, these configurations exceed the historical situation of the decisions 
themselves. As subsequent chapters will show, both the precedential value of the holdings and 
the rhetoric employed to legitimize the decisions, will be put to work in subsequent legal and 
public arguments over race, jurisdiction, and citizenship, and both will demonstrate that the 
liberal citizen is always at the brink of actually coming into being. Thus, Elk and Wong still 
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resonate with contemporary debates concerning political belonging because they put forth two 
contradictory theories of jurisdiction that have nevertheless structured citizenship throughout the 
20th century. While Wong Kim Ark is ultimately the more important citizenship decision of the 
two, as the next two chapters will detail, the two disparate definitions of ‘the citizen’ as it relates 







CHAPTER FOUR:  BREAKING THE CONTRACT OF JURISDICTION IN THE INDIAN 
CITIZENSHIP ACT (1924) 
 
 “The real object of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution, in qualifying the words 'all 
persons born in the United States' by the addition 'and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' would 
appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of 
the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the national government, unknown to the 
common law), the two classes of cases,- children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and 
children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state,-both of which, as has already been 
shown, by the law of England and by our own law, from the time of the first settlement of the 
English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of 
citizenship by birth within the country.”1—Justice Gray in Wong Kim Ark (1898)  
 
“When the Creator sent the Peacemaker to us and he formed the Haudenosaunee he did not 
define sovereignty to our ancestors. I will not attempt to define sovereignty at this time either. I 
will state that the Haudenosaunee have always conducted themselves in a sovereign manner and 
that we are sovereign.”2 –Chief Irving Powless, Traditional Chief of Onondaga  
 
 
 In tracing the work of paradox in the making of US citizenship law, this chapter analyzes 
the disputes over indigenous peoples’ legal status leading up the Indian Citizenship Act (ICA) of 
1924. Following Elk’s denial of birthright citizenship to American Indians, the ICA unilaterally 
declared all Indigenous peoples to be citizens regardless of tribal affiliation. Even though the Act 
only affected a portion of the American Indian population, roughly 125,000 people, it was highly 
contested.3 While progressive activists from organizations such as the Society for American 
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Indians (SAI) sought citizenship, so-called traditional American Indians saw citizenship as 
destroying self-governance.4 Congress also disagreed on citizenship. Some members advocated 
to continue the allotment program, some advocated to continue the Indian wars, and some 
advocated for full citizenship. Indeed, versions of the ICA had come up before Congress since 
1870 but none gained widespread support until the 1920s. Thus, even though the idea of 
citizenship for American Indians had been floating around Congress since around the time of the 
14th amendment, most historians contend that the ICA was more of an effort to “clean up the 
mess of allotment” and that the unilateral conferral of US citizenship was supposed to reduce the 
much-publicized corruption and inefficiency of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).5  
 In place of ambiguity, however, the ICA codified second class citizenship for Indigenous 
peoples by stipulating that US citizenship will not “affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other 
property.”6 Even though this sounds positive, in the context of the Supreme Court-sanctioned 
coexistence of “wardship” and “citizenship,” this clause allowed the United States to “protect” 
tribal property and assets by holding them in trusts.7 In addition, after the House passed the ICA, 
the Senate struck out “issuance of certificates,” which would allow individual American Indians 
to consent to citizenship in the application process, inserting instead “that all noncitizen Indians 
born within the territorial limits of the United States, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens 
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of the United States.”8 Then, the Senate removed the descriptor “full” from citizenship in order 
to allow individual states to restrict voting rights. When Felix Cohen wrote The Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law in 1942, individual states were still engaged in efforts to disenfranchise 
American Indians who resided on reservations.9 As such, state actors crafted a kind of citizenship 
that would inhabit liberal public culture’s treatment of racialization and exclusion by continuing 
to treat American Indians as homo sacer, or as having a “peculiar” relationship to jurisdiction.10 
This is why the ICA is often described as a tragedy.11 That is, similar to the treaties of the past, 
the ICA simultaneously empowered and disempowered American Indians through a blend of 
cooperation and coercion. According to Cheyfitz, the ICA is a legal paradox wherein sovereign 
US citizens are simultaneously colonial subjects of the US if they choose to reside in Indian 
country.12 As a new iteration of the “tragedy of colonial politics,”13 the ICA was long desired by 
progressive organizations. However, it ultimately fulfilled the goal of American Indian 
citizenship in name only. Why and how did the ICA take this tragic form?  
 This chapter attends to this question by analyzing the rhetorical labor of the “Indian 
problem” driving conversation around citizenship. The first section shows how the particular 
version of the “Indian problem” during the allotment era (1887-1934) necessitated a revision of 
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the separation between territorial and political jurisdiction articulated in the debates surrounding 
the 14th amendment and in Elk. The legal concept of competence, or the capacity to make legal 
decisions, functioned as a normative racial barrier to the kind of political jurisdiction upheld in 
Elk. In practice, however, a stable notion of competence proved to be untenable. Analyzing 
congressional hearings concerning competency commissions, I argue that the untenability of 
competence fit within legal commonsense or accepted doxa of the era. Akin to the trope of the 
“gypsy,” the Indian problem’s construction of Indigenous peoples as “incompetent” pervades 
United States history as catch-all term for the generalized alterity stemming from the failure of 
“perfect settler sovereignty,” or the imagination of the seamless conflation of sovereignty, 
territory, and jurisdiction.14 In this way, incompetence addressed some of the anxieties generated 
within liberal governance because it permitted identarian exclusion while it also masked the 
uncanniness of jurisdictional citizenship. For this reason, the separation of political and territorial 
jurisdiction relied on an implicitly acknowledged contract of perpetual incompetence.  
 Given this context, the second section traces how pro-citizenship activism by the 
progressive Society for American Indians (SAI) and anti-citizenship activism from the 
Haudenosaunee Confederation in the US-Canadian borderlands employed paradox to break with 
the contract of incompetence by “realizing” distinct and contradictory versions of American 
Indian competence. In doing so, both sides illuminated the gaps in the nation-state’s citation of 
its own sovereign authority to decide who and what is competent. Even though there is no direct 
evidence that either kind of activism motivated the ICA, state actors’ anxieties about the 
unwieldiness of the allotment program’s management of Indigenous citizenship coupled with the 
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censorship of anti-citizenship activism reflect state actors’ knowledge of the untenability of legal 
norms and protocols to manage the inclusivity of jurisdiction. Thus, in the end, I return to the 
question of the ICA as tragedy. I argue that the ICA is a reaction to the tragic realization of 
indigenous competence, which would bring about the death of the “Indian problem.”   
 
Incompetence as Threshold to Political Jurisdiction 
 Even though United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) solidified jus soli citizenship as the 
correct interpretation of the 14th amendment, Elk v. Wilkins’ so-called “Indian problem” still 
plagued US citizenship law. By the early 20th century, this problem was exacerbated by the 
United States’ ongoing incorporation of Indigenous lands in the continent as well as in the 
Pacific and in the Caribbean. Incorporation and occupation of Indigenous territories—and the 
Indigenous populations residing therein—forced the US government and courts to clarify the 
relationship between presence on US soil, jurisdiction, and legal status. While US v. Kagama’s 
upholding of the Major Crimes Act of 1885 declared that Indigenous peoples’ crimes were under 
US jurisdiction, Elk v. Wilkins (1884) and the Insular Cases (1901) kept the legal status of 
Indigenous peoples ambiguous.15 In this way, because Elk did not hold that birth or sustained 
presence on US soil renders American Indian peoples subject to US jurisdiction, the American 
Indian body was severed from US jurisdictional order. This stateless body, what one law 
professor called heitmatlos, was seen as frightfully ambiguous because of its exterior location to 
law and order.16  
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 The fear of American Indian lawlessness and the appetite for Indigenous land and 
resources contributed to the popularity of the Dawes Act of 1887, which conferred citizenship to 
American Indians who took up allotment, or (partial) ownership of a piece of property in patent 
fee after 25 years.17 The allotment program was part of the broader assimilationist agenda of 
solving the “Indian problem” by “absorbing” American Indians into mainstream liberal society 
by “killing the Indian, but saving the man.”18 Designed to “civilize” American Indians, the 
allotment program worked in tandem with other assimilationist policies by breaking up and 
parceling tribal property, dismantling tribal governance structures, enforcing gendered labor 
relations, and mandating participation in the market economy.19 These conditions were, of 
course, explicitly based on liberal principles of property and propriety, continuing a long 
tradition of articulating personhood to a dual sense of property as both a thing that is owned and 
a “moral and social relation” to what is proper.20 Owning property and working the land to 
produce a surplus in order to sell in a marketplace were seen as preparing the American Indian 
for the mental and moral requisites of citizenship.21 In this way, the allotment program put into 
action Elk’s articulation of jurisdiction as lex: the state must explicitly subject American Indians 
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to political jurisdiction through defining conditions for statutory citizenship. For the state to 
consent to American Indian citizenship, the American Indian must become a proper subject 
according to the principles of liberalism.  
 The notion of competency, or capacity to make legal decisions, was central to defining 
proper legal subjectivity via allotment. D.S. Otis, who was charged with documenting the 
allotment program, defined competence as a legal status wherein the “incompetent person, in 
law, is one who is unable to transact the ordinary affairs of his business without the necessary aid 
or assistance of another mind. A ‘restricted’ Indian is one whose property, land, or money, or 
both, held in trust by the Government, is restricted as to its disposition.”22 This definition 
encompasses the historic treatment of indigenous peoples in law, policy, and political theory 
discussed in previous chapters. Throughout US legal history, American Indians were linked with 
incompetence through their classification as “wards,” and as in a perpetual state of “tutelage”—
legal statuses that are associated with children and with the insane. Like children, American 
Indians were seen as dependent on the state-guardian— “The Great Father”—and as unable to 
manage their financial and legal affairs.23  
 Though a core part of liberal impersonalism, in practice, competence was explicitly 
racialized. While field agents determined competence based on an elusive notion of “progress 
towards civilization,” this progress was measured by “theories of social evolution and human 
genetics that fused race, biology, and culture.”24 According to Joanne Barker, field agents 
determined that the “less Native blood/biology a person possessed, the more socially assimilated 
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into US society she or he was; the more Native blood/biology a person possessed, the less she or 
he was socially assimilated.”25 For example, discussing the evaluation of competence, United 
States v. Shock (1911) found that “the varying degrees of blood most naturally become the lines 
of demarcation between different classes, because experience shows that generally speaking the 
greater percentage of Indian blood a given allottee has, the less capable he is by natural 
qualification and experience to manage his property.”26 Indeed, beginning in 1917, Indian 
Commissioner Cato Sells declared that the BIA was moving in a direction of “greater liberalism” 
by deeming that “all able-bodied adult Indians of less than one-half Indian blood” will be 
determined to be competent and thus “will be given as far as may be under the law full and 
complete control of their property.”27 As support for his decision, Sells claimed that “it is almost 
as axiom that an Indian who has a larger proportion of white blood than Indian partakes more of 
the characteristics of the former than the latter. In thought and action…he approximates more 
closely to the white blood ancestry.”28 
 This figuration of blood coincides with broader treatments of race and competence in 
early 20th century public culture. The evolutionary theories of racial progress that dominated the 
progressive era constructed indigenous, black, and Asian peoples as mentally inferior to white 
men and as suspended in a state of childhood. Moreover, insanity and mental unsoundness has 
been closely tied to racialization throughout modern history. Sander Gilman, for example, has 
documented how visual representations of madness were tied to evolutionary theories of racial 
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progress, and people of color’s bodies were frequently used in representations of mental and 
physical abnormality.29 Moreover, Antonio Viego has also shown how psychologically-defined 
notions of proper liberal subjecthood—the subject who speaks correctly, who expresses their 
interior state so as to make it transparent—have constructed racialized persons as 
“uncomplicated primitives with special access to jouissance” or as “impossible bearers of all 
civilizations’ discontents.”30  
 As a racial ideology and a legal term of art, the rhetorical form of ‘competence’ provided 
a way for state actors to racialize a supposedly non-identarian citizenship based in jurisdiction. 
While constructing the “rights-invested ‘Indian member’ whom both federal and tribal 
governments would claim jurisdictional power over,” competence also racialized the exterior as 
unfit for citizenship.31 Importantly, this exterior was seen as a permanent landscape. An 
exchange between a senator and a field agent in one of the congressional hearings conducted in 
1919 to “solve the Indian problem once and for all” illustrates the imagined permanence of 
indigenous incompetence. After the field agent stated that sometimes 25 years is not enough time 
to achieve competence, the senator responded, “so there will be no limit of time when the 
incompetency of Indians will all be removed. Perhaps that will be limited only by the sound of 
Gabriel’s horn.” To this grim statement, the agent claimed, “death finally is the end of it.”32 
Thus, unwilling to base Indigenous peoples’ citizenship on the kind of territorial jurisdiction 
constructed in Wong and yet fearful of the heitmatlos, the allotment program attempted to 
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regulate Elk’s requirement of political jurisdiction by turning “competence” into a normative 
racial barrier. 
 However, politicians’ concerns about death being the end of ‘incompetence’ should not 
be read as a longing for competence. Rhetorical and legislative labor was required to make the 
competence-incompetence barrier to citizenship permanent as state actors worried about the 
prospect of too many American Indians becoming citizens. To their surprise, by 1890 60 percent 
of the initial fee patents were sold.33 In response, the BIA mandated more rigid assessments of 
competence because they assumed that the field agents were being careless in their diagnosis of 
competence.34 In 1906, the Burke Act addressed these concerns by deferring competency, and 
thus, citizenship until the end of the 25-year period so that the government could ensure that 
American Indians were fully prepared for citizenship.35 In a Supreme Court case challenging the 
Burke Act’s deferral of citizenship status, United States v. Celestine (1909), the Court upheld the 
validity of the Act, claiming that “Congress in granting the rights of citizenship to Indians, 
believed that it had been too hasty.”36 Another similar case from 1914 also stated that the Burke 
Act’s purpose was to “postpone” citizenship until the law had taken hold on the Indian.37 
 That the BIA was worried about the classification as competent of too many American 
Indians elucidates the role of incompetence in upholding the “Indian problem” as a stable 
exterior to the national imaginary. That is, the crystallization of racialized liminality, 
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dependency, and insanity in the legal concept of incompetence provided a seemingly coherent 
threshold for legal subjectivity that, in part, addresses one of the central paradoxes endemic to 
liberalism: the tension between what Isaiah Berlin calls positive and negative liberty, or between 
the freedom to act and the freedom to be protected from other people’s actions.38 As covered in 
chapters one and two, doxa, or commonsense dominant interpretations of jurisdiction, have 
traditionally ensured the ability to mitigate anarchic freedom through narrating the extra-
territorial “political” boundaries comprising national space. As seen in 1866 and in Elk, narrating 
this “extra sense” of jurisdiction as lex allowed for identarian exclusions where the plain 
language of the law would not. Incompetence, in all its forms, provided just such a barrier 
against homo homini lupus in liberalism by providing criteria for figuring a homo sacer. While 
liberalism guarantees that all citizens must obey the law, competence guarantees that only 
citizens who possess “reason” also have a sovereign voice in making the law. Thus, fellow 
citizens are made to be fellow minds as well. While liberalism promises that citizens are free to 
contract, competence guarantees that contracts between incompetent individuals will be voided. 
Last, while liberalism guarantees that all citizens are free and equal under the law, competence 
ensures that the incompetent will be subject to law without being legal subjects in order to 
preserve the freedom of the competent.  
 The necessity of incompetence to rid citizenship of anxiety reveals why state actors 
sought to uncover norms of competence that could fix the jurisdictional boundaries of 
citizenship. In other words, the “mess of allotment” and the “willy-nilly”39 granting of 
citizenship to American Indians brought to light the need for a linguistic contract of sorts that 
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would fix the referents of competence and distinguish them adequately from the referents of 
incompetence. While blood quantum was written into law as the standard for evaluating 
competence, the Committee of 100’s hearings reveal that blood was not the precise measure of 
competence that Congress hoped for. For example, when asked about the seemingly concrete 
rule regarding blood quantum and competence, Indian Commissioner Cato Sells stated that blood 
quantum was more of a bureaucratic necessity but that it was not an adequate measure of 
competency.40 When a politician asked him, “is it a fact that the more white blood the better?”41 
Sells replied, “Not necessarily…among the most noble characters that I have ever met…men 
who have the highest ideals of devotion to duty, patriotism, love of family and industry…have 
been men every drop of whose blood was Indian.”42  
 After blood was deemed imprecise, the hearings turn to the question of whether a certain 
amount of education makes American Indians competent. However, when a commissioner asked 
if education has anything to do with “bringing an Indian to competency,” the agent answers that 
though education is beneficial, it does not determine competency and that many other factors 
must be factored in.43 As with blood, politicians demanded formal norms, but were met instead 
with a diffuse list of acts. Next, politicians ask the agents about labor and farming and whether 
tending land is a sure sign of competence. Again, agents claim that there are no definite rules. 
For example, an agent responds to a question about farming and competence by saying that some 
Indians farm well but still retain other attributes of incompetence.44 
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 As committee members discovered, competence is ambiguous; contrary to legal 
formalism’s perpetual quest for the truth of law, “there is nothing inherent to the law that can tell 
you who or what is competent.”45 For instance, when Senator Elston pressed Cato Sells on how 
American Indians are judged competent or incompetent, Sells claimed, “I would hesitate to make 
a definite suggestion at this time […] there is so much to develop and accomplish among those 
people before it could be seriously considered, that I would hardly venture a procedure at this 
time.”46 After being asked again, Sells equivocated, stating that competency commissions were 
“an embryonic idea” that the BIA was still working out.47 Field interviews between field agents 
and members of the committee are similarly vague. For example, when Snyder asked field agent 
John Wise whether there is a “general rule that you lay down as to the way an Indian should be 
declared competent,” he answered, “that is a very difficult question to answer in words.”48 He 
continued, “no two cases are quite alike. I find, and the longer I continue in this work the more 
elastic my mental attitude becomes. I prefer to approach every case with an absolutely open mind 
and without any definite, fixed rules concerning it.”49 Snyder accepts this answer because “you 
are dealing with Indians.”50 To this end, because American Indians were seen by government 
agencies as inherently resistant to “order,” the cause of normlessness fell on the American Indian 
individual, not on the agency or on the concept of competence writ large.  
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 In accepting the inability to find a rule, Snyder portrays the contract of incompetence as a 
contract that not only defers competence but that guarantees the place of the state actors’ 
judgement prior to granting citizenship. In this way, Snyder conveys that doxa articulated 
competence as an ever-shifting, perpetually out-of-reach signifier whose referents ranged from 
visual attributes such as a “well-kept home” and light skin, to vocational attributes such as ability 
to “till the soil,” to spatial attributes such as dwelling within or without tribal territory, to 
intangible attributes such as so-called proper speech, Christian piety, and feelings of love 
towards the nation-state.51 Importantly, the coupling of indigeneity and incompetence could only 
be undone when white eyes judged the appearance of competence based on each individual case.  
 Competence, then, was classified similar to the famous legal classification of 
pornography: the agents knew it when they saw it, but speech did not allow for a precise rule of 
definition. There existed a series of examples of competent and incompetent Indians that were 
generally classified under the premises of not having more than half American Indian blood; 
loving work, family, and nation; using language according to US liberal norms of propriety; 
making and saving money; and attaining education in some form. Nevertheless, the rule 
remained unspeakable. As such, besides the quasi-enforced blood-quantum rule, an official 
definition of competence or incompetence never surfaced. In the context of the expanding state 
and its “search for order” as well as the (waning) dominance of legal formalism, the inability to 
capture norms of competence is significant to understanding the role of deferral and 
indeterminacy in keeping the fantasy of the sovereign liberal subject alive in the early 20th 
century social imaginary.52 Though it is often associated with brutal assimilationism, 
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competency commissions appear to be geared towards endlessly deferring the final moment of 
assimilation, or the incorporation of all American Indians into the body politic without 
remainder. As mentioned above, liberalism needs incompetence to alleviate the anxiety that it 
produces and to guard against paradox. The casting out of the incompetent from contracts, from 
wills, from ownership, and from testifying and suing in court promises that the competent can 
exercise their natural freedom sans the threat of homo homini lupus. Incompetence, then, sustains 
the metaphorical contract of liberalism within public culture by acting as a threshold to birthright 
citizenship.  
 
Breaking with Incompetence in Progressive Pro-Citizenship Activism 
 The sustained indeterminacy of incompetence described above should be contextualized 
by concurrent public acts of Indigenous competence taking place during the early 20th century. 
As many scholars have shown, the Society for American Indians (SAI) frequently “talked 
backed” to civilization by utilizing hegemonic discourses of liberalism and racial progress in 
order to combat the dominant ideology of indigenous incompetence expressed by Congress in 
the above section.53  Founded in 1911 by a multi-national group of academics, artists, and 
professionals, the SAI and their affiliates poured social, political, and economic resources into 
lobbying Congress and shaping public opinion in support of recognizing American Indians as 
already competent and thus, as already part of the citizenry. SAI members were the most 
powerful and prolific advocates for American Indian rights during the allotment period. The 
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organization held yearly conventions, published the Quarterly Journal of the Society for 
American Indians (QJSAI) and American Indian Magazine (AIM), participated in Washington 
politics and in New York society, and many of its members gave speeches and seminars around 
the country.  
 Though SAI members were by no means unified in their political agenda, the 
organization’s main political goals were assimilationist compared to the traditionalist aims of the 
Haudenosaunee and the Red Power movements that would come later in the century. 
Specifically, they advocated for full citizenship because they viewed it as the only way to abolish 
the BIA and the allotment program. Importantly, however, SAI aimed to secure the promise of 
liberal equality for all American Indians while simultaneously celebrating and strengthening 
indigenous nationalism. For this reason, Bruyneel and Vigil have both emphasized that the SAI 
did not just mimic norms of competence “as is.”54 Instead, drawing on Homi Bhabha’s notion of 
the “third space” articulated through mimicry, Bruyneel argues that SAI articulated a “third 
space of sovereignty,” a supplemental, inassimilable space that was both part of and separate to 
the institutions and discourses of modern liberal settler colonialism.55 In making this third space, 
SAI members embodied all of the various examples of competence described above except for 
the “half-blood” norm. In turn, they destabilized the hegemonic referents of birthright citizenship 
by paradoxically articulating a specifically racialized indigenous competence. 
 In what follows, I show how the SAI’s representational politics threatened to “realize” 
liberal norms of competence by publicly breaking with the linguistic contract of indigenous 
incompetence. In doing so, I focus on documents written by Dr. Carlos Montezuma (Yavapai-
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Apache), Dr. Charles Eastman (Santee Dakota), Arthur C. Parker (Seneca), and Zitkala-
Sa/Gertrude Bonnin (Sioux). Montezuma later left the SAI and started his own magazine, 
Wassaja, because he became disillusioned with SAI’s assimilationism and with US citizenship.56 
Nevertheless, during his tenure with SAI he wrote numerous articles for QJSAI, gave speeches at 
conferences, and served as an expert witness in Congressional hearings. Eastman was also a 
physician, but he worked on reservations in the Dakotas. He also served as an BIA investigator 
and held numerous government positions. He was a frequent lecturer and public voice on 
American Indian welfare and history. Parker, an accomplished archeologist, served as SAI 
secretary and as editor for QJSAI. He also participated in academic and political affairs, writing 
and giving speeches to scholarly societies as well as to Congress. He also served on the Everett 
Commission in 1922, which aimed to decipher the legal status of the Haudenosaunee. Zitkala-Sa, 
also known as Gertrude Bonnin, was well-known in literary, scholarly, and activist circles. She 
also published fiction and non-fiction works in QJSAI, AIM, The Atlantic and in Harpers.  
 
Para-doxa: Disassociating Indigeneity and Incompetence  
 If early 20th century doxa coupled indigeneity and incompetence until white eyes judged 
the appearance of competence, SAI members worked hard to hasten the appearance of 
indigenous competence in their circulation of articles, speeches, and works of fiction. One of 
their main rhetorical tactics was to turn the cause of incompetence from an interior Indigenous 
inferiority predicated on bloodline (as seen in the Congressional discourses) to outwardly 
determined abuse by the US government. In doing so, SAI rhetoric often figured the US 
government as a machine that dehumanized American Indians. For example, in a 1914 edition of 
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QJSAI, Montezuma states “In the eyes of the public the Indian has been, and in most instances 
today is still, an outlawed creature, with no rights that protect the ordinary human being. 
Governed by a machine whose agents have most despotic powers, and whose unscrupulous 
actions in many instances ‘smell to heaven’”57 In a similar vein, Arthur C. Parker claims, “What 
an Indian now is a tangled ball of red yarn having as a nucleus the Federal Indian Bureau.”58 
Juxtaposing an artificial government brain to an organic American Indian brain, Parker claims 
that reservations deprive American Indians of their brains: “The mass of people are like unto 
limbs and body; the leaders are the brains of the people. Alas, the Indian people are denied 
leaders who shall form the brain of their race…a paternal system forms an artificial brain…This 
is the death of the race, the curse of progress, the violation of a primary right of man to struggle 
for existence.”59 Similar to the Negro Uplift discourse that SAI frequently referenced, Parker 
suggests that American Indians needed race leaders in order to fully embody the ideals of 
civilization and citizenship.60  
 As seen in Parker’s texts, the reservation was frequently described as a place of 
stagnation and racial death in contrast to urban centers of civilization. For instance, in a report on 
the New York Indians, Parker claims that “reservations are refuges for the incompetent and 
thriftless.”61 In another editorial, Parker expounds on the centrality of the environment to the 
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construction of indigeneity, saying “It is the manhood, the character, the usefulness of men that 
counts. It is his environment that determines his conservatism or progress, and not his racial 
blood.”62 Montezuma similarly argues,   
 It is a great mistake to think that the Indian is born an inevitable savage. He is born a 
 blank, like all the rest of us. Left in his primitive surroundings, he grows to possess 
 primitive language, superstition and life. We, surrounded by civilization, grow to possess 
 a civilized language, life, and purpose. Transfer the pale face infant to savage 
 surroundings, and he will grow to possess a savage language, superstition and habit. 
 Transfer the pappoose [sic] to the surroundings of civilization, and he will grow to 
 possess a civilized language and habit.63 
Here, Montezuma draws an equivalence between the potential of Anglo and American Indian 
children by using pejorative names—pale face and pappoose—and by using parallel structure, 
showing the progress from savagery to civilization at the core of all humanity. Denouncing the 
Haudenosaunee’s tribalism, which he claimed diminished the “capacity” of American Indians, 
Parker similarly claims in his report on “New York Indians” that “when the barriers are cut and 
the normal stream of civic responsibility and vigorous citizenship flows into and through them 
stagnation will cease. Instead of lethargy there will be an awakening that will stimulate moral 
energy.”64 In this way, when American Indians are removed from the static reservation 
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environment and thrust into the progressive movement of civilization, citizenship will fill their 
bodies and move them along the path to competence.  
 These portrayals of American Indian malleability are contextualized by images of past 
Indigenous glory that have been diminished by the BIA. Parker claims, for example, that “To the 
white race this problem is ‘What shall we do with them to give them justice?” To the red race the 
question is, “What shall we do with ourselves to regain individual independence, competence, 
and usefulness among men?’ The ultimate problem is how to restore the red race to the position 
of a useful, happy people, once more thrilled by the impulse that ambition and industry give to 
mankind.”65 To this end, competence is not something that has to be “brought” to American 
Indians, as the US government maintained, but instead competence must be uncovered because it 
lies within. In a similar vein, in her widely circulated pamphlet, Americanize the First American, 
Zitkala-Sa described her plan as one of “regeneration.” After vividly describing the material and 
intellectual poverty on reservations she lays out a detailed plan to replace BIA bureaucracy with 
American Indian-centered democracy.  
 As opposed to alternate progressive vocabularies of education, training, or molding, SAI 
conference platforms consistently featured this vocabulary of awakening and regenerating. As 
such, each edition of QJSAI featured the statement that the mission of SAI was to “awaken the 
pride of a people” because “with the intelligent activity of an awakened race and the attention of 
the country aroused to the value of the Indian to the blood of the nation, the ability of the race to 
do, to construct and achieve our lofty principles will find their fulfillment.” The language of 
“awakening” and “regenerating” the American Indian body described a coherent indigenous 
                                                 
65 Parker, “Editor’s Viewpoint: ‘The American Indian—What Is He?’” 16. 
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racial body—as opposed to an archipelago of nations or tribes—that collectively embodied 
characteristics that rendered it competent.   
 While the mid-century Red Power movements tended to reject SAI’s discourse of racial 
progress, recently scholars have reassessed the pertinence of SAI’s embrace of racialization. 
Phillip Deloria, Jr. has argued that out of all of the various socio-political contexts underlying 
SAI’s particular form of representational politics (i.e. progressivism, imperial expansion, 
cosmopolitanism), early 20th century racial formation was perhaps the most telling.66 Deloria, Jr. 
argues that at the beginning of the 20th century, the SAI was caught in a tension between uses of 
race as a descriptive category and race as signifying big general categories regarding human 
nature. He states this tension thusly,  
 Specifically, ‘racial-national’ descriptions produced arguments about the culture and 
 character of actual people. The ‘general categories’ used phenotype and a racial biology 
 to produce a meta-concept of the very idea of ‘race.’ Upon these categories, other 
 concepts could be mapped. Imagine a grid upon which you overlay (first) national and 
 (then) phenotypical categories, and then add in other dimensions. Assign innate 
 characteristics to each category, and you can then see the building of a complex, shifting 
 set of hierarchies. Now, introduce the historical motion carried in the idea of social 
 evolution, with some of the categories changing over time. Then add in the possibility of 
 racial crossing, which biologized cross-social relationships and produced an entirely new 
 set of possibilities: inferior hybrids, superior crosses, sterility, racial decline, eugenics, 
 vanishing, one-drop rules, blood quanta, and the like.67  
                                                 





I quote Deloria’s entire description because it succinctly portrays the rocky and confusing terrain 
of early-20th century racial formation that SAI navigated. As evidenced by the simultaneity of 
positive and negative eugenics, race was caught between signifying static biological 
characteristics and phenotypes and as signifying malleable—or ‘improvable’—cultural and 
national traits. Of course, both significations were held together by the belief that the white race 
was the apotheosis of health and progress. SAI saw rhetorical potentials and pitfalls in all these 
racial ideologies and they used them to construct American Indians as competent.  
 
Towards the Appearance of Competence 
 In addition to decoupling indigeneity from incompetence, the SAI constantly sought 
opportunities to publicly display indigenous competence. Leading up to and following WWI, the 
most frequently cited evidence for indigenous competence was military service and patriotism. 
American Indian participation in the Revolutionary and Civil Wars were a frequent appeal for 
enfranchisement and full legal status similar to how DREAM Act advocacy appeals to 
undocumented people’s military participation. After WWI, however, SAI and their affiliates 
seized the sizable indigenous participation in order to demonstrate that American Indians, as a 
race, volunteered to die for the country that they loved. For example, a New York Times article 
on “Indian Citizenship” from 1919 cites a SAI statement beginning with a vivid depiction of 
American Indian heroism during WWI. It then goes on to cites SAI statement made the year 
earlier stating,  
 The close of the war should see the legal status and condition of the Indians greatly 
 improved. A grateful Government and people will not withhold from the native American 
 race full rights as free men under the Constitution…It is the greatest anomaly in history 
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 that the Indians in this land of their nativity should be deprived of the privileges of 
 democracy, the liberty which they love and crave.68  
During WWI, SAI also portrayed American Indian participation as a “gift.” In an article titled 
“Indian Gifts to Civilized Man,” Zitkala-Sa references the trope of Indigenous handiwork in 
order to claim that the ultimate gift proffered by “the Red Man, citizen or non-citizen of our 
United States,” is that he “is a loyal son of America.”69 In a similar vein, in a chapter titled “The 
Indian’s Gifts to the Nation,” Eastman documents the American Indian’s “faithfulness” and 
“constancy” in serving the US nation in countless military battles. Perhaps in tongue-and-cheek 
fashion, Zitkala-Sa introduces the first issue of American Indian Magazine in 1918 by addressing 
the “beloved government” on behalf of its “lovers of Liberty.”  
 The SAI also presented themselves as icons of Indigenous competence. Each edition of 
QJSAI featured portraits of the authors dressed in what was called “citizen’s clothes,” or 
traditional Anglo-European clothing. Descriptions of major accomplishments accompanied the 
photos, which were carefully curated to coincide with liberal norms of competence. For example, 
Montezuma (figure 1) was lauded as a medical doctor who desired “independence” from the BIA 
for the Indian. Goulette (figure 2) is described as a highly successful teacher and a leading 
citizen and Shotredge (figure 3) is described as a University of Pennsylvania student and a 
member of the University Museum staff. In addition to highlighting their own competence, SAI 
texts presented the entire American Indian race as competent. For example, QJSAI frequently 
featured images and stories of American Indians enacting competence through farming (figure 
4), which was one of the most cited congressional descriptions of competence.  
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69 Gertrude (Zitkala-Sa) Bonnin, “Indian Gifts to Civilized Men,” American Indian Magazine 6, no. 3 (1918): 115. 
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 Importantly, in visualizing norms of competence, SAI members also continuously 
highlighted their indigeneity. For example, all the above-mentioned portraits indicate the 
nationality of the person. They also contain language that emphasizes their commitment to 
Indigenous politics. For example, Goulette (figure 2) is described as “defender of her race,” and 
Shotredge (figure 4) is described as a “hereditary chief.” In this way, SAI members juxtaposed 
their presentation of competence with strategically essentialist performances of racialized 
Indigeneity, attempting to undo the historical fusion of indigeneity and incompetence found in 
legal documents from early modern English law to early 20th century US Congressional records.  
 SAI maintained this contradictory subject position by constructing a pan-racialized 
American Indian public figure who always already embodied the diverse acts of competence 
articulated by Congress, the BIA, and liberal ideologies of legal subjecthood writ large. At times, 
SAI members even performed stereotypical depictions of indigeneity in their many public 
appearances. In her history of American Indian intellectualism, Vigil documents how SAI 
members frequently participated in pageants and performances where they “played the Indian” to 
varying degrees, depicting Indians as happily joining the march of American progressive 
civilization and as participating in contemporary civic life.70  In the context of Wild West shows 
and exhibitions that depicted American Indians as dying barbarians (i.e. Reverend Dixon’s 
memorials), SAI members used opportunities to perform indigeneity for white audiences 
strategically. Instead of refusing to give white audiences what they wanted—that is, caricatures 
of Indianness—SAI members opted to construct indigeneity on their own terms, often by 
juxtaposing traditional appearance with performances of Western intellectualism and 
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patriotism.71 For example, the front page of Zitkala-Sa’s Americanize the First American 
pamphlet features a large portrait of Zitkala-Sa wherein she traditional Sioux headdress. Tiny 
American flags make up the border of the portrait, suggesting that not only is the author’s 
Indigeneity similarly bordered by her Americanness, but that she identifies as an American first 
and an Indigenous person second (figure 5).  
 Similar to how Bruyneel (following Bhabha) describes the simultaneous anxiety and 
erotic charge produced by the colonial subject’s mimicry of white colonist subjectivity—always 
with a difference—SAI members’ performances of indigenous authenticity and proper liberal 
subjecthood increasingly threatened white US Americans’ hold on constructing indigeneity as 
incompetent. In this way, it is significant that the SAI did not “turn” American Indians into 
proper liberal subjects by making them white or by appealing to the promise of interracial 
marriage. Though both discourses were present in early 20th century depictions of indigeneity, 
they constructed a specifically racialized iteration of the liberal competent subject. American 
Indians were, according to SAI’s representational politics, innately competent subjects who were 
stripped of competence by a Kafkaesque bureaucracy. Most of all, they were determined to 
secure the rights of citizenship and thus, they were determined to demonstrate their inevitable 
incorporation into the US (white) body politic.  
 
                                                 






Figure 1. Portrait of Dr. Carlos A. 
Montezuma from QJSAI 1914 
 









Figure 3. Louis Shotredge from 
QJSAI 1914 
Figure 4.  Portrait of a “sower” 








Figure 6. Portrait of SAI at the inaugural conference at Ohio State University in 1911.  
 
Figure 5. Front page of Zitkala Sa 
(Gertrude Bonnin)’s pamphlet, 





Dislocating the Source of Judgement: Blood, Soil, and Nomos    
 Along with the visual performance of competent indigeneity, SAI members took visual 
and textual discourses of race and national love and constructed the American Indian as already 
inevitably and completely incorporated into both political and territorial jurisdictions. One of the 
main ways of expressing embeddedness within the body politic was to use the association of war 
with brotherhood and especially with blood. For example, in an editorial on American Indian 
participation in WWI, Zitkala-Sa describes the result of American Indian participation thusly,  
 The spirit of a great united American brotherhood fighting in a common cause—the 
 defense of world democracy, pervaded the whole affair. American Indians are watching 
 democracy, baptized in fire and blood overseas. They are watching the christening with 
 mingled feelings of deepest concern—the thing lies so close to their hearts it is difficult 
 to give it expression. Indian soldiers lie dead on European battlefields, having 
 intermingled their blood with that of every other race in the supreme sacrifice for an 
 ideal.72 
Here, Zitkala-Sa describes indigenous peoples and white Americans as united by a “common 
cause” that binds them together ideologically as well as physically through the sacrifice of blood. 
For instance, “blood” and death on foreign soil are figured as the means for achieving the “ideal” 
causes of the war—democracy and freedom. Moreover, Zitkala-Sa does not describe indigenous 
and settler blood as the same; they are separate and yet “intermingled” with that of every other 
race that fought and died in Europe. Drawing on the equivalence of blood and nation in 
discourses of citizenship, the bloody sacrifice in war is portrayed as unifying separate races and 
placing them in equal standing in the fight for the ideals that animate US citizenship.  
                                                 




 In a series of editorials on American Indian participation in the Civil War, Parker uses 
similar language, claiming “The blood of the red man flowed and mingled freely with the blood 
of your fathers in the gory trenches of the South.”73 Parker’s emphasis on the mingling of blood 
and soil during war speaks to both fantasies of jurisdiction analyzed in the previous chapter: 
indigenous peoples are citizens because of their inherent relationship to the soil as well as their 
figurative kinship through years of war fighting and dying side by side. Parker also extended 
these metaphors to describe the literal mixing of blood, depicting the coming absorption of 
Indigenous blood into the national blood. In the following issue’s editorial, he claimed that  
 The blood of the red man will not die out. His blood with all that has been put into it will 
 enter the arteries of the greater race. He will be absorbed. American has an obligation to 
 herself in preserving the physical and psychic purity of this blood, for it will pulse in the 
 veins of her future children, her future citizens.74  
Even though Parker does allude to miscegenation here, he still refuses to cede the trope of the 
“dying Indian” that pervaded early 20th century progressive discourses about citizenship and 
assimilation. Instead, Parker’s his claim that indigenous blood will “pulse in the veins” of the 
national future conveys that indigenous blood is already part of the broader body politic whether 
white people recognize it or not. Charles Eastman’s The Indian To-Day expresses a similar 
sentiment, stating that “[the Indian] will live, not only in the splendor of his past, the poetry of 
his legends and his art, not only in the interfusion of his blood with yours, and his faithful 
adherence to the new ideals of American citizenship, but in the living thought of the nation.”75 
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All of these statements “speak back” to the notion represented by Congress in the previous 
section that the only way to rid the nation of the Indian problem is to kill them all. Even if 
American Indians die, their blood and their legacies live on.  
 SAI frequently represented American Indians as always already competent and as always 
already part of the nomos—but with a racial/blood difference. In doing so they destabilized the 
figure of indigenous incompetence in two ways. First, they consistently threatened to “realize” 
indigenous competence by turning themselves and other indigenous peoples into objects of 
settler desire for assimilation and ‘civilization.’ While this is what progressive congress claimed 
to want, the administration of competency commissions demonstrates that the “Indian problem” 
and indigenous incompetence played a key role in sustaining investment in liberal citizenship. 
Second, they turned themselves into objects of settler desire only by substituting the state’s 
authority to judge competence, and thus, citizenship. In their portrayal of a specifically racialized 
indigenous permanence, they contested the state’s authority to judge who is competent—and 
thus, subject to political jurisdiction. By associating indigenous peoples with blood and soil—as 
always already inside the body politic—the SAI worked against the kind of citizenship mediated 
by lex that Elk v Wilkins and the allotment program upheld. Put another way, the SAI visualized 
the inability of the law’s universal language to maintain a coherent distinction between inside 
and outside. Thus, the SAI’s representational politics destabilized the fantasy of consensual 
incorporation by threatening to realize the liberal belief that all the People can be incorporated 
regardless of identarian or ascriptive characteristics—represented under the sign of the Citizen—




Breaking with Incompetence in Anti-Citizenship Activism 
 Congress’s desire for sustained incompetence should also be contextualized by 
concurrent public acts of indigenous peoples refusing the citizenship that had been refused to 
them. In contrast to the SAI’s progressivism, so-called conservative and traditional nations 
contested citizenship because they viewed it as worsening the ambiguous legal status of 
American Indians.76 For example, during the Snyder hearings cited above, Porfirio Mirabel, 
representing the Taos Pueblo, claimed   
 One thing I fear very much is about citizenship. There is a bill pending on that in the 
 House or Senate…All I ask the Government of the United States is that we want to be left 
 alone and not to be made citizens, to be as always we have been from the old time of our 
 ancestors’ time, not molesting us any as to the citizenship…I do not want to be wiped 
 out. I want to be free, as I have always been. We do not want to be citizens.77  
In stark difference to Winneshiek, Elk, and Wong Kim Ark’s demands for citizenship, Mirabel’s 
position shows how the political value of citizenship had shifted greatly since the allotment 
program. Because it was increasingly clear that citizenship status would not coincide with “the 
rights of man” that Dandy’s Band had demanded, traditional indigenous peoples saw citizenship 
as the universalization of allotment. Thus, even though the committee assured Mirabel that they 
were not going to impose citizenship on American Indians who did not want it, as mentioned 
above, the imposition of citizenship was precisely what the Snyder committee ended up 
advocating in order to deal with “the mess of allotment.”78  
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 In response to the shift in policy from withholding citizenship to imposing it through 
allotment and then threatening to impose it through statute, the Council of Hereditary Chiefs 
from the Haudenosaunee Confederation were the most publicly vocal opponents of citizenship at 
the beginning of the 20th century. The Haudenosaunee describes the federalist organization of the 
Onondaga, the (Tonawanda) Seneca, the Mohawk, the Oneida, the Cayuga, and the Tuscarora.79 
(also known as the Six Nations and as the Iroquois). Though the Haudenosaunee were unaffected 
by allotment because of jurisdictional disputes between New York state and the Ogden Land 
Company (OLC), similar to Mirabel, the traditionalist faction saw both US and Canadian 
citizenship as intensifying the ongoing forced assimilation campaigns in both countries.80 
 Like the SAI, the Haudenosaunee also broke with agreed upon referents of incompetence 
by enacting indigenous competence. However, in contrast to the SAI, the Haudenosaunee used 
these discourses to refuse US and Canadian citizenship instead of to articulate themselves as 
citizens. That is, instead of representing their competence as invalidating the gap between 
territorial and political jurisdiction imposed by the notion of incompetence, they positioned the 
gap as irreconcilable and as maintaining the inherent presence of an indigenous sovereignty that 
precedes and exceeds settler state sovereignty.81 Together these two discourses pointed out the 
inability of the state to keep a firm grasp on the Indian problem.  
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 Though less powerful than the SAI, Haudenosaunee advocacy was widely circulated in 
mainstream public culture, eliciting both support and opposition. Leading up to the ratification of 
the ICA, members of the Haudenosaunee mounted two public events of citizenship refusal, the 
Everett Commission in 1922 and the Geneva Campaign from 1923 to 1924. The Everett 
Commission was a series of hearings and reports conducted by New York representative Edward 
Everett and a panel of experts, including SAI member Arthur C. Parker. The goal of the 
commission was to figure out who had jurisdiction—the US federal government or New York—
over the Haudenosaunee residing on the US side of the border and who had claims to their 
land—the OLC, New York, the US, or the Haudenosaunee. The Geneva Campaign was an 
international effort to bring attention to Canadian violence and US assimilation policies by 
petitioning the League of Nations for membership. During the Geneva campaign, Deskaheh 
published two pamphlets: the 8-page pamphlet titled Chief Deskaheh Tells Why He’s Here Again 
and the 56-page legal brief The Redman’s Appeal for Justice: The Position of the Six Nations’ 
that They Constitute an Independent State.  
 
Precedential (In)Competence  
 While the SAI repeated and inhabited the various markers of competence articulated in 
official citizenship discourse, the Haudenosaunee utilized the topos of competence to cite the 
legal history of treating indigenous peoples as sovereigns in case law and in treaties. Treaties 
have often been cited as proof of indigenous nation competence because their mere existence 
proves that the relationships established between early settlers and Indigenous nations were 
political and based in the legal idiom of international law.82 Thus, the existence of treaties shows 
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that indigenous peoples were perceived as competent by European colonists as well as by the 
United States until 1871 when President Grant stopped making new treaties. However, like the 
discourse of racialization taken up by the SAI, citing treaties and other evidence of competence 
via precedent carries the risk of simultaneously citing indigenous incompetence. For this reason, 
Seneca legal scholar Robert Porter argues that these precedents “cannot be disconnected from 
their underlying colonial underpinnings.”83 In this way, when indigenous peoples cite 
precedential recognition of their competence, they simultaneously cite the settler state’s authority 
to declare their (in)competence because the state’s claims over legal meaning are tied to its 
monopoly over violence.84 This sentiment came up in the Everett hearings when Onondaga 
representative, Mr. Johnson claimed that “we know that what we signed in the books is all 
written by one side, the white man has written them to satisfy himself and down the Indians.”85  
 The Geneva campaign and the Everett hearings seem to mitigate these risks by 
illuminating the rhetorical nature of all claims to competence. For instance, in its citation of the 
Marshall Trilogy—the series of cases that declares that indigenous peoples are wards—
Redman’s Appeal analogizes Georgian, Cherokee, Iroquois, and Canadian sovereignties, stating:  
 In that case the State of Georgia, successor of a British colony, had based her claim to 
 sovereignty over the Cherokees on the terms of British Crown charters granted to a 
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 company of British colonizers. Canada’s resentment to the act of the British Parliament 
 of 1868 rests in no better foundation if its meaning is to be interpreted as she seeks to 
 do.86  
This statement serves as a reminder that US federal and state sovereignty as well as Canada’s 
sovereignty—which was tenuous at the time87—are all based in legal texts which must be 
interpreted by state actors. The notion that nation-state sovereignty is based in the ephemera of 
paper was reiterated in one of Deskaheh’s letters to The Headway in the United Kingdom where 
he argued that “there are still many States in Europe whose very existence as such, rests on 
Treaties centuries old,” which have been “sanctified by their antiquity.”88  In this way, the 
Haudenosaunee bring to light the necessity of judgement and interpretation to upholding 
competence and sovereignty as a whole.  
 The Geneva campaign’s use of wampum, which is a belt or a string of patterned beads 
made of seashells, also brings to light the symbolic nature of all claims to competence. In the 
Great Lakes and Eastern Woodlands regions during the 17th and 18th centuries, wampum was 
central to treaty negotiations between Indigenous nations and settlers because, like a signature or 
a seal of approval, it had the performative function of formalizing agreements and making them 
binding.89 While the wampum presented to the Dutch in DC referenced amiable relations 
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between the two peoples, The Redman’s Appeal cites a more famous two row wampum 
exchanged between British settlers and the Haudenosaunee at the end of the 17th century that 
signified not only Haudenosaunee sovereignty but an egalitarian structure of international 
relations figured by friendship. Introducing the wampum, reiterates the symbolic and 
interpretative nature of treaties and implied competence by drawing an analogy between 
wampum, the oral culture that accompanied it, and treaties by citing international legal doctrine:  
 There is no rule of international law that a treaty must be reduced to writing if it is 
 actually concluded between competent parties. There is no rule of international law that a 
 unilateral document containing an offer by one people should not, when accepted by the 
 other, be the indisputable evidence of a binding contract. Such a contract is a treaty, and 
 the arrangement ultimately concluded in this case was founded in treaty.90  
By interpreting wampum as representing a kind of oral contract, recognized by international law, 
the pamphlet violates the linguistic contract upholding what constitutes a legally binding 
agreement: paper treaties, wampum, and spoken words equally make up the trail of international 
relations proving Haudenosaunee independence.  
 Haudenosaunee representatives also paradoxically turned legal proof of indigenous 
incompetence into proof of competence. For example, the Geneva campaign reinterpreted legal 
decisions that are often used to prove indigenous incompetence. In Redman’s Appeal the 
Constitution’s exclusion of American Indians is proof of not “quasi-sovereign” status but 
complete sovereign independence: “in providing the basis for federal taxation (Article I, sec, 2, 
subd. 3) directed that Indians be excluded from consideration in determining population in 
                                                 




respect to representation and taxation.”91 Redman’s Appeal also frames the 14th amendment’s 
inclusion of “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” to the citizenship clause as an extension of 
the Constitution’s exclusion. In line with conservative interpretations of the amendment, the 
pamphlet categorizes the citizenship clause as only a “measure to extend citizenship to negroes,” 
claiming that the addition of “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” keeps the clause from referring 
to American Indians.92 Thus, turning to Elk, Redman’s Appeal states that  
 this qualification, ‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ was required by and fitted the case 
 of the aboriginal peoples found within the exterior boundaries of the United States as 
 fixed by her treaties with European Powers…and therefore left [American Indians] 
 outside the lawful jurisdiction of the United States.93  
Referencing the explicit exclusion of Indigenous peoples from US jurisdiction, Redman’s Appeal 
affirms the same trajectory of citizenship law used to exclude American Indians from birthright 
citizenship.  
  During the Everett hearings, this tactic was especially prevalent and powerful. For 
example, John Snyder (Seneca) begins a long monologue by saying that the Haudenosaunee 
“strenuously reject citizenship,” and that “the State of New York created a voluntary trust and 
was bound to perform the duties of its office in precisely the same manner as though the trust had 
been created by operation of law and the State was legally constituted trustee.”94 After citing a 
number of treaties, he says “the State had no power to revoke the trust or shift the obligation 
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imposed upon it unless with the full consent and acquiescence of the cestuique trust.”95After 
establishing that the representatives of the earlier treaties, such as the Haldimand, were 
competent, Snyder turns to the Buffalo Creek and the agreement with OLC, stating that “so we 
say the trust was irrevocable because the cestuique trust was incapable and disabled under the 
rule to act for himself. Consequently, consent by him to withdraw these funds would be 
ineffectual to relieve the state of its obligation to perform [its] duties.”96 In other words, Snyder 
reinterprets the validity of treaties that dispossessed the Haudenosaunee by claiming that they 
were not premised on a meeting of the minds. As incompetents, the Iroquois did not consent to 
give up their land.  
 After Snyder’s detailed foray into contract and Constitutional law, Everett thanks him 
and addresses the rest of the Seneca present in the hearing. His remarks to the Seneca 
demonstrate that, at least in that moment, he was persuaded by Snyder’s legal interpretation. 
First, he claims that “[Snyder] is competent to comprehend the intricate subject we have before 
us.”97 Everett then reassures the Seneca of two major points of contention between the 
committee and them. He states, “Mr. Snyder has stated the law when he asserted that citizenship 
could not be imposed or forced on anybody” and that “no third party can come in a contract 
between two people without the consent of both original contracting parties and this Commission 
could not change that rule of law.”98  





97 Everett, 184. 
 




 Given Everett’s acceptance of Snyder’s construction, it is not surprising that he came to 
the following conclusions:  
 That the Indians of North America were the legal possessors of the soil at the time of the 
 discovery of this continent by Columbus in 1492. That they maintained a regular form of 
 government which was recognized by the several countries who visited the continent 
 shortly after its discovery. That at that time, the Indians on this continent were 
 sufficiently able to maintain themselves against any foreign power that visited this 
 continent…It is a part of the conclusions of the commission that where a white man made 
 a trade or contract with the Indian, knowing that the Indian was ignorant of the results of 
 the treaties or contracts, that necessarily the minds of the contracting parties did not meet 
 and that such conditions should be given careful consideration in this report.99  
Importantly, Everett contradicts accepted interpretations of the doctrine of discovery by claiming 
that the Haudenosaunee were the legal possessors of the soil at the time of European settlement. 
Importantly, instead of the connection between indigeneity and national soil leading to 
citizenship for everyone, Everett’s construction of this connection essentially kills off settler 
authority over the soil and the citizenry in the first place. In other words, Everett’s claim that the 
Haudenosaunee were legal possessors of the soil prior to colonization refigures the source of 
jurisdictional authority, substituting settler state sovereignty for indigenous sovereignty. The 
report’s conclusion reiterates this substitution, stating that the United States and New York must 
settle the “recompense coming to the Indian from the finding that the land still belongs to 
him.”100 This is a monumental decision as Everett’s conclusions worked in diametric opposition 
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to state and federal goals. For this reason, Upton speculates that Parker and the rest of the 
committee refused to sign Everett’s report. The Commission of Indian Affairs also refused to 
accept the report, even going so far as to keep it from public view until the 1970s.101  
 Despite the struggle to stabilize the linguistic contract of incompetence and to ensure the 
state’s role in judgement, as the Everett Report censorship shows, ‘the state’ is not even a unified 
source of power that can reliably uphold its own interests in furthering the project of settler 
coloniality; individual state actors can be persuaded by unofficial interpretations of legal 
doctrines, making legal decisions that upset the nation-state’s sense of perfect settler sovereignty, 
or the imagination of the seamless conflation of sovereignty, territory, and jurisdiction. Thus, 
when indigenous peoples refuse settler colonial sovereignty, when they demand recognition as 
political sovereigns by reinterpreting treaties and precedents and then disavow the state’s 
authority to (not) recognize their interpretation, they are rewriting the linguistic contract that 
locates the source of judgement in the state. As Mark Rifkin explains, while this may not 
overthrow the nation-state, it deeply disturbs it because “the citation of sovereignty by the state is 
less a confident and self-assured indication of untroubled control than a restless performance in 
which the failure to find a normative foundation on which to rest the legitimacy of national 
jurisdiction remains a nagging source of anxiety.”102  
 Even though the nation-state’s monopoly on violence renders its legal judgement the 
most authoritative,103 breaking the contract still emphasizes that the source of sovereign 
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judgement is never securely fastened to the nation-state. Simpson illustrates this conundrum 
when she claims, 
 built into sovereignty is a jurisdictional dominion over territory, a notion of a singular 
 law, and a singular authority... But this ongoing and structural project to acquire and 
 maintain land, and to eliminate those on it, did not work completely. There are still 
 Indians, some still know this, and some will defend what they have left. They will persist, 
 robustly.104  
Indeed, from the perspective of land and geography, the fact of indigeneity made manifest by the 
reservation/reserve system and the recognition of treaties makes the United States and Canada 
anything but coherent nation-states where jurisdiction seamlessly lines up with national 
boundaries. When indigenous peoples refuse official legal interpretations that erase their own 
jurisdictions, then, they bring attention to the perpetual failure of political jurisdiction to keep the 
settler colonial project afloat.  
 In addition to competing over the source of judgement within national jurisdiction, the 
nation-state also competes for jurisdiction on a global stage. Globalization dislocates the source 
of authority from the individual nation-state, dispersing it into NGOs, supra-regional 
organizations such as the UN and the World Bank, and transnational corporations.105 However, 
even within the modern legal topos of sovereignty and jurisdiction, the global has been a 
constant threat to the nation-state. That is, sovereignty consistently bears three competing 
definitions: (1) the highest authority harnessed by the state within its territorial jurisdiction; (2) 
the power of the citizenry to consent to governance in modern liberal democracy; (3) the 
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willingness of other states to uphold the external sovereignty of another state by not interfering 
in its jurisdiction.106  
 While the fact of indigeneity and the discussion of the linguistic contract details the perils 
of the first and second definitions for a stable location of authority, the third definition is a 
comparable source of instability. After the waning of natural law, international law was imagined 
in the 19th century as providing a common language to mediate the third dimension of 
sovereignty.107 The Hague Conferences, the creation of the Permanent International Court, and 
the League of Nations were intended to institutionalize this common language, and thus, provide 
a foundation for an international linguistic contract.108 However, as Carl Schmitt laments in his 
elegy to the European “family” of law in The Nomos of the Earth, the internationalization of 
international law, the abstraction of its language so that it could be used, applied, and 
subsequently “perverted” by decolonizing nations, who seized the language of international law 
to assert their sovereign status, were constant threats to the European sovereignty guaranteed by 
classical interpretations of international law.109 As will be demonstrated in the next section, the 
Geneva campaign was firmly in conversation with this broader “mestizo international law” 
movement taking place in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, wherein decolonizing nations 
from around the world seized the language of international law to assert their sovereign status, in 
turn transforming the doctrinal structure of classical international law.110   
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Dislocating the Source of Judgement: The Law beyond the Judge   
 Though the Everett Campaign served more as an internal event in motivating the 
Hereditary Council to get more aggressive in its anti-citizenship stance,111 the Geneva Campaign 
was an international affair that usurped official channels of contesting citizenship. Specifically, 
the Geneva campaign disavowed recognition from any single nation-state by usurping the 
judicial procedures underway in North America and embarking on an international campaign. 
When the Haudenosaunee had tried this tactic in the past by appealing to tried to Britain, with 
whom they have the Haldimand Treaty guaranteeing their independence and their rights to the 
land around Grand River, Winston Churchill denied their request for a meeting, calling the issue 
“domestic,” and within the “exclusive competency of the Canadian Government.”112 
Disillusioned with judicial procedure after the censorship of the Everett Report, the 
Haudenosaunee decided to bypass official channels of resolving “Indian Affairs,” sending 
Deskaheh and Decker to mount an international public campaign to appeal to a higher authority 
than either nation-state. Decker and Deskaheh made their first international appeal when they 
travelled to Washington, D.C. to meet with the Dutch charge d’affaires in 1922.113 Giving him an 
historic wampum and a petition,114 they hoped he would appeal to the League of Nations on their 
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behalf.115 Addressed to the Secretary-General Eric James Drummond, the petition was a 10-page 
document that framed the Six Nations’ complaint against Canada in terms of Article 17 of the 
League’s Covenant, which states that the League will mediate in disputes between member states 
and non-member states.116 Surprisingly, the Dutch forwarded the petition to League officials and 
then to members of the Council in August 1923 after the secretary tried to “bury the matter,” a 
move that would characterize the League’s general response to Deskaheh.117   
 The circulation of the petition to a wider audience coincided with Decker and Deskaheh’s 
arrival in London. There, Deskaheh spoke to humanitarian societies and released Chief Deskaheh 
Tells Why He’s Here Again. The pamphlet is the first piece of campaign literature that is not 
directly addressed to a person or an institution, as it begins with the claim “I am on my way to 
the League of Nations, and stopped off to tell why... I go because your Imperial Government 
refused my plea, for protection of my people as of right against subjugation by Canada.”118 
Addressed to the British public writ large, Chief Deskaheh is less a demand for British 
recognition than an indictment of Britain’s failure to uphold the Haldimand Treaty and protect 
the Six Nations from settler aggression.  
 The campaign would only become more public and more global. Upon arriving in 
Geneva in September 1923, Deskaheh published Red Man’s Appeal. While Chief Deskaheh is 
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largely an appeal to the British public and an admonishment of Canada and the British 
government, The Redman’s Appeal addresses a “universal audience,” or an indeterminate and 
imaginary mass of individuals and institutions. This is evident from not only the pamphlet’s 
general address (e.g., while Chief Deskaheh discusses “your imperial government” The 
Redman’s Appeal contains no such language), but also from its multinational circulation. Both 
Deskaheh and Decker widely circulated in Geneva as well as in Italy, Ireland, and Britain.119 
Moreover, Deskaheh’s allies also distributed the literature on his behalf, at times garnering the 
wrath of Britain and Canada. For instance, Deskaheh’s core alliance in the League, the 
Delegation of Ireland, Panama, Persia (Iran), and Estonia, sent a letter of support to the 
Secretary-General in September 1923 and Iranian representative Arfa-ed-Dowleh followed up 
numerous times, demanding that the Six Nations’ appeal be brought to the floor in Council.120 
Thus, in addition to physically bypassing the legal system in Canada and the United States by 
sending Deskaheh to London and then to Geneva, the campaign also refuses to engage with the 
settler states as addressees of its appeals. This continues the task of de-naturalizing the nation-
state as the locus of recognition in Indigenous peoples’ nation-building projects.  
 Though many of the campaign’s demands are addressed to the League, Deskaheh also 
usurped League procedures once he determined that the League was a “travesty of 
justice…dominated and controlled by Britain.”121 First, after realizing that he would never be 
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granted permission to speak on the assembly floor, Deskaheh began speaking in unofficial 
venues around Geneva, including the town hall, the YMCA, The Theosophical Society, and The 
Swiss English Conversation Club.122 Second, after the League removed Red Man’s Appeal from 
circulation, he refused to stop circulating the pamphlet. After accusing Deskaheh of distributing 
propaganda through “unofficial channels of communication,” the League sent a notice forbidding 
Deskaheh from distributing the pamphlet.123 They even went as far as removing the pamphlet 
from the League’s official journal and publishing Canada’s response to Deskaheh’s claims 
instead.124 In this way, the journal featured an argument-by-argument rebuttal to a pamphlet that 
was never allowed to be published in the first place. At first, Deskaheh relied on his main allies, 
the Delegation of Ireland, Persia, Estonia, and Panama, to keep distributing the pamphlet and 
pressuring member nations to hear Deskaheh’s case. However, Britain intervened, telling these 
nations that pursuing the Six Nations’ matter any further would “amount to an impertinent 
interference in the domestic affairs of the British Empire.”125 In response, Deskaheh continued to 
distribute his pamphlet.  
 In line with SAI rhetoric, the Geneva campaign did not just publicly break with the 
contract of incompetence. It also confronted the US and Canadian governments as legitimate 
sources of judging and interpreting competence and incompetence in the first place. Deskaheh 
and Decker mainly did this by directing demands towards an external authority (as opposed to 
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towards the United States or Canada): international law. While the procedures for interpreting 
and upholding international law were by no means more neutral or more egalitarian than those 
guiding Canadian or US law, the Haudenosaunee took advantage of a moment (kairos) in which 
international law was being rethought and refigured by decolonizing nations in Asia, Africa, and 
South America.126 This moment of transition from classical Eurocentric international law to 
modern international law led to not only new theorizations of “state” and “nation,” but also of 
authority and recognition. This emerging construction of international law is most evident in Red 
Man’s Appeal’s description of Six Nations’ statehood. After establishing that the Six Nations 
have been called a “nation” officially and unofficially for over two hundred years, the pamphlet 
claims: 
 In English speech no essential difference is intended whether the word “State” or 
 “Nation” is used. They are equivalents. The Covenant of the League of Nations does 
 indeed speak of the members of “States,” but it speaks at the same time of the superior 
 law which constrains their behaviour as the International law. It does no violence to 
 propriety to say that a body of American aborigines who constitute a nation constitute  
 equally a state.127  
Instead of being bound to the European family of “civilized” nations, as classical international 
law would have it,128 the excerpt describes the Covenant as referring to a radically exterior law 
that equally binds all states to its tenets. The campaign’s literature continues this line of thought 
throughout the pamphlet by constructing the League of Nations as a mere vehicle for a pre-
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existing body of international law. That is, by invoking the global destabilization of national 
sovereignty, it sheds doubt on the supremacy of any nation-state’s claim to sovereign power.  
   
Facing the Anxiety of Liberalism: Tragedy and Legal Rhetoric   
 This chapter has investigated the making of the ICA by tracing the rhetorical labor of the 
“Indian problem” in multiple discursive constructions of American Indians’ relationship to US 
citizenship. While settler rhetoric consistently sought ways to sustain the “Indian problem” in 
order to maintain the gap between political and territorial jurisdiction, progressive and traditional 
American Indian rhetoric employed paradox in ways that ruptured the contract of incompetence. 
In turn, both sides illuminated the gaps in the nation-state’s citation of its own sovereign 
authority to judge who is subject to political jurisdiction.  
 Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century, incompetence became yet another way to 
regulate jurisdictional national belonging, continuing the tradition of the “savage” outside to 
civilization. As Lumbee scholar Robert Williams has shown, the “Indian as savage” has haunted 
western thought, functioning as a limit with which to construct an imagination of civilization.129 
However, while Williams points out the necessity of the “savage” exterior to a establish a 
coherent “civilized” identity, he does not consider that this exterior has proven to be untenable 
for two reasons. First, as shown by Dandy’s Band’s participation in Wisconsin’s market 
economy, John Elk’s taxes, and the SAI’s representational politics, establishing the juridical 
subjects of “competent” and “incompetent” allows for the “social (after)lives” of these categories 
to be taken up, fleshed out, and inevitably modified; “competence” can permit the “savage” to 
join civilization. Moreover, as the Haudenosaunee’s anti-citizenship activism demonstrates, the 
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“savage” can also take the figure of competence as indicative of its own sovereignty; the 
“savage” can utilize the rhetoric of competence laid down to construct itself as outside the 
jurisdiction of so-called civilization and can then can utilize this rhetoric to disassociate herself 
from both citizen and homo sacer. Both treatments of competence employed paradox to break 
with the contract of incompetence by “realizing” distinct and contradictory versions of American 
Indian competence. In addition to challenging who and what is competent, both pro-and-anti 
citizenship discourses also challenged the US government’s rhetorical agency over the capacity 
to decide what separates the incompetent from the competent.  
 Even though there is no direct evidence that either kind of activism caused the ICA, state 
actors’ anxieties about the unwieldiness of competency commissions’ management of indigenous 
citizenship, coupled with the censorship of anti-citizenship activism, reflect state actors’ 
knowledge of the untenability of legal norms and protocols to manage the inclusivity of 
jurisdiction. The trail of correspondence documenting the attempt to sabotage the Geneva 
campaign reveals three imperial powers and an international institution that were disturbed and 
even frightened by the campaign. For instance, one Canadian politician wrote in the Canadian 
Annual Review that if Deskaheh’s claims were recognized, “if such rights, under treaties with 
Indians all over Canada were admitted…a condition would be created which would be untenable 
and inconceivable.”130 In this way, if the Geneva campaign were persuasive to enough people, if 
the Edward Everetts of the world agreed with The Redman’s Appeal, settler coloniality would be 
fundamentally scarred. 
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 The US government’s ultimate decision to statutorily impose US citizenship on 
indigenous peoples is often read as the tragic result to good intentioned progressives (i.e., the 
SAI and “friends of Indians” organizations). The outcome of both campaigns supports this 
characterization. SAI disintegrated over internal disagreements about peyote, assimilationism, 
and citizenship;131 Chief Deskaheh was barred from reentering Canada after Geneva. Finding 
refuge with Decker and Clinton Rickard near Rochester, he died shortly after returning. In a 
radio broadcast shortly after he returned to the US, he ridiculed liberal public culture’s 
hypocrisy, stating  
 So boys and girls, if you grow up and claim your right to live together and govern 
 yourselves—and you ought to—and if you do not concede the same right to other 
 peoples—and you will be strong enough to have your own way—you will be tyrants, 
 won’t you? If you do not like that word, use a better one, if you find one, but don’t 
 deceive yourselves by the words you use.132  
Narrating the tragedy of the social contract myth enshrined in the Constitution and in countless 
pamphlets and treatises, Deskaheh indicts the land of the free as the land of tyranny.  
 However, the settler hypocrisy illuminated in Deskaheh’s last speech also figures the ICA 
as a reaction to tragedy instead of as a tragedy in and of itself. That is, tragedy is not only a 
common generic form for inhabiting paradox; it is also a way of interrogating the multiple legal 
aporias that pervade what is known as racial jurisprudence, or legal rhetoric that encircles the 
split between the universal and the particular.133 In an essay on Constitutional tragedy, Dorothy 
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Roberts demonstrates this revisionist reading of legal tragedy when she flips the question from 
‘what’s the worst outcome of adhering to the Constitution?’ to ‘why, given all of the evidence 
against the promise of the Constitution, are black people still faithful to the Constitution?’ That 
is, instead of inquiring into the outcome of the Constitution’s legal tragedies, she asks why black 
people and other disenfranchised groups desire to cite the promise figured in the Constitution. In 
addition to the plain fact that it is an inescapable hegemonic discourse, Roberts argues that black 
people’s instrumental Constitutional fidelity “is not the faith that the Constitution will end 
racism. The constitutional allegiance of Black leaders such as Douglass, Du Bois, and King was 
grounded in their participation in the social struggle for citizenship rights.”134 Citing Patricia 
Williams’ theory of alchemy, she argues that black leaders have been faithful to how the 
Constitution’s rhetoric functions in political struggles as a site of alchemy, or the way in which 
communities marginalized and disempowered by US laws have made something out of the 
nothingness of legal rhetoric. According to Patricia Williams, it is true “that blacks never fully 
believed in rights…Yet it is also true that blacks believed in them so much and so hard that we 
gave them life when there was none before…The making of something out of nothing took 
immense alchemical fire.”135 Alchemy, in other words, describes the rhetorical labor of people 
like Fredrick Douglass, Deskaheh, and Everett, people whose representation of Constitutional 
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doctrine provoked a feeling of threat and anxiety in white interlocutors that the language of the 
law can be taken apart and reassembled in a way that thwarts dominant political goals.136  
 This kind of legal tragedy is similar to the location of what Lacan would call “law ex 
nihilo” in his description of tragic experience in the seminar on the ethics of psychoanalysis.137 
Similar to Roberts, Lacan rejects the moralization of tragedy. He resists the notion that analysis 
should reconcile society’s impediments to fulfilling one’s desire either through endless 
sublimation or through facilitating the awareness of the ‘tragic split.’”138 In other words, analysis 
is not about resolving the paradoxes wrought by tragic experience nor is it about resigning to a 
vague notion of impossibility. In this way, citizenship’s tragedies represented by the ICA, then, 
cannot be merely dealt with through sublimation. Tragedy, then, is more about the price that the 
hero must pay to actually “realize” her desire. In other words, similar to Roberts’ focus on the 
alchemic struggle to force the Constitution to fulfill its promise by essentially going beyond the 
Constitution to create a new Constitution, the move of desire in tragedy is towards liberation so 
that it “no longer depends upon the interdiction (of the law) but is led to find and articulate its 
own law.”139 This is why Alenka Zupancic claims that for Lacan, tragedy is not all that tragic 
because it can produce the kind of liberation that takes place in the case of Oedipus before he 
dies.  
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 Lacan turns to the figure of Antigone in Sophocles’ play to illustrate the manifestation of 
law ex nihilo in tragic experience. Antigone tends to be interpreted as a tragedy dealing in the 
opposition of discourses, namely positive law, or lex, and chthonic law, or nomos. While Creon 
represents the written laws of the city, Antigone represents the laws of the Earth and of kinship. 
Antigone is seen as tragic because she refuses to abide by Creon’s laws and she buries her 
brother, whose body has been outlawed and forbidden from receiving a burial. As punishment, 
Antigone is cast out to the realm of the dead. Before dying from being buried alive, she hangs 
herself. This casting out of Antigone is also why she is frequently identified with the figure of 
the homo sacer in biopolitics literature.  
 However, for Lacan, Antigone is not a scapegoat or homo sacer as much as she figures 
the limit between the first and second orders of death, which is the zone of tragedy.140 Focusing 
on Antigone’s last speech where she claims that she would not refuse the law for her husband or 
child because they are replaceable while her brother is not, Lacan argues that Antigone’s position 
between two deaths “affirms the unique value of [Polynices’] being without reference to any 
content.”141 Lacan is clear that Antigone’s position as living dead is “essentially that of 
language.” Her attachment to her brother, precisely because he is her brother and nothing else, is 
“the limit or the ex nihilo to which Antigone is attached. It is nothing more than the break that 
the very presence of language inaugurates in the life of man.”142 What makes Antigone the 
epitome of tragic structure, however, is not that she desires the limit. In psychoanalytic theory, 
we all desire to “break” with language. Instead, Antigone goes beyond the limit, “she pushes to 
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the limit the realization of something that might be called the pure and simple desire of death as 
such. She incarnates that desire.”143 In other words, Antigone “eats the book.”144 This is the 
spectacle of the realization of desire.  
 Lacan’s framing of tragedy can reframe the present understanding of the ICA as a policy 
that was either invited by progressive American Indians or imposed upon traditionalist nations. 
Tragedy, thought of as crossing the limit into law ex nihilo, reveals the potential rupture at the 
core of racial jurisprudence such as the ICA because it elucidates the formal labor of both 
racialization and decolonization in writing, interpreting, and arguing about the law. In other 
words, the final draft of the ICA should be read against the pressures on liberal fantasies 
exhibited in indigenous peoples’ representations of their relationship to citizenship. By 
consuming and spitting out representations of indigenous (in)competence, pro-and-anti-
citizenship activists represented two drastically different versions of citizenship, both of which 
denied the US government’s authority to write the alien citizen into birthright citizenship law.  
 In this way, both Deskaheh and members of SAI do not engage in mimicry to advocate 
for their interpretations of “subject to jurisdiction” as much as they took legal rhetoric to law ex 
nihilio. In turn they went beyond hegemonic interpretations of competence and incompetence 
(para-doxa), forcing new meanings and identifications. Specifically, both the SAI and the 
Haudenosaunee broke the contract of incompetence by contesting the state’s authority to judge 
who is competent—and thus, subject to political jurisdiction. By associating indigenous peoples 
with blood and soil—as always already inside the body politic—the SAI worked against the kind 
of citizenship mediated by lex. The Haudenosaunee, in turn, used the language of competence 
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and incompetence to position themselves as arbiters of lex, and thus as not in US political or 
territorial jurisdiction. In going beyond the law, both sides represented the emptiness of 










CHAPTER FIVE:  CAN THE CITIZEN SPEAK? JUDGING CONSENT IN EXPATRIATION 
LAW 
 
The legal person is the same, but the psychological person has become another—Richard von 
Krafft-Ebing, 1886.1  
 
“Consider how terrible it is to come to know the undetectable difference between what it is to be 
the subject of and what it is to be subject to political decision.” –Fred Moten.2 
 
 
 In 2001, the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan captured Yaser Esam Hamdi in an active 
combat zone and turned him over to the US government. Although Hamdi claimed that he was a 
US citizen, born in Baton Rouge, LA, he was classified as an “enemy combatant” and transferred 
to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.3 After a few months, however, the US government transferred Hamdi 
to US soil due to internal disagreements regarding his citizenship status.4 The internal discord 
was only made more contentious when Hamdi’s father filed a writ of habeas corpus petition as 
next friend.5 Initially, the district court granted the petition and appointed Federal Public 
Defender Frank Dunham, Jr. as council. However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
the petition, claiming that the separation of powers required federal courts to practice restraint 
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during wartime because the judicial branch is not equipped to oversee the “conduct of overseas 
conflict.”6 Following the reversal, Hamdi’s father appealed and Hamdi remained in solitary 
confinement.  
 Hamdi’s now publicly recognized citizenship status threw into turmoil what would have 
otherwise been unexceptional during the height of the War on Terror, during which the United 
States detained over 100,000 so-called enemy combatants.7 Indeed, Hamdi’s US citizenship 
status was discomforting for everyone. Rightwing public culture vacillated between assertions 
that Hamdi was not a “real” citizen and renewed xenophobic calls to reinterpret the 14th 
amendment in order to bar future Hamdis from being classified as “real” citizens. Joining 
Islamophobia with racist “anchor baby” narratives, numerous Congressional hearings, editorials, 
and comment sections on Breitbart cited Hamdi as the exemplary reason for doing away with 
birthright citizenship.8 In contrast to John Walker Lindh, a white man from Marin County, 
California who was captured in the same active combat zone in Afghanistan, Hamdi’s citizenship 
status was deemed to prove the danger of the 14th amendment’s broad inclusivity since US v. 
Wong Kim Ark (1898). Lindh was a traitor who should be punished and even expatriated; Hamdi 
was an “accident” that proved the illegitimacy of US citizenship as a whole since Wong Kim Ark, 
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or the untenability of nomos as a ground for political community.9 Hamdi was born on US soil 
but had not been “stamped” as an allegiant subject.  
 Meanwhile liberal journalists and civil liberties advocates, already horrified by the 
executive power asserted in the PATRIOT ACT, saw Hamdi’s indefinite detention, alongside US 
citizen Jose Padilla’s,10 as a sign that “US citizen” had completely lost its meaning. Journalists 
remarked that both detainees signified that the US government could revoke the writ of habeas 
corpus for anyone anywhere without congressional authority. For these journalists, the denial of 
Hamdi’s habeas rights reflected the fragility of their own citizenship status during wartime. Even 
though as a citizen Hamdi was able to file a habeas petition, which is one of the oldest ways in 
which citizens can address the government by literally ‘demanding the body,’ the fact that 
Hamdi was placed in indefinite detention in the first place, denied a public trial, and publicly 
called a fraudulent citizen encapsulated the fragility of that form of address guaranteed by 
English common law.11  
 The aftermath of the Supreme Court’s contentious plurality decision in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld (2004) led to more confusion. The decision held that the US government could classify 
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citizens as enemy combatants but that they must give them a habeas hearing. Both liberals and 
conservatives saw this as a victory.12 However, the US government did not give Hamdi a 
hearing. Instead, he was released to Saudi Arabia under the condition that he renounce his US 
citizenship and his capacity to sue the US government.13 This outcome was perplexing to many. 
A law professor from the University of Houston even wrote a letter to the New York Times 
correcting their assertion that Hamdi was no longer a US citizen. Citing the cases Afroyim v Rusk 
(1967) and Vance v Terrazas (1980), he argued that “the United States government has no 
authority to compel such a renunciation, and Mr. Hamdi’s proclamation that he is no longer an 
American is legally meaningless.”14 If not seen as outright illegal, Hamdi’s renunciation was 
largely pronounced as erroneous.  
  The Hamdi case is formally similar to the other citizenship problems covered so far, 
wherein the language of the 14th amendment interferes with state interests—in this case with 
fighting the War on Terror by fitting “enemy citizens” into the extra-legal, homo sacer-like 
“enemy combatant” status.15 Just as the early 20th century controversy over American Indian 
citizenship illuminates the state’s inability to decide who is subject to jurisdiction in a way that 
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seamlessly upholds state interests, Hamdi captures a similar indecipherability of citizenship law. 
In both cases, exceptions are declared to square the law with politics so as to manage the racial 
anxieties emanating from liberalism’s possible paradoxes (i.e., a fellow citizen could really be a 
citizen terrorist). However, one central difference is that the specific kinds of discomfort 
surrounding Hamdi surfaced because public and legal culture had already begun to figure 
citizenship as inherent to the person upon birth or naturalization in US jurisdiction. As I will 
show below, contrary to Wong Kim Ark’s declaration of jus soli, citizenship continued to be 
recognized or denied based on state actors’ judgements. Throughout the 20th century, state 
officials detained, deported, and excluded from reentry Chinese, Japanese, communists, and 
Mexican American citizens.16 Until the 1970s, citizenship was not publicly or legally understood 
as inherently and perpetually granted at birth. Importantly, this was comforting for people 
concerned with the many meanings of national security because the state could exercise its 
judgement to correct the potential errors of the ‘soil,’ cleansing the body politic of alien citizens.  
 However, in the era of Hamdi, as opposed to the era of Wong Kim Ark and the Society 
for American Indians, citizenship “sticks” to people in a way that infuriates white supremacists 
and that simultaneously gives comfort that one’s political identity—regardless of one’s other 
identities—is secure against the kind of state violence perpetuated against “illegals” and 
“aliens.”17 In other words, Hamdi only emerged as a problem for both sides of the political aisle 
because we had begun to already conceive of jus soli through the fantasy of nomos, or through 
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the imagination of an unmediated citizenship status that does not depend on recognition or on 
any extra “sense” other than birth on national soil.  
 While this shift in the public’s perspective of citizenship coincides with larger societal 
shifts towards understanding politics through the prism of “rights” rhetoric,18 the joining of 
citizen and inherent right is specifically a product of the Warren Court’s (1953-1969) treatment 
of Wong Kim Ark and expatriation law. According to legal historian Patrick Weil, Earl Warren 
and Hugo Black’s rhetoric in a series of expatriation cases from 1958 to 1967 constructed the 
citizen as not only the vehicle par excellence of “rights” but also as “sovereign,” or as outside the 
grasp of congressional power to judge who is and is not a citizen.19 In this way, the “rhetorical 
culture” that renders Hamdi’s citizenship uncomfortable is not necessarily the heightened tension 
of the War on Terror. Instead, the discomfort emerges from the kind of citizenship figured in the 
Warren Court’s interpretation of Wong Kim Ark. The question arises, then, of what happened: 
Why was Hamdi expatriated? Most of all, why were people so surprised?  
 In attending to these questions, this chapter begins by tracing the rise of what Weil calls 
the sovereign citizen amidst a surge of nonconsensual expatriations in the first half of the 20th 
century. Specifically, I extend Weil’s thesis by showing that the Warren Court’s construction of 
citizenship heightens the paradox of identity and consent found in Elk and Wong Kim Ark by 
figuring the citizen in a chiastic relationship to the country. Such a figuration equivocates the 
source of authority to make and unmake citizens, in turn placing the burden of interpreting the 
citizen’s consent on the state. This ambiguity leads the Court to eventually substitute consent 
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with assent in order to make the citizen’s psyche sensible for the state. By reading intent as 
located in the citizen’s assent, these cases invert and yet advance Elk’s racialized logic of 
recognition by placing the ultimate authority to interpret the citizen’s consent in the state.  
 With the legal-rhetorical context of the sovereign citizen in mind, the final sections of the 
chapter return to Hamdi. Comparing the contentious oral arguments in the Supreme Court case 
with the clinical settlement agreement that Hamdi “eagerly” signed in order to attain his 
freedom,20 I argue that because the expatriation cases substitute speech for the citizen’s will, 
Hamdi’s entrance into the liberal citizen subject identity—through the granting of habeas corpus 
by the majority opinion—is also the moment where he becomes “outlawed” through his own 
speech. Such outlawing occurs because, despite our ideological associations of speech with 
presence and with will to power, speech is always mediated (in this case by legal institutions) 
and always puts people into a struggle over recognition.  
 The Hamdi case reads as paradoxical to many because it goes against the core promises 
of liberal citizenship—impersonal consensualism. When examined in the context of the larger 
rhetorical history of expatriation, however, its inconsistences can be read as symptoms of a larger 
rhetorical problem with birthright citizenship covered throughout this project. That is, liberal 
fantasy relies on regulating doxa in order to guarantee an outside to citizenship. However, once 
the means of producing an outside to citizenship become solely located within the citizen, a 
struggle for recognition over how to interpret the citizen’s sovereign decision ensues. In 
concluding, I argue that this struggle for recognition is based in what Patchen Markell calls “the 
aspiration to sovereignty,” which refers to the corporate (including state) and individual pursuit 
                                                 




of power to deterritorialize and reterritorialize the symbolic order of things.21 The aspiration to 
sovereignty is part of what animates both the state—determining how its jurisdiction is 
materialized—and the citizenry in its capacity to speak and be heard. However, the aspiration to 
sovereignty is an unfinished problem that must be negotiated rhetorically in legal and political 
discourse. Even as citizenship can be used as the basis for rights, the aspiration to sovereignty 
characterizing citizenship also makes it unstable and potentially violent. 
 
Chiasmus: Writing the Sovereign Citizen 
 Between 1907 and 1967, 22,000 people were “voluntarily” expatriated.22 Importantly, 
this number only reflects those who were ‘consensually’ expatriated by states attorneys and does 
not include the roughly 600,000 US citizens of Mexican ancestry who were forcibly ‘patriated’ 
to Mexico during the 1930s via deportation.23 Though novel institutional arrangements, such as 
border patrol and the Federal Bureau of Naturalization, allowed for the sheer number of 
expatriations and deportations to occur, both practices were seen as necessary by the public and 
by Congress largely due to the xenophobic securitization rhetoric marking this period.24 For 
example, the only early oppositional voices to the practice appear in publications whose 
audiences were immediately affected by expatriation—Mexican American, Japanese American, 
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and socialist newspapers.25 Mainstream opposition to expatriation is not represented in print until 
the late 1950s with Anthony Lewis’ reporting for the New York Times. In line with public 
opinion, the Supreme Court also largely ignored the increasing number of appeals against 
expatriations, seeing the separation of powers as preventing its capacity to interfere in 
congressional regulation of both foreign affairs and immigration and naturalization proceedings.  
  In addition to Red Scare and Cold War securitization discourses, however, expatriations 
were not seen as an overreach of state authority because they were consistently marked as 
consensual. After all, expatriation law’s origin story in the United States begins with the 
Expatriation Act of 1868’s ratification alongside the 14th amendment. The Act describes 
expatriation as the inherent “right” of the citizen to choose their allegiance: 
 Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, 
 indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
 happiness…Therefore any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any 
 officer of the United States which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of 
 expatriation, is declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Republic.26 
In line with US mythology surrounding the right to expatriation as fundamental to liberal society, 
the Act connects expatriation to the Bill of Rights’ triad “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.” However, just as the 14th amendment opened questions about how formerly excluded 
peoples fit into birthright citizenship, the expatriation act’s declaration of the inherent right to 
expatriate opens questions about how such a right is exercised—do certain acts constitute 
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expatriation regardless of intent? How does the government ascertain intent? Answering these 
questions required jurists to discern whether a citizen’s intent to expatriate could be interpreted 
from either her speech or from a series of ever-expanding expatriating acts declared by Congress.  
 
Disputing Voluntariness in Congressionally-Defined Expatriating Acts  
 The first method of answering the question of how the citizen expresses consent to 
expatriate involved judging whether the citizen had committed any number of predetermined 
expatriating acts. Pressured by growing discontent over the expatriation of women who married 
foreigners, Congress created an explicit system for statutory expatriation by passing the 
Nationalization Act of 1906 and the Expatriation Act of 1907. 27 Together these acts formalized 
expatriation procedures that were for the most part already practiced. When written into law, 
however, these acts also introduced an ambiguity that would haunt congress during the entire 
20th century. In a splitting of “citizen” between state and individual power, Congress explicitly 
held that expatriation had to be voluntary but that the government must “establish the outward 
and visible standards of such volition and compel the individual to accept the consequences of 
his freely willed decision.”28 The outward standards established in these acts included marrying 
male foreigners, naturalizing in another country, serving in a foreign military, and voting in a 
foreign election. By establishing that voluntariness only referred to the commission of the 
outwardly defined expatriating act and not to the person’s intent to expatriate, Congress ensured 
that the US government maintained the authority to both define and judge the citizen’s consent to 
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expatriate, leaving the citizen’s will underdetermined. This stipulation kept the Supreme Court 
from granting certiorari to denationalization appeals.  
 Though the Cable Act of 1922 stopped the expatriation of women after marrying a 
foreigner,29 the Nationality Act of 1940 added even more avenues for voluntary expatriation. 
Now, citizens could be expatriated for demonstrating a “lack of attachment” to the Constitution 
during naturalization and for residing abroad for extended periods of time.30 As evidenced by the 
discussion of American Indian citizenship in the previous chapter, “lack of attachment” was not 
a new metric for national belonging since propriety is often managed through the discourse of 
sentiments and feelings. The disciplinary technologies, including citizenship and naturalization 
laws, comprising modern biopolitics often manage and normalize bodies by orienting affective 
attachment towards sanctioned objects of desire such as the nation, the heteronormative family, 
the demands of labor, etc.31 Moreover, the discourse of attachment was racialized, allowing 
politicians to exclude people who were already citizens without using a racial idiom that had 
been outlawed by the 14th amendment. However, like the slipperiness of ‘competence,’ lack of 
attachment to the constitution generated a number of new and more diffuse expatriating acts, 
such as participation in politically radical organizations ranging from the mundane trade union to 
the pro-Nazi German-American Bund.  
 Lack of attachment finally warranted judicial intervention because it drew attention to the 
inner mind of the citizen before, during, and after naturalization. As such, lack of attachment 
required state actors to judge the past-tense “will” of the citizen in order to decipher whether he 
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or she was truly emotionally attached to the Constitution. Justice Frankfurter described this 
metric in a Supreme Court conference in 1943 where he said that the point of the “lack of 
attachment” metric was to assure that the citizen was really part of the “fellowship which binds 
people together by devotion to certain feelings and ideas.”32 However, such a requirement for 
uninterrupted citizenship status not only introduces the problematic of attributing cause and 
effect, as in, does joining the worker’s party cause one to become disaffected from the 
Constitution? Or, is joining the worker’s party an effect of a pre-existing ill will towards the 
nation? Interpreting lack of attachment also introduces the problem of judging the citizen’s 
psyche. As expressed in the epigraph, this involved distinguishing between the seemingly 
obscure and fluid “psychological person” and the seemingly static “legal person.”  
 These conundrums regarding the interiority of the subject have plagued legal and political 
discourse since the onset of modernity’s construction of a self with inner thoughts and feelings. 
Indeed, as covered in chapter two, liberalism encircles the trope of homo homini lupus, or the 
struggle over wolf, man, and sovereign, in turn regulating the citizen’s will. The regulation of the 
will is imagined as preventing para-doxa, or counter-hegemonic, potentially regicidal 
interpretations of law. While pre-Reconstruction models of citizenship made explicit identarian 
exclusions to ensure a degree of homogeneity to keep antagonism and indeterminacy at bay, 
post-Reconstruction citizenship formally disallows identarian exclusions in the name of liberal 
impersonalism and consent. Thus, in order to maintain the same kinds of exclusions that ward off 
the “anarchic” kernel of citizenship, liberal legal culture has sought a linguistic contract, or a 
metalanguage of citizenship that continuously figures an “outside” in order to protect 
                                                 




Frankfurter’s “fellowship.” “Lack of attachment,” like incompetence, provided the rhetorical 
means of excluding citizens who might antagonize the body politic.  
 However, the regulation of the citizen’s lack of attachment also invited judicial scrutiny. 
Given the difficulty of proving “lack of attachment,” it is no surprise that this stipulation 
provoked the first Supreme Court interventions into expatriation law. In Schneiderman v. US 
(1943) and Baumgartner v. US (1944), the Court scrutinized the lower courts’ reliance on 
“mental reservation” as a means for denaturalizing foreign-born citizens for acts committed and 
speech uttered after their naturalization.33 The Court ruled that in both cases the government had 
not demonstrated sufficient evidence that either Schneiderman, an active member of the 
Worker’s Party, or Baumgartner, an active member of the German-American Bund, had 
demonstrated lack of attachment during their naturalization proceedings. In this way, the Court 
declared that the government could not determine a citizen’s past feelings by presenting evidence 
about their current lack of attachment. In both cases, the Court ruled that the government had to 
prove lack of attachment during the time of naturalization by “clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing” evidence.34  
 In response to the rulings, Congress wrote new legislation explicitly naming acts that 
demonstrate lack of attachment to the Constitution. With popular support from the outbreak of 
the Korean War, the McCarran Act (1950) made affiliation within five years of naturalization 
with an organization that advocated for overthrowing the US government evidence for “lack of 
attachment.”35 Predating the indefinite detentions during the war on terror, this act also 
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authorized the president to detain all people believed to be participating in “acts of espionage or 
sabotage.”36 Fueled by McCarthyism, the McCarran-Walter Act (1952) added another grounds 
for expatriation: refusing to testify about subversive activity before a congressional committee 
within ten years of naturalization.37 During this time period, Eisenhower’s attorneys general (first 
McGranery and then Brownell) made headlines every three months or so by announcing 
denationalization proceedings against presumed communists.38   
 Even as expatriation functioned as a public mode of securing the body politic from 
“undesirables,” its rapid expansion also began to garner more judicial scrutiny. An increasing 
number of cases at multiple levels demanded that the US government prove how and why it 
initiated expatriation proceedings on individuals. Public opinion reflected this scrutiny as well. 
Beginning in the 1950s, editorials and letters to the editors in mainstream publications 
denounced the legality of expatriation laws. For instance, an editorial titled “Ike’s Plan to 
Expatriate Reds Needs Legal Teeth,” says “many legal problems arise when an attempt is made 
to impose expatriation for actions not clearly defined” because the act must be voluntarily 
committed.39 As mentioned above, Anthony Lewis also began to report on expatriation 
proceedings, and most of all, questioning their validity.40 As such, even though Eisenhower’s 
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announcement of communist expatriation during his state of the union address was met by loud 
applause, the legality of carrying out this wish was increasingly coming under scrutiny.41 If 
denationalization served Red Scare and Cold War public culture by making the cleansing of 
political and racial dissidents from the body politic visible, then this visibilization was perhaps 
unintentionally also seen as a threat to the citizenry writ large as an ever-expanding cadre of 
citizens were subject to scrutiny and removal.42 
 
The Warren Court Contests the Power to Define Expatriating Acts 
 While interventions into expatriation law in the 1940s dealt with how the US government 
should prove which citizens committed predetermined expatriating acts willingly, the actual 
congressional power to declare expatriating acts did not get contested until Earl Warren became 
chief justice in 1953, ushering in what would become known as the Warren “rights revolution.”43 
Scholars have characterized Warren’s leadership on the Court as at once revolutionary and 
contentious. Warren’s unorthodox jurisprudence, characterized by a concern for “justice” over 
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legal norm and societal implication over logical consistency, exacerbated long-standing tensions 
on the Court. Weil notes that on one side sat Felix Frankfurter, “the great defender of judicial 
deference to Congress; on the other were Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge, advocates of 
the intervention of the Court to safeguard individual rights.”44 When Warren joined the Court, he 
formed a lifelong alliance with Hugo Black, with whom he would work to fundamentally change 
the relationship between citizen, consent, and state.  
 The Court’s treatment of expatriation was especially contentious because the justices 
disagreed on how to read the 14th amendment in conjunction with Congress’s traditional power 
over regulating naturalization and foreign affairs. While Felix Frankfurter did not see the 
relevance of the 14th amendment to expatriation laws, Black and Warren were strong believers 
that the 14th amendment’s citizenship clause invalidated congressional power to determine acts 
that constitute expatriation apart from explicit renunciation of one’s citizenship.45 Unlike the 14th 
amendment’s due process clause, which permits life, liberty, or property to be deprived as long 
as the government follows a certain set of procedures, Black and Warren expressed that the 
language of the citizenship clause gave absolute protection to the basic right of citizenship. For 
example, Warren corresponded with one of his law clerks about the notion of “sovereignty of the 
individual” and its relevance to expatriation law.46 Specifically, he viewed the 14th amendment 
and its reading in Wong Kim Ark as holding that citizenship is absolute and perpetual despite 
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Congressional regulation of naturalization. Both Warren and Black viewed jurisdiction as a one-
way street where once someone is “subject to jurisdiction” they cannot be expunged “because 
one branch of that government can be said to have a conceivably rational basis to do so” unless 
they choose to leave.47 In this way, Warren and Black’s conception of jurisdiction opposes 
Justice Gray’s in Elk. While Gray held that lex is the ultimate source of citizenship, Warren and 
Black argued that once a citizen becomes a citizen—either through birth-on-soil or 
naturalization—she is the ultimate source of sustaining that status. 
  In 1958, three expatriation cases gave Warren and Black the opportunity to connect the 
14th amendment to expatriation law: Perez v. Brownell (1958), Nishikawa v. Dulles (1958), and 
Trop v. Dulles (1958). Like most of the other cases covered thus far, all three involve the 
exclusion of “alien citizens,” or of people who had been racialized to not fit into the Cold War 
body politic. For instance, Clemente Martinez Perez was born in El Paso, Texas in 1909 but 
because he moved to Mexico at the age 10 or 11, he did not become aware that he was a US 
citizen until 1928.48 In the early 1940s he took advantage of the alien railroad labor program and 
entered the US as a Mexican laborer. In 1947, however, upon trying to enter the United States as 
a citizen, he was excluded on the grounds that he had expatriated himself by voting in a Mexican 
election and by not serving in the military during World War II. With the help of the ACLU, he 
sued attorney general Herbert Brownell in 1954, requesting that he be declared a US citizen 
because voting in a foreign election does not signal voluntary renunciation of US citizenship.49 
In a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court ended up ruling against Perez, declaring that Congress has the 
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authority pass legislation that avoids “serious international embarrassment,” potentially resulting 
from voting in foreign elections.”50  
 Mitsugi Nishikawa was born in California in 1916. After going to Japan in 1939 to attend 
university, World War II began and he was forced to join the Japanese Army. After the war 
ended, he applied for a passport to return to the US but was denied on the grounds that he had 
expatriated himself for serving in a foreign army. With the help of the ACLU, he sued Dulles on 
the grounds that he was forced to serve in the Japanese military and thus, had not voluntarily 
surrendered his US citizenship. In a 7 to 2 vote, the Court ruled in favor of Nishikawa because he 
served in a foreign military under duress.  
 Alfred Trop was born in Ohio. Though Trop was white and did not hold dual citizenship 
with another country, he was deemed unfit for citizenship because he demonstrated a lack of 
patriotism upon abandoning his post when serving in the US military in Casablanca. He was only 
AWOL for one day before surrendering to a US officer. However, upon returning to the United 
States he learned that he had expatriated himself for refusing to serve in the military during 
wartime. With the help of the ACLU, he also sued Dulles on the grounds that expatriation should 
not be a punishment for military violations. Like Nishikawa, the Court also ruled in Trop’s favor, 
holding that expatriation could not be a punishment.  
 Together, these cases lay the discursive blueprint for what Weil calls the sovereign 
citizen, or the citizen whose status emerges from and is sustained by birth or naturalization 
within US jurisdiction. Per Weil, the sovereign citizen is sovereign precisely because his or her 
status precludes state recognition. Even though the most publicized phrase from Warren’s Perez 
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dissent was that citizenship is “nothing less than the right to have rights,”51 Weil argues that Trop 
and Nishikawa establish that citizen sovereignty goes further than the articulation of citizenship 
with rights because it protects citizens from unwilling expatriation even if they also possess 
another nationality. In effect, sovereign citizenship redefines the concept as “both a club that 
limits entrance from outsiders and a public good that places no inherent limits to the secured 
rights of its members.”52 In other words, sovereignty’s association with ultimate power secures 
the citizen even against the state’s declaration of laws that outlaw the citizen’s identification with 
threatening associations. Even in the context of heightened securitization of the body politic, 
then, the figure of the sovereign citizen privileges the securitization of the individual legal 
subject.  
 Warren’s early drafts in Perez reflect his belief in the necessity of a secure citizenship 
status that precedes positive law, or lex. For instance, he describes individual sovereignty as 
preceding the whims of Congress: “The people who created this government endowed it with 
broad powers. They created a sovereign state with power to function as sovereignty. But the 
citizens themselves are sovereign, and their citizenship is not subject to the general powers of 
their government.”53 Warren expanded on this concept in his majority opinion in Trop, which 
states that “in our country the people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever its 
relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship.”54 Warren’s words ironically mirror 
and invert Justice Gray’s in Elk, whereby Indians are deemed unable to simply assume US 
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citizenship despite their relationship to the soil. For Warren, the citizenry writ large’s 
relationship to jurisdiction disallows congress to sever its political relationship to the people. In 
other words, only the citizen can articulate the “extra sense” of jurisdiction, or its rhetorical and 
prudential dimension.  
  Even though Warren and Black did not manage to completely withdraw congressional 
authority to define the will to expatriate by overturning Perez in 1958, in 1967 Afroyim v Rusk, 
gave them another opportunity to intervene in congressional expatriation.55 Roughly ten years 
later, and after the death of Frankfurter, Warren and Black seized another opportunity to interfere 
in statutory expatriations. In this case, Black authored the majority decision overturning Perez 
and thus, congressional authority to expatriate citizens without their explicit renunciation. Here, 
Weil writes that the sovereign citizen becomes an official part of law.56 It is no surprise then that, 
like Perez, Afroyim’s rhetoric was largely praised in mainstream press and in law journals. For 
example, the Boston Globe characterizes the “liberal wing” of the Court as “protect[ing]” and 
“guard[ing]” citizenship.57 A few days later the Globe ran a story titled “No More Banishment,” 
which lauded Black’s statement that “citizenship should not be trifled with.”58 This phrase was 
quoted by a number of articles in the days following the publication of the opinion.59 A New 
York Times article titled “Always a Citizen,” claimed on June 1 that “Chief Justice Warren’s 
magisterial dissent in the Perez v Brownell denationalization case in 1958 is one of the most 
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impressive opinions in his service on the Supreme Court. That opinion has now nine years later 
achieved vindication in the Court’s ruling this week.” 60 
 One of the most highly circulated excerpts from Afroyim captures the form of sovereign 
citizenship aptly:  
 Citizenship in this Nation is a part of a co-operative affair. Its citizenry is the   
 country and the country is its citizenry. The very nature of our free government makes 
 it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens 
 temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship.61    
Here, the citizen’s intent to expatriate shifts from something that can be outwardly determined by 
policy, or lex, to something that only the citizen herself determines. In doing so, Black’s rhetoric 
puts the citizen is in an egalitarian relationship with the government, who is deemed incapable of 
erecting laws that undo one’s citizenship status. This egalitarianism is formally expressed by the 
chiasmus “its citizenry is the country, and the country is its citizenry,” which is then reiterated by 
the use of citizen as a synecdoche for Congress. Both formal moves construct a congruency 
between citizen and state. Indeed, Aleinikoff argues that the celebrated phrasing turns on the 
“congruency thesis,” which sees citizenship as the “meeting ground of sovereignty and 
democracy: sovereignty is located in the citizenry (the demos) that selects those who will captain 
the ship of the state.”62 Such a configuration exemplifies liberal self-governance, where the 
citizen regulates his or her own will, in turn, forming part of the larger body politic.  
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 It is important that Black expressed the notion of sovereign citizenship via chiasmus, 
which puts words and things into a congruent relationship by reversing their order. As Robert 
Hariman has stated, chiasmus is a seldom used, yet often-quoted trope because most see it as 
overly ornamental and artificial.63 Nevertheless, chiasmus has a long history of figuring 
relationships of power, such as the kings two body’s refrain “The king is dead. Long live the 
king.”64 Chiasmus is perhaps frequently used to represent complex relationships of power 
because the instability among terms caused generates a third, often unstated, term that grounds 
an ontological claim concerning the relationship between objects as well as the relationship 
between word and world.65 In other words, chiasmus generates an ambiguity about how objects 
are made commensurate in the first place. In Black’s excerpt both figurations of the citizen 
firmly place the power of declaring law onto the citizen, thus locating the source of power to 
“posit and depose” onto the people. 66  
 The chiasmic relationship between citizen and country was attacked in Justice Harlan II’s 
dissent. He argued:  
 Finally, the Court declares that its result is bottomed upon the “language and the 
 purpose” of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; in explanation, the 
 Court offers only the terms of the clause itself, the contention that any other result would 
                                                 
63 Robert Hariman, “What Is a Chiasmus? Or, Why the Abyss Stares Back,” in Chiasmus and Culture, ed. Anthony 
Paul and Boris Wiseman (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 46. 
 
64 Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2016), 55. 
 
65 Hariman, “What Is a Chiasmus? Or, Why the Abyss Stares Back,” 47. 
 
66 Santner claims, “Modern politics is always biopolitics not simply because the wealth of nations—the 
commonwealth—is now seen to reside in the well-being of the population but rather because the procedures of 
Setzen and Ensetzen, of positing and deposing, that formerly focused on the figure of the sovereign now transpire 
within the life of every citizen. In a word, the privilege and horror, the sublimity and abjection, of the flesh now 




 be “completely incongruous,” and the essentially arcane observation that the “citizenry is 
 the country and the country is its citizenry.” I can find nothing in this extraordinary series 
 of circumventions which permits, still less compels, the imposition of this constitutional 
 constraint upon the authority of Congress.67  
Here, Harlan II highlights the ambiguity (i.e., the arcaneness) of the chiasmus while lamenting 
that the majority based its judgement on the “terms” present in the citizenship clause itself. 
Ironically, for Harlan the judicial branch of the state did not adequately judge why the citizenship 
clause’s words remove the state from the position of ultimate judge. Justice Frankfurter’s former 
law clerk Alexander Bickel expressed a similar condemnation of the opinion’s ambiguity. In an 
article attacking the Warren Court’s figuration of citizenship during this time period, he wrote 
that the relationship expressed in the chiasmus was “regressive rhetoric.”68 Comparing the 
chiasmus to Justice Roger Taney’s conflation of white people and the nation-state in Dred Scott 
(1857), Bickel argues that the phrase is overly ambiguous; “a relationship between government 
and the governed that turns on citizenship can always be dissolved or denied…it is at best 
something that was given, and given to some and not others, and it can be taken away.”69 
 Bickel and Harlan II’s critiques portend the problems with interpreting the citizen’s intent 
to expatriate. The chiasmic figuration of power obscures an interpretive aporia in the citizen’s 
will, in turn, inverting the kind of one-way recognition written in Elk and upheld by American 
Indian citizenship law. While the expatriation cases from the 1940s and 1950s directed the US 
government to judge the citizen’s will through establishing the facticity of pre-determined 
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expatriating acts, Afroyim deprives the government of its authority to determine what constitutes 
the will to expatriate aside from explicit and formal renunciation. As sovereign, the citizen 
herself determines her will to expatriate. Because citizenship “sticks” to the body at birth or 
naturalization unless the citizen intends to detach from the country, Congress loses the power to 
determine at the onset what acts detach the person from citizen. In this way, person and citizen 
become an opaque amalgamation in the eyes of the state. This opaqueness has a cost, however. 
As will be evident in case law following Afroyim and during the War on Terror, the citizen-
country chiasmus opens questions about sovereignty posed by Harlan II and Bickel. What 
mediates the relationship between citizen and country? Who decides when citizens expatriate 
themselves?  
 
From Intent to Assent: Recognition and Consent in Vance v Terrazas (1980)  
 Weil suggests that Afroyim is the apotheosis of citizen sovereignty and that a subsequent 
expatriation decision, Vance v. Terrazas (1980), affirms the Warren Court’s linking of the 
citizenship clause to the sovereign citizen.70 In glowing praise of Warren Court liberalism, Weil 
states that  
 To the specter of expatriation that cast a tall shadow over a great many American 
 citizens, the United States Supreme Court, under Warren’s leadership, responded by 
 embracing the innovative concept of citizenship sovereignty. Nowhere else in the 
 democratic world has a court of law defined so smartly and with such novelty the 
 complexity of the link between the individual and the nation-state.71  
                                                 






The discourse of expatriation in public culture supports Weil’s arguments. After the 1980s, 
expatriation largely becomes associated with taxes and corporate interests in offshore banking as 
well as with wealthy retirees known as “expats.”72 The privileged connotation of both of these 
associations signals that expatriation was no longer seen as something imposed on “undesirable” 
citizens by the government and was instead a voluntary choice carried out by wealthy 
individuals. Moreover, as mentioned above, the incredulity surrounding Hamdi’s expatriation 
demonstrates that doxa concerning the 14th amendment’s citizenship clause makes citizenship 
appear to most of us as secure and perpetual unless we say so.  
 Nevertheless, an attention to Vance v. Terraza’s rhetoric foreshadows the problems with 
consent and sovereignty that arise during Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004). As the law professor quoted 
at the beginning of the chapter notes, the legal community largely sees Vance as clarifying the 
ambiguities regarding how citizens voluntarily renounce their US citizenship because it holds 
that citizens voluntarily expatriate themselves only by explicitly renouncing their US citizenship. 
What is explicit renunciation, however? And, how does it contribute to coterminous legality and 
discomfort marking Hamdi’s renunciation?  
 Laurence J. Terrazas was born in the United States to Mexican parents, acquiring dual 
citizenship at birth. In Fall 1970, Terrazas filled out an application for a certificate of Mexican 
nationality in order to continue to study at a university in Monterrey, Mexico. In doing so, he 
swore “adherence, obedience, and submission to the laws and authorities of the Mexican 
republic” and “expressly renounce[ed] United States citizenship, as well as any submission, 
obedience, and loyalty to any foreign government, especially to that of the United States of 
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America.”73 After Terrazas revealed his activities to an officer in the US Consulate, the US 
Department of State issued a certificate of loss of nationality. In response, Terrazas filed suit 
against the secretary of state Cyrus Vance. The District Court found in favor of Vance, claiming 
that Terrazas had acted “voluntarily in swearing allegiance to Mexico and renouncing allegiance 
to the United States.”74 However, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that taking an oath to a 
foreign state was not “clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence” of “intent on [the] appellee’s 
part to renounce his United States citizenship.”75  
 In both the District and Appeals levels of Vance, justices struggle to square assent with 
intent in deciding whether Terrazas voluntarily relinquished his US citizenship upon uttering the 
words of the oath for Mexican nationality. While the District Court claimed that the Court must 
read Terrazas’ intent from his assent in the oath, the Court of Appeals claimed that the US 
government did not prove that upon speaking the oath, Terrazas intended to renounce his US 
citizenship. In weighing these two holdings in the context of expatriation case law, Supreme 
Court Justice White similarly struggles with intent and assent in reading the will of the citizen to 
expatriate themselves. He writes that “in the last analysis [of Afroyim], expatriation depends on 
the will of the citizen rather than on the will of Congress and its assessment of his conduct.”76 
White continues, the Court “in overruling Perez, ‘reject[ed] the idea…that, aside from the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has any general power, express or implied, to take away an 
American citizen’s citizenship without his assent” and that “assent should not therefore be read 
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as a code word for intent to renounce.”77 In considering case law, White struggles with 
deciphering intent from assent. Conceding that it is impossible to know the mind of the 
individual, he writes that “It is difficult to understand that assent to loss of citizenship would 
mean anything less than an intent to relinquish citizenship.” This leads to the conclusion that  
 an expatriation act and an intent to relinquish citizenship must be proved by a 
 preponderance of the evidence. We also hold that when one of the statutory expatriating 
 acts is proved, it is constitutional to presume it to have been a voluntary act until and 
 unless proved otherwise by the actor.78  
In this way, Vance maintains the integrity of the citizen-country chiasmus by defining the will of 
the citizen as legible through assent. Since there is no way to truly know the citizen’s mind, the 
Court must judge intent only by what it can see and hear.  
 On one hand, this articulation of will represents the epitome of liberal notions of consent. 
For example, as stated in chapter two, western thought imagines the community of citizens as 
one where speech substitutes for violence. Legible speech is the medium par excellence by 
which the liberal subject exercises her will in the political sphere. On the other hand, while the 
articulation of intent to assent coincides with liberal ideals about explicit consent—as opposed to 
tacit consent—as the Hamdi case demonstrates, it also delves into the same issues of 
interpretation and sovereignty discussed in the previous chapter. By figuring speech mediating 
between citizen and country, Vance continues to locate the power of interpretation in the 
jurispathic principle, or in the power of the courts and the state to decide what to make of a 
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citizen’s speech.79 As covered in the previous chapters, the jurispathic principle of legal 
interpretation privileges the state’s claims over legal meaning because they are tied to the “state’s 
imperfect monopoly over the domain of violence.”80  
 Thus, if intent to expatriate arises from the citizen’s speech then both Terraza and 
Hamdi’s renunciations are valid. Hamdi “eagerly” signed the settlement agreement with the 
guidance of a lawyer and, upon arriving in Riyadh, he immediately renounced his US 
citizenship.81 Yet, as a number of legal scholars have stated, anyone who knows anything about 
contractual consent would argue that Hamdi assented under extreme duress, nullifying the 
contract.82 Moreover, Hamdi did not even receive his end of the deal; he was never actually 
granted his habeas hearing. In the end, Hamdi’s only words to the state were the words that 
expatriated him. Nevertheless, it is impossible to assume that Hamdi did not intend to expatriate 
himself given relationship between citizen and country articulated in Vance. Because it is 
impossible to know the mind of the citizen, the state, with all its jurispathic power, has to 
decipher intent from his speech.  
 Why does the jurispathic principle continue to make a home in liberal citizenship? In her 
study of Cold War rhetoric and the Korean War non-repatriates, Jenell Johnson reminds us that 
amidst authoritarian treatments of ideological and racial difference during the first half of the 
20th century, a liberal theory of persuasion existed that was as important for holding the practice 
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of Cold War securitization together as more coercive measures.83 She argues that the ideology of 
American exceptionalism fueling illiberal Cold War tactics relied on a liberal citizen-subject who 
chose American values of capitalist freedom over totalitarianism because this choice was the 
ideological foundation for the Cold War mythos. In much the same way, the uptick in 
denationalizations before and during the Cold War relied on the assumption of the citizen’s 
willed decision to be a loyal member of the body politic. However, as Johnson maintains, choice 
is an ambiguous and anxiety-provoking measure of loyalty. The inability to define visible 
markers of choice in a way that still upheld state interests drove a decades-long battle between 
Congress, civil liberties advocates, and the Courts. As will be demonstrated by the Hamdi 
decision, substituting intent with assent became a way to rhetorically manage the opaqueness of 
the citizenry and the inability to truly judge wolf from man.  
 
Demanding the Citizen’s Speech in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
 The public and legal deliberations concerning Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), opened a series 
of unanswered questions regarding the chiasmic relationship between citizen and country figured 
in Afroyim. While the plurality opinion authored by O’Connor focuses on presidential power, 
holding that “war is not a blank check” for the executive branch, the oral arguments revolve 
around the citizen’s right to habeas corpus and they demonstrate the legibility of Hamdi against 
not only the sovereign citizen but also against the citizen who’s speech matters and can be 
interpreted by the state. For instance, after being interrupted by Justices Scalia and Kennedy with 
a barrage of questions regarding the difference between citizen and non-citizen combatant during 
wartime, Hamdi’s lawyer Frank Dunham, Jr. interrupts Kennedy’s question, exclaiming “The 
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difference is that Mr. Hamdi is a citizen. He is not entitled to belligerent immunity. He is subject 
to prosecution under our laws.”84 After Scalia and O’Connor present Dunham with a series of 
hypothetical treatments of citizen combatants during war time, Kennedy claims, “But you 
wouldn’t accept that would you Mr. Dunham?” To which he exclaims. “Well I wouldn’t accept it 
without Mr. Hamdi [interruption by Kennedy]—having the opportunity to be heard.”85   
 As the hearing gets more heated—punctuated by sounds of exasperated sighs, shuffled 
notes, and increased interruptions—Dunham answers O’Connor’s question about the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) by referencing all of the pending citizen 
enemy combatant cases in order to highlight the potential for any citizen—regardless of 
jurisdiction—to be detained incommunicado.86 He claims that if the AUMF  
 is interpreted to mean that [the president] can impose indefinite executive detention on 
 anybody that he thinks is necessary in order to fulfill that command, we could have 
 people locked up all over the country tomorrow without any due process, without any 
 opportunity to be heard, because we know that this war that we’re talking about here is 
 going on worldwide and it’s going within our own borders.87  
In a recording of the oral arguments, Dunham emphasizes “to be heard,” raising his voice and 
pausing before finishing his statement.  
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 After a question about how he knows the intent of Congress, Dunham adds, “Congress 
didn’t intend to…authorize widespread detentions of people with no opportunity to be heard, 
indefinite, solitary confinement for as long as they might live.” Dunham reiterates the 
importance of the citizen’s speech in his closing statements, where he exclaims:  
 And why do we have the great writ? We have the great writ because we didn’t trust the 
 executive branch when we founded this Government. That’s why the Government is  
 saying trust us is no excuse for taking away and driving a truck through the right of 
 habeas corpus…I would urge the Court not to go down that road. I would urge the Court 
 to find that citizens can only be detained by law. And here there is no law. If there is any 
 law at all, it is the executive’s own secret definition of whatever enemy combatant is. 
 And don’t fool yourselves into thinking that that means somebody coming off a 
 battlefield because they’ve used it in Chicago, they’ve used it in New York and they’ve 
 used it in Indiana.88 
Referencing Justice Marshall’s famous claim that habeas corpus is the “great writ” that compels 
the government to recognize the legal status of an imprisoned person in Ex Parte Watkins (1830), 
Dunham emphasizes the fundamental right to be heard and be seen by the government.89 
Importantly, Dunham was not the only person to emphasize the importance of habeas corpus to 
the entire order of citizenship. During Oscar Clement’s presentation, Justice Souter interrupts to 
make a statement about the antiquity of the writ of habeas corpus and the Magna Carta 
guaranteeing the right to be heard in front of a neutral decision maker. When asking about 
whether the Mobbs Declaration was hearsay, Justice Ginsburg also interrupts Clement’s 
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response, claiming, “The person who is locked up, doesn’t he have a right to bring some tribunal 
himself his own words, rather than have a government agent say what was told to him that 
somebody else said.”90 All of these statements allude to the citizen’s sovereignty, its right to not 
be detained or removed without first being recognized as a speaking being under the law.  
 Ostensibly, Hamdi was granted the opportunity to be heard. First in petitioning for 
habeas corpus in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2003) and then again when the plurality decision Hamdi v 
Rumsfeld (2004) held that citizen enemy combatants must receive hearings. Yet, from the 
beginning, Hamdi’s speech was directed through channels predetermined by the US government. 
First, he could only speak through his father, who petitioned on his behalf as next of friend. 
Then, his speech was filtered through Dunham, who was denied access to his client and then 
censored. During oral arguments Dunham even indicated that he cannot even represent Hamdi’s 
speech: “Well, I’ve only recently been allowed to talk to my client, Your Honor, and everything 
he has told me they tell me is classified, so I’m not allowed to convey it to the Court this 
morning…”91 Finally, O’Connor’s plurality decision held that enemy combatants who are 
citizens must be granted a forum for contesting their status.92 In announcing her decision to the 
press, she reiterated that even when classified as enemy combatants, citizens must be given the 
opportunity to receive “notice of the factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to 
rebut the government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision maker.” Hamdi must be given 
the opportunity to “[tell] his side of the story.” However, despite O’Connor’s lofty rhetoric, 
Hamdi was never given the opportunity to break out of the sanctioned channels of 
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communicating consent. After months of negotiation with Saudi Arabia, Hamdi was released 
from detention upon renouncing his US citizenship and agreeing to never step foot on US soil 
again—the soil upon which he was born. Upon being granted the chance to express his will as a 
citizen, Hamdi paradoxically outlaws himself in order to attain freedom. Necessarily mediated by 
the official channels of communication—the lawyer, the signature, the oath of renunciation—
Hamdi’s speech only matters to the US government whence it fulfils the mission of expunging 
him from citizenship.  
 Can the sovereign citizen speak their will? And, if she does, how will state actors 
interpret her speech? As Robert Cover has claimed, the legal meanings of speech acts always 
occur in the shadow of violence and coercion. He argues that  
 By exercising its superior brute force…the agency of state law shuts down the creative 
 hermeneutic principle that is spread throughout our communities. The question, then, is 
 the extent to which coercion is necessary to the maintenance of minimum conditions of 
 legal meaning in autonomous interpretive communities.93 
As demonstrated throughout this project, the coercion necessary to secure acceptable 
interpretations of citizenship law (doxa), to keep citizenship from being figured paradoxically, 
has been a part of making citizenship law from the very beginning. State actors have 
continuously sought interpretative protocols for guaranteeing the appearance of the homo sacer 
within a citizenship law defined by jurisdiction instead of identity. Thus, the subjection of speech 
to conditions of judgement that secure an outside to citizenship status only continues an ongoing 
pattern.  
 
                                                 




Citizenship and the Aspiration to Sovereignty  
The legal person is the same, but the psychological person has become another—Richard von 
Krafft-Ebing, 1886.94 
 
“Consider how terrible it is to come to know the undetectable difference between what it is to be 




 These two epigraphs represent a struggle over recognition permeating citizenship law 
after the Warren Court. As demonstrated throughout, the elaboration of the “second sense” of 
jurisdiction and the location of authority to recognize citizens in lex regulated the inclusivity of 
birthright citizenship by sustaining the jurispathic principle of law. As mentioned above, the 
jurispathic principle describes the judge’s interpretative authority, mediated by jurisdiction and 
sanctioned by the state’s monopoly on violence.96 The jurispathic principle allows state actors to 
continuously figure outlawed birthright citizens. Such a figuration solicits public investment in 
an impersonal and consensual birthright citizenship by maintaining a gap between political and 
territorial jurisdiction, thus, allowing for the racialized exclusion of native-born people. 
However, the Warren Court’s chiasmic figuration of the citizen-state relationship dissolves the 
jurispathic tendency by locating the authority to recognize citizenship in the citizen-subject itself. 
In doing so, the Court inverted the relationship between citizen-state-and-judgement upheld in 
Elk, the final draft of the ICA, and expatriation policies in the first half of the 20th century. 
Nevertheless, as illustrated by Vance and then by Hamdi, once the citizen becomes “subject of” 
political decision, the inevitable imperative to interpret and recognize that decision places the 
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citizen back in the location of being “subject to” political decision. Per Moten, this 
“undetectable” difference has always been there for the noncitizen, the nonsubject, and the 
“unsovereign.”97 That is, the difference between subject of and subject to has always been 
undetectable for subjects such as Perez, Terrazas, and Hamdi. In this way, even after the Warren 
Court, citizenship cannot seem to rid itself of its attachment to a more medieval kind of 
sovereign power that locates the source of judgement and authority solely in the state. 
 The state retains its jurispathic authority because liberal governance relies on mediation 
to render the citizenry legible. For this reason, the census, identification documents, and other 
forms of legal administration that document and, most of all, visualize the citizenry play such a 
prominent role in liberalism.98 Similar to territorial jurisdiction’s allowance of an impersonal 
spatial mode of governance, legal technologies of identification make the citizen’s will legible to 
state actors. Scholars such as James Scott have demonstrated how these visualizing tactics are 
not neutral. They both obscure and mold the will of the citizenry, mediating the conditions for 
democracy.99 For example, Terrazas’ will to expatriate was mediated by a preexisting Mexican 
oath of naturalization that was largely outside of his control. Per administrative protocol, 
Hamdi’s speech was channeled through his father (i.e., his ‘next friend’), then through his 
lawyer, then through an oath of renunciation, all of which exerted influence on both the message 
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and its interpretation.100 Both Hamdi and Terrazas demonstrate that by making the citizen’s will 
legible, the state essentially makes the citizen’s will.  
  However, while Scott illuminates the incommensurability between liberalism’s quest to 
interpret the citizen’s will and the citizen’s actual will, Hamdi and the expatriation cases also 
demonstrate that liberalism’s imperative to render the two commensurate is an ongoing struggle. 
As late 19th century psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing acknowledges in the epigraph, 
squaring the legal subject with the psychological subject has proven to be difficult for state 
actors. For this reason, Patchen Markell argues that the politics of legal recognition always 
inevitably involves misrecognition because of the temporality of mediation and interpretation.101 
Similar to the state’s trouble with deciding whether a citizen’s commission of un-American acts 
demonstrated a past or present lack of attachment to the Constitution, recognition links a 
subject’s past and present to her future, in turn fixing a “horizon of temporality.”102  
 Not only has the opaqueness of the citizen’s psyche been problematized throughout 
modern liberalism, but the racialized subject’s psyche has proven to be doubly opaque and 
troublesome for liberalism’s visualizing technologies. As mentioned in chapter four, insanity, 
psychic impenetrability, and mental unsoundness have been closely tied to racialization 
throughout modern history.103 Thus, in addition to the indecipherability of the citizen’s will in 
general, racialization functions as another layer of mediation, troubling the state’s quest to render 
the citizen transparent. Drawing on Danielle Allen, Fred Moten illustrates this struggle over race, 
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speech, and recognition by juxtaposing the public speech that animates life in common in 
liberalism to dark speech. While dark speech deals in “rumor, gossip, a kind of unauthored and 
unauthorized speech whose origins cannot be traced,” liberal citizenship relies on “speech whose 
origins are visible, in the light of day, emerging from a place in the sun in which the rights and 
obligations of publicness, and the power to be seen can be assumed.”104 On one hand, liberal 
citizenship relies on speech that is not only legible but is also transparent and readily-understood. 
On the other hand, Moten argues that dark speech, which he associates with blackness, 
unsovereignty, and with the jurisgenerative principle, threatens the transparency of public 
speech, or its ability to be mediated and consumed by state institutions. Importantly, the fluid 
boundary between the two functions as a “realm in which the ones who are not one enact a 
necessary failure of coalescence, composure, completeness—the personal and the political body 
falls apart, or more precisely, is always already fallen.”105  Dark speech constantly threatens the 
public speech upon which liberal institutions rely: “this constant drama of broken words…is like 
a regenerative grammar of muted, mutant, worldless jurisdiction.”106 In the face of dark speech, 
the jurispathic principle exerts its interpretive authority, recognizing, clarifying, and imposing 
legal meaning. Nevertheless, dark speech is a constant nagging force, interrupting and displacing 
liberalism’s public speech. Thus, even if Hamdi demonstrates that the end result might be the 
same: the state exerts its authority to judge and determine the conditions in which the citizen 
supposedly consents; the struggle over that authority persists because the administration of 
                                                 








liberal citizenship relies on being able to interpret what it cannot actually see much less manage: 
the (alien) citizen’s will.  
 The fluid boundary between the jurisgenerative and jurispathic principles, documented by 
Moten and demonstrated by the history of expatriation law, capture a larger problem with 
sovereignty and recognition in liberal public culture. Put another way, as Hegel and countless 
other philosophers have argued, human sociality is characterized by ongoing struggles over 
recognition. Lacan elucidates this relation by centering the role of speech; “to speak…is first of 
all to speak to others,” which necessarily puts the subject in relation to others and to the world.107 
While the articulation of citizenship to state automatically positions the citizen’s speech in 
relation to a body of sovereign power. As evidenced by the ongoing struggle over jurisdiction 
characterizing the history of citizenship, both bodies are positioned in relation to the Other. 
Following Lundberg, the speech relationship—the address to a specific other, ourselves as other, 
and the Other—precludes the kind of mutual reciprocal relationship idealized in liberalism. This 
is because, following Heidegger, we are “thrown into language” and for this reason “speech 
overflows with possibilities for meaning because of the beyond from which it flows.”108 Moten 
would add that dark speech throws another wedge in this equation.  
 Thus, as evidenced by the state’s struggle to interpret, to command, and to make its 
decision legible, state speech is also constituted in relation to the Other and to the (alien) citizen. 
The state also struggles to maintain its position as the source of judgement against the “soil,” the 
“blood,” and the post-Warren Court citizen’s “will” that threatens to take its place. This is why 
Markell claims that our political world involves an ongoing aspiration to sovereignty, which 
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refers to the corporate (including state) and individual pursuit of power to deterritorialize and 
reterritorialize the symbolic order of things. While, in modern liberal democracy, the state, “a 
phantom limb of the ‘king’s head,’” is the locus of the aspiration to sovereignty that 
characterizes modern politics.109 The rhetorical forms animating liberalism dislocate this 
authority. Per Markell, “while states may be disproportionately powerful actors in many respects, 
they can no more achieve the sovereignty they seek, and that others seek through them, than can 
individuals. (This impossibility is already manifest in the fact that states depend upon their 
subjects, as well as other states, to recognize their sovereignty—a dependence that ironically 
undercuts the very condition of independence it is supposed to sustain.”110 The public and legal 
struggles over writing and interpreting Hamdi’s consent—subjecting Hamdi to US sovereign 
authority while at the same time writing him as a subject of sovereign authority—demonstrate 
that all sides are bound up in the aspiration to sovereignty characterizing citizenship law.  
 As evidenced by state actors’ struggle to interpret the will of the citizen, the aspiration to 
sovereignty is an unfinished problem that must be negotiated rhetorically in law and politics. In 
this way, because citizenship within liberalism necessitates the labor of recognition on all sides, 
citizenship is intertwined with an ongoing rhetorical struggle characterized by our relationship to 
one another, to power, and to the Other. This negotiation renders citizenship immensely unstable. 
That is, even as citizenship can be used as the basis for rights and, in the case of Yaser Hamdi, 
habeas corpus, it is ultimately a site of struggle over the remnants of the king’s head dispersed 
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EPILOGUE: WE HAVE NEVER BEEN LIBERAL 
 
 Modern politics is always biopolitics not simply because the wealth of nations—the 
 commonwealth—is now seen to reside in the well-being of the population but rather 
 because the procedures of Setzen and Ensetzen, of positing and deposing, that formerly 
 focused on the figure of the sovereign now transpire within the life of every citizen. In a 
 word, the privilege and horror, the sublimity and abjection, of the flesh now belong to 
 some sense to the fate of every member of the polity.1   
 
 Sitting in my first graduate class and looking at a chart of “paradigms of thought” 
delineating “premodern,” “modern,” and “postmodern,” I remarked, “why do I feel like my 
world is still very premodern?” Growing up in both Botanica-centric South Florida and the 
Baptist Church lined streets of North Carolina, my world did not lack master narratives or magic. 
As a child my mom reminded me to cover my feet at night to keep witches from eating my toes 
and my neighbors swept in front of doorways to keep brujos out. As a young adult my 
housemates limpiaron la casa with sage and fire to purge the demons causing night terrors. 
Explaining this to the professor, who I should clarify is a card-carrying member of the alternative 
modernities cohort and by no means suggested that we exist in some sort of homogenous 
time/space where we are all “modern,” she remarked that this is precisely the condition of 
postmodernity—fragmentation, polysemy, etc. However, this answer never satisfied me. Doesn’t 
the premodern do something to our supposed postmodernity? Isn’t all the paradox kind of 
disruptive? Not just in the way that McDonalds generates endless hybridities. But, is there not a 
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deep affective orientation towards the comfort of premodern certainty and most of all premodern 
power—the kind of power that Foucault told us was left in the past? In the era of Congressional 
opposition to Obama and then Trump, how many liberals have longed for a benevolent dictator? 
In other words, doesn’t modernity’s preference for metaphor and postmodernity’s cruel irony 
generate a longing for Vico’s giants and Schmitt’s nomos?  
 This study started from these questions as they play out in the political and legal registers 
of citizenship. Though I have by no means answered them fully, I have tried to show how the 
citizen—the emblem of modern liberalism—tracks between these oppositional temporalities as a 
form of paradox, or as a constant site of struggle over jurisdiction and judgement. Moreover, the 
movement between temporalities is driven by racialization as well as by an ongoing 
decolonization. In this way, alien citizenship is a reaction to the perpetual and disruptive 
presence of dark speech, the jurisgenerative practice that haunts citizenship law’s jurispathic 
tendencies. Thus, analyzing citizenship from the perspective of the social (after)lives of 
citizenship law has demonstrated that jurisdiction’s two senses—as political and territorial—are 
sites for rhetorically managing the anxieties of impersonal consensualism in a liberal public 
culture. Specifically, the ability for the (after)lives of jurisdiction to “realize” impersonal 
consensualism, or to move towards figuring the anarchic, the regicidal, and the tragic have made 
it the site of racial anxiety and intense judicial scrutiny. As evidenced by the continuous attempt 
to locate the homo sacer within birthright citizenship law after the 14th amendment, jurisdiction 
unsettles liberal public culture precisely because it formally articulates its core ideological tenets 
of impersonal consent.  
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  The recalcitrance of jurisdiction resembles the recalcitrance of nature in modernity 
described by Bruno Latour in We Have Never Been Modern.2 Contesting the scholarly tendency 
to either blame or praise modernity, Latour takes aim at the “modern constitution” characterized 
in the works of Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle. He demonstrates that representations of 
modernity always involve translation—the creation of mixtures between hybrids of nature and 
culture—and purification—the creation of entirely distinct ontological hybrids between human 
beings and nonhumans. While the modern constitution suggests that nature can be known and 
controlled and that humans freely determine their social and political fate, our everyday practices 
and experiences of the world contradict the promises of the constitution. This incongruency 
occasions the proliferation of hybrids that must be ideologically purified. Like modernity, 
liberalism is another representational schema that orders our writing of the social world, acting 
as a sponge for a myriad of political sentiments, beliefs, and institutional protocols. Relatedly, 
liberalism only coheres in its purification of medieval forms of governance and self-making, 
such as sovereignty and coercion. However, what is cast out of the liberal frame—a political 
scene characterized by ascription, perpetual subjection, and undivided sovereignty—always lurks 
as ‘translated’ entities.  
 The task of this project has been to locate these translated entities and then to analyze 
their rhetorical labor. In doing so, I contend that liberalism, like modernity, has never happened. 
Importantly, I am not referring to the debate between historians of ideas on whether liberalism is 
or is not the intellectual foundation of the United States. As maintained throughout, liberalism is 
more of a fantasy formation, or an aspirational horizon, and less a set of always-already existing 
phenomena. In fact, liberalism’s inability to be precisely located in any one law, policy, 
                                                 




institution, or public discourse is why it is such a potent political fantasy. As Elizabeth Povinelli 
has stated in her work on liberal modernity, “we can never agree on the referent of liberalism.”3 
For one, liberalism is not a singular “thing.”4 Liberalism is “located nowhere but in its continual 
citation as the motivating logic and aspiration of dispersed and competing social and cultural 
experiments,” such as citizenship.5 Michael Kaplan similarly urges scholars to view liberalism as 
an imaginary, or as a rhetorical amalgam of images, texts, feelings, and beliefs that structure how 
we interpret and bring about the political.6  In this way, what Hector Amaya describes as the 
ideological tenets of liberalism—“the citizen is the political agent, the social actor, the grantor of 
legitimacy to the nation through the social contract, the sovereign, and the benefactor of 
distributive justice”—have not always manifested in the everyday lived reality of citizenship. 7 
Nevertheless, these ideological tenets are core features of liberalism’s legal rhetoric. Following 
Latour, liberalism as fantasy hangs together in the gap between the everyday experience of 
politics as subjection and the writing of oneself as a subject of politics. As this project has 
shown, the rhetorical labor of translating and purifying the multiple temporalities of citizenship 
takes place in that gap where the fantasy of liberalism is brought to crisis. As such, Louis Hartz’ 
much-contested thesis that the United States is thoroughly Lockean and essentially liberal is not 
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necessarily wrong.8 This is because Hartz, similar to Povinelli and Kaplan, views liberalism as a 
“storybook truth,” a “frame of mind,” and primarily as a “myth” that has had immense influence 
on how the United States organizes its political society.9  
 Importantly, liberal citizenship has never happened precisely because its rhetorical forms 
have been realized, taking the social (after)lives of “subject to jurisdiction” towards paradox. For 
example, Dandy’s Band’s use of jurisdictional citizenship to avoid removal demonstrated that 
the topos of jurisdiction was a double-edge sword for jurists and politicians concerned with 
maintaining a firm distinction between citizen and Indian. Because Dandy and other outsiders 
inhabit and cross into territories that end up being incorporated under US jurisdiction, they can 
turn citizenship via jurisdiction towards interpretations that legitimize their belonging to the soil. 
Moreover, the aftermath of the Elk and Wong decisions both demonstrated that jurisdiction as 
nomos and jurisdiction as lex could be utilized against the dominant imagination of birthright 
citizenship. As SAI and the expatriation cases demonstrate, jurisdiction as nomos can permit the 
alien citizen to figure their inherent belonging to the nation. Moreover, as the Haudenosaunee’s 
anti-citizenship activism demonstrated, the “other” can also take the exclusions written into 
jurisdiction as indicative of its own sovereignty, utilizing the legal rhetoric of exclusion to 
construct itself as outside the jurisdiction of so-called civilization. Last, the expatriation cases 
elucidated that the coercion necessary to secure acceptable interpretations of citizenship 
remained in citizenship law even after the Warren Court figured the sovereign citizen. However, 
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liberalism’s formal commitments to consent put citizenship in an unresolved struggle over the 
aspiration to sovereignty. The paradox continues.  
 The ensuing anxiety has provided the cultural logic for the most illiberal forms of 
violence in the 19th and 20th centuries. Hence, liberal citizenship has been translated into liberal 
public culture as dependent on state recognition (Elk v. Wilkins), as dependent on one’s relation 
to the soil (US v. Wong Kim Ark), as dependent on competence (Dawes Act), as a tool of 
colonization (Indian Citizenship Act), as contingent on one’s feelings and political attachments, 
and as dependent on the citizen’s speech. All these iterations of citizenship emerged from 
struggles over the capacity to figure the relationship of judgement in a citizenship law defined by 
jurisdiction. In this way, it is not just that liberalism has never happened; its formal attributes 
(i.e., consent, universalism, impersonalism) are always at the brink of being taken to task by 
jurisgenerative, or paradoxical, readings of legal rhetoric.  
 The goal of this project, however, is not to actually make liberalism happen. Instead, the 
goal is to inhabit the fantasies upholding liberalism differently. Following Antonio Viego and 
Yannis Stavrakakis’ advocacy of a psychoanalytic ethics that aims to traverse the fantasy, 
inhabiting liberal fantasy differently entails understanding and exposing the cost of enjoyment. 
For example, Stavrakakis argues that understanding the tendency to dismiss democratic politics 
by appealing to totalitarianism or to particularism, involves traversing the fantasy of utopian 
unity by encircling the real—the lack that makes utopian politics impossible. Through 
sublimating and identifying with the symptom, Stavrakakis argues for a political semantics that 
would institutionalize the lack or inconsistency of the Other that fantasy occludes.10 By 
sublimation, Stavrakakis does not advocate for substituting one fantasy of liberalism with 
                                                 




another (i.e., consent for non-consent or identity for impersonality), but accepting and identifying 
with the impossibility of its representation.11 In a similar vein, Viego argues that ethnic studies 
should expose the traumatic loss caused by the effects of the signifier on the racialized human. In 
the vein of representation, following Hortense Spillers, Viego argues for caring for the ethno-
racialized subject by taking on the role of the hysteric and ruining the ethno-racialized self, the 
ego.12 Both Stavrakakis and Viego advocate for a rhetorical scholarship that does not try to 
remedy the paradoxes of political and legal tragedies. Instead, they aim to identify and ruminate 
on the cost of enjoying our objects of desire.  
 Thus, following Stavrakakis and Viego, the aim of this project has not been to locate a 
pure citizenship or a pure liberalism, scrubbed clean from ascriptivism and coercion. The fact 
that citizenship law, like modernity, is both immensely rhetorical and recalcitrant, prevents such 
purification. What rhetoric can offer, however, is an alternate grammar of citizenship law and an 
alternate mode of reading its social (after)lives. In what follows, I conclude by sketching what 
this could look like.  
 First, the case studies here demonstrate that the enjoyment of never having been liberal—
of continuously imposing the will of the state in order to figure alien citizenship—undergirds the 
history of citizenship in the United States. That is, contrary to claims that (neo)liberalism 
depoliticizes citizenship and renders it exclusionary, I argue that liberalism’s formal 
commitments—impersonality and consent—provoke anxiety when encircled by the subjects that 
have been figured as unsovereign or as outside of liberal public culture. Put another way, 
liberalism has not so much been what makes citizenship exclusionary and violent. Instead liberal 
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rhetoric threatens the sovereign authority to exclude in the first place. In this way, liberal rhetoric 
might provide the means of sublimating and identifying with the symptoms plaguing birthright 
citizenship.  
 Though not engaged in psychoanalytic ethics, Ayelet Shachar has argued for a similar 
reassessment of liberal rhetoric’s potential to liberate birthright citizenship from its exclusionary 
and racializing tendencies. In The Birthright Lottery she outlines a theory of jus nexi citizenship, 
or rooted citizenship, holding that people become citizens through their enjoyment of place.13 
Sounding eerily similar to John Locke’s theory of tacit consent, jus nexi locates political 
commitment in settlement and use of resources within a jurisdiction. Put another way, jus nexi is 
a literalization of liberal citizenship defined by jurisdiction. In a similar vein, Identify Native 
2020 utilizes the flipping of lex and recognition found in indigenous anti-citizenship rhetoric in 
arguing that undocumented migrants of indigenous descent cannot be deported because they are 
not subject to US jurisdiction.14 Instead, the campaign argues that undocumented indigenous 
peoples partake in the kind of inherent sovereignty articulated by both Deskaheh and SAI. Both 
representations of jurisdiction sound incongruous only because liberal rhetoric enjoys never 
being liberal. Like Dandy’s Band, however, Identity Native 2020 and jus nexi mobilize post-14th 
amendment rhetorical forms to go beyond liberalism as we know it.  
 Last, seeing liberal citizenship as a struggling horizon instead of an already-existing 
phenomenon reframes how sovereignty relates to rhetoric. As illustrated throughout, the struggle 
to define citizenship via jurisdiction stems from liberalism’s displacement of sovereign power 
away from the ‘king’ and onto both the people and the law. Like modernity’s displacement of 
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nature, the remnants of the king’s hold on sovereign power have not just disappeared, however. 
Instead, they surface as translated entities, such as “blood,” “soil,” and “will,” that subjects can 
latch on to in figuring the source of the sovereign authority to recognize citizenship. However, as 
the case studies demonstrate, fixing the source of sovereignty to “blood,” “soil,” or “will” is like 
fixing a mandala in sand only to destroy it again. For instance, the splitting of the trope of the 
king’s head to blood, soil, and will allowed the US government to articulate a ‘second sense’ of 
jurisdiction for the purposes of racializing a citizenship law that worked against racialization. 
Nevertheless, this ‘second-sense’ of jurisdiction provided the rhetorical groundwork for the 
Geneva Campaign’s refusal of settler state sovereignty. The rearticulation of political jurisdiction 
as indigenous sovereignty was then extinguished by the ICA. In these discourses, sovereignty 
appears as both object of desire and animating force. It is both the “will” articulated by the state 
that figures certain people as noncitizens and it is the caravan crossing into US jurisdiction. It is 
fleeting nonetheless.   
 Specifically, the imbrication of sovereignty with rhetoric through the topos of jurisdiction 
calls for theorizing sovereignty not as a property, or even as an act. Instead, because sovereignty 
is troped—by the struggle between “blood,” “soil,” and “will,”—it is nothing. In other words, 
sovereignty marks the possibility of self-mastery that can be experienced; “but is simultaneously 
unknowable and ‘inscrutable’…the phantom pain of the decapitated subject.”15 The nothingness 
of sovereignty, however, is what gives life to the social (after)lives that constantly destabilize the 
capacity to name the alien citizen. Put another way, sovereignty-as-nothing constantly ‘unworks’ 
individual, state, and international conceptions of sovereignty. Instead of a measure of political 
power, sovereignty-as-nothing is a kind of unruly multitude, or an unbearable excess that 
                                                 




threatens the integrity and the “organicity” of the body politic’s composition.16 This remainder, 
or “flesh,” is what keeps liberalism from ‘happening.’ The constant attention paid to scrutinizing 
“subject to jurisdiction” aims to tie down its referents to sustain a gap between territorial and 
political jurisdiction that privileges the state’s judgement. However, this remainder is also what 
has taken liberal citizenship beyond itself into law ex nihilio. What future possibilities remain in 
an impossible liberalism?  
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